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Summary
Use of video surveillance has significantly increased in the last few decades.
Modern video surveillance systems are equipped with techniques that automat-
ically extract information about the objects and events from the video streams
and allow traversal of data in an effective and efficient manner. Pervasive usage
of such systems gives substantial powers to those monitoring the videos and
poses a threat to the privacy of anyone observed by the system. Aside from pro-
tecting privacy from the outside attackers, it is equally important to protect the
privacy of individuals from the inside personnel involved in monitoring surveil-
lance data to minimize the chances of misuse of the system, e.g. voyeurism.
In this context, several techniques to protect the privacy of individuals, called
privacy enhancing techniques (PET) have therefore been proposed in the liter-
ature which detect and mask the privacy sensitive regions, e.g. faces, from the
videos. However, very few research efforts have focused on addressing the secu-
rity aspects of video surveillance data and on authorizing access to this data.
Interestingly, while PETs help protect the privacy of individuals, they may also
hinder the usefulness of video surveillance systems resulting in compromising
the very purpose of such systems, i.e. public safety. Thus the challenge is to
provide sufficient need-specific data to those monitoring the surveillance systems
yet preserving the privacy of people as much as possible. This can be achieved
through a dynamic access control mechanism that may provide proportionate
access to data while allowing reversing the PETs whenever required. In this
context, a summary of thesis contributions is given below.
In this thesis, we present an abstract model of video surveillance systems that
helps identify the major security and privacy requirements in a video surveillance
system. We study existing solutions against these requirements and point out
practical challenges in ensuring the security of video surveillance data in all
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stages (in transit and at storage). Our study shows a gap, between the security
requirements that we identified and the proposed security solutions, where future
research efforts may focus in this domain. From the challenges that we outline
regarding security in video surveillance, we focus on development of a dynamic
access control mechanism.
We develop a general-purpose access control model that is suitable for video
surveillance systems as well as other domains sharing similar requirements. As
the currently dominant access control models – the role-based access control
(RBAC) and the attribute-based access control (ABAC) – suffer from limita-
tions while offering features complementary to each other, their integration has
become an important area of research. Our access control model combines the
two models in a novel way in order to unify their benefits while avoiding their
limitations. Our approach provides a mechanism that not only takes informa-
tion about the current circumstances into account during access control decision
making, but is also suitable for applications where access to resources is con-
trolled by exploiting the contents of resources in the access control policy. We
evaluate our model against RBAC and ABAC and demonstrate that our model
brings together the benefits offered by RBAC and ABAC while addressing the
role- and permission-explosion issues faced in RBAC.
Based on our access control model, we then present an access control mecha-
nism for video surveillance systems. Contrary to the existing approaches, the
proposed access control mechanism is role-oriented and retains advantages asso-
ciated with role-based access control, yet it allows specification of policies using
the metadata associated with the objects as well as the attributes of users and
environment. In addition to role hierarchies, the content-based permissions in
our model allow derivation of several permissions from the explicitly stated ones
due to the hierarchical relations between the attributes of different entities. We
implement a prototype of the proposed mechanism and demonstrate that the
access control policies using our approach may be specified via eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML).
Resumé
Anvendelse af videoovervågning er steget betydeligt i de seneste årtier. Moderne
videoovervågningssystemer er udstyret med teknikker, der automatisk udtrække
oplysninger om objekter og hændelser fra video strømme og tillade gennemgang
af data på en effektiv måde. Allestedsnærværende brug af sådanne systemer gi-
ver omfattende beføjelser til dem der overvåge videoerne og det udgør en trussel
mod privatlivets fred for enhver der observeres af systemet. Bortset fra at be-
skytte personfølsomme oplysninger imod udefrakommende angribere, er det lige
så vigtigt at beskytte personfølsomme oplysninger fra det indvendige personale,
der deltager i overvågningen af video data for at minimere risikoen for misbrug
af systemet, f.eks voyeurisme. I denne sammenhæng er flere teknikker til be-
skyttelse af personfølsomme oplysninger, kaldet privacy enhancing techniques
(PET), derfor blevet foreslået i litteraturen. Disse teknikker registrerer og ma-
skere personfølsomme oplysninger i video strømme, f.eks ansigter. Imidlertid har
meget få forskningsindsatser fokuseret på at løse de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter
af data videoovervågning og om at give adgang til disse data. Imens PETer hjæl-
per med at beskytte personfølsomme oplysninger, kan de også hindre nytten af
videoovervågningssystemer, dette resulterer i kompromittering af formålet med
sådanne systemer, dvs. den offentlige sikkerhed. Således er udfordringen at give
tilstrækkelig behov-specifikke data til dem der overvåger disse systemer, mens
de personfølsomme oplysninger beskyttes så meget som muligt. Dette kan opnås
gennem en dynamisk adgangskontrol, der kan give et forholdsmæssig adgang til
data, samtidig med at vende effekten af PETer når det er påkrævet. Nedenfor
gives et sammendrag af afhandlingens bidrag.
I denne afhandling præsenterer vi en abstrakt model af videoovervågningssyste-
mer, der hjælper med at identificere de væsentligste sikkerheds krav og privacy
krav i et videoovervågningssystem. Vi studerer eksisterende løsninger mod disse
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krav og påpege praktiske udfordringer i at garantere sikkerheden for video over-
vågningsdata i alle faser (i transit og ved opbevaring). Vores studie viser en kløft,
mellem de sikkerheds krav som vi identificerede og de foreslåede sikkerhedsløs-
ninger, hvor fremtidige forskningsindsatser kan fokusere på dette område. Fra
de udfordringer, som vi har fremført med hensyn til sikkerheden i videoovervåg-
ning, fokuserer vi på udvikling af en dynamisk adgangskontrolmekanisme.
Vi udvikler en generel adgangskontrol model, der er egnet til videoovervågnings-
systemer samt andre domæner, med lignende krav. Da de aktuelt dominerende
adgangskontrol modeller – role-based access control (RBAC) og attribute-based
access control (ABAC) - lider af begrænsninger mens de tilbyder funktioner der
supplerer hinanden, er deres integration blevet et vigtigt forskningsområde. Vo-
res adgangskontrol model kombinerer de to modeller i en ny måde for at forene
deres fordele og samtidig undgå deres begrænsninger. Vores tilgang indeholder
en mekanisme, der ikke kun tager oplysninger om de nuværende omstændigheder
i betragtning under adgangskontrol beslutningstagningen, men er også velegnet
til applikationer, hvor adgang til ressourcer styres ved at udnytte indholdet af
ressourcerne i adgangskontrol politiken. Vi evaluerer vores model mod RBAC og
ABAC og vise, at vores model samler fordelene ved RBAC og ABAC samtidig
med at de adressere role- og permission-explosion udfordringerne i RBAC.
Baseret på vores adgangskontrol model, præsentere vi en adgangskontrol meka-
nisme for videoovervågningssystemer. I modsætning til de eksisterende tilgange,
er den foreslåede adgangskontrol mekanisme role-oriented og bevarer fordele for-
bundet med role-based access control, men det giver mulighed for specifikation af
politikker ved hjælp af metadata i forbindelse med de ressourcer samt attribut-
terne for brugere og miljø. Udover role hierarkier, tillader de indholdsbaserede
permissions i vores model afledning af flere permissions fra de udtrykkeligt be-
tegnede, på grund af de hierarkiske relationer mellem attributterne for forskellige
enheder. Vi implementerer en prototype af den foreslåede mekanisme og vise,
at de adgangskontrolpolitikker ved hjælp af vores tilgang kan specificeres via
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML).
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Chapter 1
Introduction and
Motivation
The work presented in this thesis is part of a large project, Managed Video as
a Service (MVaaS), that involves four PhD students working on following four
aspects of video surveillance systems: data extraction, data indexing, architec-
ture, and security. The work has been carried out in close collaboration with
Milestone Systems, Denmark which is one of the leading IP-based video surveil-
lance solution providers. The goal of the MVaaS project is to support the vision
of Milestone Systems with respect to future video surveillance systems, where
users will require ubiquitous access to live and stored video data. In this thesis,
we focus in particular on the security and privacy challenges arising from this
vision.
1.1 Video Surveillance
The use of video surveillance has increased manifold in the last two decades, par-
ticularly in the developed countries [46]. Continuous security threats to public
safety and an increased sense of insecurity caused by incidents of terrorism, such
as the 9/11 attacks, the London and Madrid bombings and the recent incidents
in France and elsewhere, demand to build infrastructure to protect against harm
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to people and property. The rapidly decreasing costs of hardware including cam-
eras, storage and communication infrastructure are also playing an important
role in the ubiquitous spread of video surveillance systems [130]. As the cost of
hardware and communication infrastructure has come down while the cost of
security personnel’s training, management and salaries has generally increased,
considerable savings can be achieved through incorporation of video surveillance
systems. Therefore, a video surveillance system is considered an invaluable and
indispensable tool in combating crime. Law enforcement agencies worldwide rely
on these systems for helping to prevent, detect and investigate attacks against
public safety. As a consequence, in many developed countries, surveillance cam-
eras are now frequently found in office buildings, shopping malls, housing estates,
streets, squares, parks, buses, trains, stations, airports and various other public
places.
Traditional video surveillance systems, also known as closed-circuit television
(CCTV), are simple recording systems which need to be monitored by humans
without automated technological assistance. This makes them very expensive in
terms of operation due to the tedious and time consuming process of manually
watching videos. They are mainly used as deterrents and the recordings help
the investigation once an incident has occurred. Compared to these traditional
solutions, modern digital solutions are less expensive while offering much bet-
ter quality. Modern systems are equipped with advanced techniques such as
object-detection, object-identification, object-tracking and event-detection, by
exploiting algorithms from the fields of computer vision, image processing and
pattern recognition [58]. These techniques potentially allow those monitoring
the videos to recognize a target object e.g. a vehicle, or even automatically track-
ing an individual spanning over multiple areas in a surveillance network [87],
with trivial effort.
1.2 Privacy Protection
The deployment of surveillance cameras all around major public areas is a source
of concern due to its impact on the privacy of involved individuals. Privacy ad-
vocates and civil libertarians consider video surveillance a serious threat to the
privacy of non-criminals who may be captured by cameras in public places sev-
eral times a day [76, 134]. The use of pervasive video surveillance may lead to a
“big brother” society perception in which all the activities of an individual can
be profiled, either allowed legally by law enforcement authorities or performed
out of curiosity by a personnel. Doing so requires a significant amount of time
and effort in traditional surveillance systems. Yet there have been reported
incidents, in traditional video surveillance, where the guards observing videos
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were involved in unauthorized collection of data on the activities of individu-
als [19, 34, 141]. For instance, in a report by BBC News [19], a group of council
employees in the UK spied on a woman’s apartment using surveillance cameras
installed in that area. The possibilities for such misuse are further increased
with the advent of modern video surveillance systems that facilitate rapid data
retrieval enabled by searching and advanced imaging technology. Thus, the pri-
vacy concerns are obviously much more serious in modern video surveillance
systems compared to traditional ones.
Despite these privacy concerns, the importance of video surveillance systems in
combating the security threats is considered very important [49]. As criminals
and terrorists increasingly make use of new technology to mount attacks on pub-
lic safety, the public and law enforcement agencies must continuously increase
their technological capabilities to protect innocent citizens. However, the need
for increased security does not imply any less importance for privacy. In order
to increase the public acceptance of video surveillance systems, it is important
that their deployment strikes a balance between security and the need to protect
privacy. Therefore, surveillance systems must be designed and used in ways that
protect individuals against crime, without compromising their rights to privacy.
The need to balance the usage of video surveillance against its negative impacts
has been the focus of several research efforts during the last few years. It is im-
portant to note that in video surveillance, often it is the behavioral information
of people – activity of people – which is important to monitor rather than the
identity of the people [34]. In this context, various privacy enhancing techniques
(PETs) have been proposed in order to protect the privacy of observed people
by detecting and masking the privacy sensitive regions of people, e.g. faces, in
images and captured video. Some of the key categories of PETs include ob-
fuscation [127, 122, 160], scrambling [27, 32, 46], and abstraction [61, 73, 130].
Obfuscation reduces the level of details of privacy sensitive areas with the help
of blurring or pixilation, scrambling encrypts the sensitive regions with a key
allowing the area to be decrypted only by authorized personnel, and abstraction
replaces the semantic objects, e.g. humans, in the video with dummy objects
such as silhouettes or skeletons.
1.3 Security in Video Surveillance
Due to the use of digital video surveillance where data is transferred over the
Internet, security of data is an important requirement because of the stringent
need to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. A com-
prehensive solution covering all aspects of security is quite complicated and
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requires the integration of different tools and techniques. In such a context, ac-
cess control plays a fundamental role by establishing which users are authorized
to perform what actions on which objects. Many solutions addressing the secu-
rity requirements including integrity [14, 128, 137], confidentiality [80, 82, 133]
and access control [24, 23, 107] have been proposed in multimedia systems,
e.g. video on demand and business video conferencing. However, key factors in-
volved in video surveillance systems are quite different from those in multimedia
systems. Hence these solutions cannot be directly applied in video surveillance
systems, though a few commonalities exist. In video surveillance systems, unlike
multimedia applications, there are several video producers (cameras) with lim-
ited processing capabilities. Due to the communication over public networks,
the security aspect is to be addressed when data is transferred from camera-
to-server, server-to-server and server-to-handheld devices or monitoring room.
Moreover, in video surveillance, there is a unique requirement to protect privacy
of individuals by obfuscating the privacy sensitive regions. However, our study
of literature reveals that little research attention has been paid to address the
security of video streams and the associated data while they are transmitted
or stored. Similarly, little research is found in the literature that targets the
challenge of access control in video surveillance systems. This thesis focuses on
access control and presents our work to enhance security and privacy in video
surveillance systems through a dynamic access control mechanism.
1.3.1 Access Authorization
Modern video surveillance systems normally employ a network of several cam-
eras deployed throughout the surveilled region to capture video data at their
respective locations, and transfer this data to the storage servers and the users
via public networks. Users wishing to access live or recorded data may either
access it in a monitoring room, similar to traditional CCTV systems, or us-
ing a computing equipment, such as their hand-held devices. Such users are
commonly referred to as observers in video surveillance. As the potential capa-
bilities offered by modern video surveillance systems – such as searching for an
individual or a semantic object contained in video, and monitoring the activities
of an individual spanning over multiple locations – make it easy to invade an in-
dividual’s privacy, it becomes critically important to control the access to data
in such systems [87]. Clearly, video surveillance is expected to become more
pervasive which leaves us with only two choices: either trust all the observers or
devise a mechanism for watching the watchers in order to minimize the chances
of using such systems abusively [122].
On the one hand, PETs help protect the privacy of people but on the other hand,
they might impede the efficacy of a video surveillance system. For instance, in
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case of an anomalous incident, the observers may need to access full information
in a video, e.g. revealing the identity of a person, in order to closely investigate
the incident. This interesting observation implies that the existing PETs cannot
be effectively applied until there is a mechanism to reverse these PETs when
required. Therefore, the use of PETs without considering current circumstances
may render the system useless as an observer may be disallowed full access to
the data when needed. Thus, the challenge is to utilize the video surveillance
system by exposing sufficient need-specific data while simultaneously preserving
the privacy [87].
Video data contains multiple levels of information which may include original
raw video, reconstructed video with regions revealing identity removed deliber-
ately, e.g. blurred faces, video with lower resolution, etc. Different users can be
given access to varying granularity levels of information in the video depending
on their authorizations and the current circumstances. In normal circumstances,
an observer may be granted access to only the behavioral information while hid-
ing the privacy-sensitive regions. However, in case of an emergency, full access
to the videos may be authorized. One possible way to protect the privacy in
video surveillance, while retaining the useful functionality of video surveillance,
is to use a dynamic access control mechanism that utilizes the plethora of PETs
in video surveillance systems. A dynamic access control mechanism may enable
preserving the privacy of people yet allowing maximum need-specific access to
the data by providing multiple privacy levels, with each level accessible to dif-
ferent access privileges in different circumstances.
As mentioned above, very few research efforts have focused on access control in
video surveillance systems. One reason for lack of research focus in this area is
because it is dependent on certain related research areas: i) efficient video anal-
ysis for semantic visual concept representation, called video analytics, and ii)
effective indexing structure linking the semantic visual concepts with the videos
to enable efficient retrieval [23]. Recently, several research efforts targeting ex-
traction of semantic concepts – semantic objects e.g. humans, vehicles, etc.,
and semantic events e.g. vandalism, fire, luggage left-behind, etc. – contained
in the video, have been reported; see for instance [16, 109, 146]. These semantic
concepts are stored as part of the metadata associated with a video, in order to
allow retrieval of videos based on metadata information. Various solutions to
retrieve videos based on metadata information have been designed [59, 144, 148].
An ISO/IEC standard, MPEG-7 [86], has also been developed, focusing exclu-
sively on associating metadata with the video and providing the basis to retrieve
videos based on metadata. To achieve efficient retrieval of videos, solutions to
store MPEG-7 descriptions in the form of multimedia databases have also been
proposed [17, 44, 149]. Metadata information associated with the video may
also be used in specification of the access control policy in video surveillance
systems. For example, a user may be authorized to access all videos belonging
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to a specific region which contain a truck and were recorded during 1700 – 1900
hrs. Such content-dependent authorization on video data allows granting or
denying access to videos based on the information within the video data. With
these advancement in the areas of video analytics and indexing, effective access
control mechanisms for video surveillance systems may now be designed.
1.3.2 Access Control Paradigms
Role-based access control (RBAC) and attribute-based access control (ABAC)
are the most popular access control paradigms today [38, 74]. Researchers have
shown that traditional access control models (cf. § 2.4), including discretionary
access control and mandatory access control (MAC), can also be configured
through these paradigms [66, 106]. The RBAC paradigm encapsulates privileges
into roles, and users are assigned roles to acquire privileges, which makes it sim-
ple to administer and facilitates reviewing permissions assigned to a user [38].
However, in RBAC, permissions are specified in terms of object identifiers, re-
ferring to individual objects. In many applications such as video surveillance,
access to data is more naturally described in terms of its semantic contents [24]
for example, a user may be granted access to a video in case there is unattended
luggage left behind. Moreover, it has been recognized that RBAC is not ad-
equate for situations where information about the current circumstances is a
required parameter in granting access to a user [74]. A relatively new access
control paradigm, ABAC [161] has been identified to overcome these limitations
of RBAC [38]. However, ABAC is typically much more complex than RBAC in
terms of policy review, hence analyzing the policy and reviewing or changing
user permissions are quite cumbersome tasks. Both RBAC and ABAC have
their particular advantages and disadvantages yet they both have features com-
plimentary to each other, and thus integrating RBAC and ABAC has become an
important research topic [38, 63, 67]. Also, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) has announced an initiative to integrate RBAC and its
various extensions with ABAC in order to combine the advantages offered by
both RBAC and ABAC [74].
We realize that video surveillance systems introduce several challenging require-
ments with respect to the formulation, specification and enforcement of appro-
priate access control policies. Among others, these requirements demand that
the access control policy must be specified based on the semantic contents of
data to be protected and the occurrence of anomalous incidents must be con-
sidered when granting an access request. In addition, the access control model
needs to facilitate the visualization of any modifications done in the policy.
Some of these requirements, such as content-based authorization, require the
use of ABAC approach while others such as modification visualization require
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using RBAC approach. Motivated by the access control requirements in video
surveillance and the NIST initiative, we propose an access control model that
combines the features offered by both RBAC and ABAC. Our work focuses on
development of a novel content-based access control mechanism yet providing
administrative benefits typically offered by RBAC.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
The main contributions of the work presented in this thesis and its appendices
are summarized below:
1. We identify threats to privacy posed by video surveillance systems and in-
vestigate the legal infrastructure for ensuring privacy. We classify the video
surveillance systems and the legislation in different countries that may apply on
video surveillance systems. Further, we suggest guidelines in order to help those
who want to deploy video surveillance while least compromising the privacy of
people and complying with legal infrastructure. Parts of this work have been
published as the following peer-reviewed book chapter:
• [114]: Rajpoot, Q. M., and Jensen, C. D. Video surveillance: Privacy
issues and legal compliance. Promoting Social Change and Democracy
Through Information Technology, V. Kumar and J. Svensson, Eds. IGI
Global, 2015, pp. 69–92. Published.
2. We propose an abstract model of video surveillance to help identify a list of
security and privacy requirements in a video surveillance system. We examine
the existing solutions proposed to fulfill the major security and privacy require-
ments identified through our model and outline the associated challenges. Our
study identifies a potential gap where research efforts need to be put in by point-
ing out challenges that need to be addressed while designing security solutions
in this regard. This work resulted in the following publication accepted at a
peer-reviewed conference:
• [113] Rajpoot, Q. M., and Jensen, C. D. Security and privacy in video
surveillance: Requirements and challenges. In 29th IFIP International
Information Security and Privacy Conference (IFIP-SEC), 2014, Springer,
pp. 169–184. Published.
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3. In our quest to develop an access control model for video surveillance sys-
tems, we build a general-purpose Attributes Enhanced Role-Based Access Con-
trol (AERBAC) model that integrates the RBAC and ABAC access control
models. AERBAC retains the flexibility offered by ABAC, yet it maintains
RBAC’s advantages of easier administration, policy analysis and review of per-
missions. Moreover, we evaluate AERBAC by comparing it with RBAC and
ABAC, and elaborating the features offered by each of these models. Our
model has the following key features: (a) it allows context-aware access con-
trol decisions by associating conditions with permissions that are used to verify
whether the required contextual information holds when a decision is made, (b)
it offers a content-dependent authorization system while keeping the approach
role-oriented, in order to retain the advantages offered by RBAC. This work
resulted in the following publications accepted at peer-reviewed conferences:
• [117]: Rajpoot, Q. M., Jensen, C. D., and Krishnan, R. Integrating at-
tributes into role-based access control. In 29th Data and Applications
Security and Privacy Conference (DBSec), 2015, Springer, pp. 242–249.
Published.
• [116]: Rajpoot, Q. M., Jensen, C. D., and Krishnan, R. Attributes en-
hanced role-based access control model. In 12th International Confer-
ence on Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business (TrustBus), 2015,
Springer, pp. 3–17. Published.
4. Based on AERBAC, we develop a Role Oriented Access control Mechanism
for Video Surveillance (ROAMVS). We extend AERBAC with spatio-temporal
constraints and define how users and objects in video surveillance systems may
be specified using the proposed model. In order to enable multilevel access
control that reveals different information to different users in the same video,
we define privilege modes by combining video properties with actions. We de-
scribe derivation of permissions in ROAMVS from explicitly stated permissions,
due to existence of attribute hierarchies. A prototype implementation of our
access control mechanism using eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) is developed to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed access
control model in video surveillance applications. The ROAMVS model offers
the following novel features: (a) it provides a metadata-based yet role-oriented
access control mechanism that allows to review the permissions assigned to a
user, (b) it offers multilevel access control without using negative authorizations
and hence avoiding any conflicts in the policy. Based on this work, a manuscript
is currently under preparation which will be submitted in the IET Information
Security journal:
• [115]: Rajpoot, Q. M., and Jensen, C. D.: Role-oriented Access Control
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Model for Video Surveillance Systems. Elsevier Computers & Security
(To be submitted).
1.5 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 provides an overview of video surveillance systems and the access
control paradigms. It highlights the privacy issues in video surveillance and de-
scribes the recent research trends to combine attributes and roles. This chapter
sets the background in order to help reader understand the challenges relevant
to privacy, security and access control in video surveillance, discussed in next
chapters.
Chapter 3 presents an abstract model to identify the security and privacy re-
quirements in video surveillance. This chapter reviews the existing solutions for
the identified requirements and points out the challenges to be addressed. It
also identifies the features desired in an access control model suitable for video
surveillance systems.
In Chapter 4, we present our Attributes Enhanced Role-Based Access Control
model and its formal specification. We then evaluate AERBAC by comparing
it with RBAC and ABAC, and elaborating each of these models with respect
to the features required by video surveillance systems.
Chapter 5 presents our access control mechanism for video surveillance and de-
scribes how the policy may be specified using the characteristics of user, objects
and circumstances. It explains permission derivation due to attribute hierar-
chies, discusses the prototype implementation and compares our solution with
other relevant approaches.
Chapter 6 summarizes the presented research and identifies future work direc-
tions.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides an overview of surveillance in its different forms while
focusing in particular on video surveillance systems. We discuss a simplified
architecture of video surveillance systems and its capabilities in order to help a
reader understand the security and privacy issues in video surveillance systems.
A major contribution of this thesis is to provide an access control mechanism
suitable for video surveillance systems. Thus, towards the end of the chapter,
we provide an overview of the two main access control paradigms that are most
commonly used in industry and academia. We briefly discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of each of these paradigms and describe the recent research
trends to combine attributes and roles.
2.1 Surveillance
Surveillance is the act of watching the activities of people, with or without the
consent of the people being watched, typically for management or security rea-
sons. The recent technological developments have reduced hardware costs and
increased the levels of automation, so governments and law enforcement agen-
cies worldwide consider surveillance a cost-effective method for fighting serious
threats to public safety.
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Surveillance is increasingly used in developed countries and the majority of peo-
ple are unaware of the magnitude of its occurrence in the form of our images
recoded by surveillance cameras in public places, interception of our communica-
tion over the Internet, or our voices recoded during phone conversations [105].
There are several forms of surveillance and a significant amount of work in
surveillance has been carried out through biometrics [84] and ’dataveillance’
such as communication monitoring [86]. Several sociologists have discussed the
reasons motivating the high level of surveillance experienced in modern soci-
eties along with its implications. Surveillance is viewed as a key tool of social
classification, power and disciplinary control in the modern state [85]. The
term Panopticon is often used to indicate the ultimate power offered by massive
surveillance [53, 156]. The term Panopticon is originally coined by the English
philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century to de-
scribe a type of building where a single watchman can observe all people from
a central location [45, 129]. The Panopticon was promoted as the ideal archi-
tecture for a prison, because the fact that prisoners cannot know when they
are being watched means that they always have to act as if they are currently
under observation, thus effectively controlling their own behavior at all times
(this is called an ’unequal gaze’ by Foucault [53]). The ’unequal gaze’ achieved
through the Panopticon causes the internalization of disciplinary individuality,
and creates the docile body required of the prisoners. This means one is less
likely to break rules or laws if they believe they are being watched, even if they
are not currently under observation.
2.1.1 Forms of Surveillance
Although, our particular focus is on video surveillance, we do provide a brief
overview of other forms of surveillance before we start discussing video surveil-
lance. The aim is to provide an overall picture of surveillance in its different
forms and to give a clear idea to a reader about: (i) the scale of surveillance
and the extent to which the data about activities of people is being collected
both by law enforcement agencies and private organizations, e.g. Google and
Facebook, (ii) the use of automation in surveillance and the general perception
of people about surveillance, and (iii) to distinguish between different forms of
surveillance though there exist some commonalities in terms of privacy issues
and the legal infrastructure applicable to these different forms of surveillance.
Surveillance systems are normally divided into two major types based on the
means using which they are conducted: i) Electronic Surveillance and ii) Non-
electronic Surveillance. The former includes computer surveillance, mobile phone
surveillance, workplace surveillance and video surveillance. Non-electronic surveil-
lance, on the other hand, does not involve digital technology but makes use of
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human-beings such as appointing human operatives to shadow a target or inter-
cepting postal messages. The benefit of electronic surveillance is that it facili-
tates automation, e.g. by computers, so that mass surveillance can be achieved
with relatively few human resources. The costs of surveillance technology (hard-
ware and network connectivity) are decreasing, so human resources have become
the most costly component of a surveillance system. The automation of surveil-
lance systems therefore allows more people to be monitored at equal costs or
an overall reduction of costs in the surveillance system. Therefore, the advent
of digital technology has significantly reduced the use of non-electronic surveil-
lance.
2.1.1.1 Computer Surveillance
Computer surveillance is the act of monitoring the computer activity, data stored
in the computer and the data transmitted over the network. Computer surveil-
lance techniques that focus on the activities and data stored on individual com-
puters are typically referred to as host-based techniques, while techniques that
primarily monitor the data transmissions and traffic flows on the network are
known as network-based techniques. Regardless of the techniques that are be-
ing used, computer surveillance can be either voluntary and participatory, such
as the use of cookies by web-browsers, or involuntary and even surreptitious,
such as the use of device fingerprinting techniques [94, 159] or the extensive
amounts of log data that have been stored by European network providers since
the introduction of the European Data Retention Directive [1].
Host-based surveillance techniques normally require software to be installed on
the individual host. This software may be installed either by the users or system
administrators for explicit monitoring purposes, as is the case with anti-virus
software and other softwares installed to detect or prevent the presence of ma-
licious software (aka. malware) on the host computer. This software typically
monitors activities, e.g. running processes and subsystems, and/or data on the
system, e.g. important system files, such as the content of configuration files,
system and application log-files, or important data files created by the users.
Some information stored on the computers may be public in nature, but should
still be restricted to a limited set of authorized users. This is particularly true
for online social media, such as Facebook, Linked-In, Instagram and Snapchat,
which can be analyzed to extract information about a person’s interests, asso-
ciations, beliefs, plans and activities [7].
Network-based computer surveillance requires access to the communication in-
frastructure at some point between the two communicating parties. For example
the Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in the United States,
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authorizes the law enforcement agencies to tap phone conversations and to inter-
cept Internet traffic including reading of emails. This act requires the Internet
Service Providers to install sniffing technology allowing law enforcement agen-
cies to monitor the Internet traffic. The use of such surveillance techniques
by the intelligence community have recently received much attention after the
revelations of Edward Snowden, a former employee of Booz Allen Hamilton
contracted to work for the National Security Agency (NSA). Edward Snowden
has leaked documents that shows that the NSA is collaborating with a num-
ber of U.S. federal agencies and foreign intelligence agencies to filter Internet
traffic passing through these countries [20, 142]. The implications of such mass
surveillance of Internet communication is similar to the effects of video surveil-
lance in public places that we mentioned above, i.e. people are likely to apply
self-censorship and refrain from expressing opinions and views that may be con-
sidered “dangerous” by the intelligence services. As the work of the intelligence
services is necessarily secret, self-censoring citizens must leave a wide margin of
error, which severely limits the expression of free speech through the Internet.
As with modern video surveillance, this mass surveillance capability stems from
the automation made possible by computers.
Many online services offered nowadays, e.g. social media, email, data storage,
are provided free of charge, or at a very low cost, which entitles the service
provider to impose their own conditions on the use of their services. For in-
stance, Google’s privacy policy states that Google scans the contents of emails
exchanged over its email service, Gmail, collects information about their users’
Internet surfing habits and modifies cookies on their users’ computers. This in-
formation is primarily collected by Google to profile their users and make their
online marketing more effective, but U.S. law enforcement agencies publicly ad-
mit to using such data collected from such organizations in order to strengthen
the profile of an individual under surveillance. It is common to find laws that
authorize security agencies to monitor activities of their people over the Internet,
in other parts of the world such as the European Data Retention Directive [1].
2.1.1.2 Workplace Surveillance
Frequent usage of Internet and email at work and sophisticated computer tech-
nology allow the employers to regularly monitor the actions of their employees
while they are at work. Activity logs from enterprise resource planning (ERP)
systems, or customer relationship management (CRM) systems provide man-
agement with an accurate record of what, where and when their employees
work. While these activity logs are typically required to comply with corporate
governance legislation, they may also be abused to closely monitor the activi-
ties of employees in the workplace. Employers are continuously increasing the
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monitoring spanning from monitoring of email, web surfing to tapping of office
phones to enhance the productivity of the organization. This has become so
prevalent that the U.S. government has published a brief discussion of what
practices are legal [143]. Secondary use of data, i.e. use of data for a purpose
different from the one for which it was collected, is generally not allowed, but
it is difficult to prevent or detect. According to a survey conducted by Ameri-
can Management Association [9], more than 75% of US organizations monitor
email messages, Internet usage, phone calls and computer files of their employ-
ees. More than 25% of the fired workers were dismissed for misusing of email
while around 33% have been fired for misuse of the Internet. Misuses include
violation of company policy, inappropriate content and excessive personal use.
There are many genuine reasons for organizations to know what is happening
within the organization, however, the employer is expected to remain aware of
the employee’s right to privacy. In most countries, privacy or data protection
legislation, at a minimum, requires that employers obtain consent from the em-
ployees by stating how the organization is monitoring them, what information is
being collected, the purpose of the information collection and who may review
the information. Compliance with this legislation generally also prevents the
employer from secondary use as mentioned above.
After a brief introduction of different forms of surveillance, we now shift our
focus to video surveillance.
2.2 Video Surveillance
Video surveillance is a system that employs, normally, a network of cameras to
monitor a particular area (public or private) for protection against theft, vio-
lence, terrorism or other similar issues. A simple system would allow a watchman
to observe what is going on in an area under surveillance while a sophisticated
one may include thousands of cameras linked together making use of state-of-
the-art technology, e.g. object-detection, rapid data retrieval (cf. § 2.2.1).
Video surveillance systems are of different types depending mainly on the area
where they are deployed, e.g. publicly accessed area, private area. The type of
video surveillance systems determines the scale of such a system, the security
and privacy issues, as well as the legislation applicable in these systems. In this
context, Fig. 2.1 offers a taxonomy of video surveillance systems as a hierar-
chical structure. We classify video surveillance into two major types: i) Video
surveillance in publicly accessible areas, and ii) Video surveillance in private ar-
eas. Publicly accessible areas such as streets, public transport, shopping malls,
supermarkets, etc. are accessible to anyone and anything observed here may
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be observed by everybody. On the other hand, private areas such as offices are
accessible to a limited number of people whose identity may already be known.
Video surveillance in publicly accessible areas can be performed either by public
authorities (e.g. law enforcement authority) or by private sector (e.g. owner of
a supermarket) and each has to follow the relevant laws. Video surveillance in
private areas can also be categorized into two subcategories: i) imposed by third
party, and ii) self-initiated. In the former, the video surveillance is initiated by
a third party with/without consent of the people under surveillance, example
includes workplace video surveillance; while in the latter category, it is initiated
by the people under surveillance themselves and example includes use of video
surveillance in one’s own home.
our focus
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Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of video surveillance system
In this thesis, our focus, in particular, is to address security and privacy issues
in video surveillance held in publicly accessible areas (also known as CCTV)
which are accessed by public authorities such as city/council administration
staff, police, etc.
The potential benefits of CCTV especially with respect to security are seen as
a cost effective mechanism to fight severe threats to public safety. People are
monitored in public areas like train stations, buses, stores and around ATMs
sometimes without even noticing. In UK alone, there exist more than 4 million
cameras [97] and a report from BBC News [18] estimated that an average person
in London is caught on camera around 300 times a day. The pervasive form of
video surveillance systems combined with the technological advances have the
potential to disrupt the balance between the need for such systems and the
privacy of individuals [140]. To better understand the privacy concerns raised
due to usage of video surveillance, the issues related to security and privacy
in video surveillance and the importance of access control; below we discuss a
simplified architecture of a modern video surveillance system and the capabilities
2.2 Video Surveillance 17
of such systems.
2.2.1 Capabilities of Video Surveillance Systems
In contrast to the early age and many currently deployed CCTV cameras, which
can only see as far as a human eye and have fixed direction, modern cameras
can pan and tilt and can provide a lot more detailed image than previously pos-
sible. A camera having a 60-times optical zoom lens can read what is written
on a cigarette pack at 100 yards [132]. Furthermore, in a report by New York
Times [93], 400-times magnification cameras have been deployed in Chicago.
Improved quality of recordings, reduced storage costs and use of digital tech-
nology enable traversing and exploitation of recorded data in ways previously
impossible with analog recordings.
The use of advanced video analytics techniques such as object-detection and
event-detection is continuously increasing in modern video surveillance sys-
tems [58]. Compared to these modern solutions, traditional CCTV systems
are simply monitored by human observers without automated technological as-
sistance. The modern systems facilitate rapid data retrieval and make it easy to
search for a particular person or activity and may lead to profiling of individu-
als [134]. These techniques may allow those monitoring the systems to perform
voyeurism and gather unauthorized data about activities of an individual [134].
Doing so requires a significant amount of time and effort in traditional surveil-
lance systems, however, there still have been reported incidents of voyeurism
(cf. § 2.3.3) in traditional systems. Therefore, the privacy concerns in modern
video surveillance systems become obviously much more serious.
Although facial recognition and other remote biometric systems [64] are yet in
their infancy, there is a significant investment in this area and the reliability
of the identification process is improving [140]. Advancements in this area can
be integrated with video surveillance systems to track movement in their field
of view or across networked cameras allowing those monitoring the system to
automatically follow a target object in an entire city [87]. This means that
people can be tracked in real time and with little effort, which makes cyber
stalking quite easy for anyone with access to the surveillance system, regardless
of whether this access is authorized or not. People participating in political
rallies can be followed to their home address as the meeting dissolves and any
people visiting celebrities or political dissidents can be followed on camera by
paparazzi or law enforcement agents in oppressive regimes. Due to the advent of
modern video surveillance systems that facilitate rapid data retrieval enabled by
searching and advanced imaging technology, massive usage of CCTV in public
places is of great concern for civil libertarians and is seen as a threat to privacy
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by critics [76] (cf. § 2.3).
2.2.2 Architecture of a Video Surveillance System
Modern video surveillance systems primarily use the Internet as the medium
to transfer data to intermediary servers, storage systems and the users. Such
a system normally employs a network of several cameras which capture video
data at their respective locations, as depicted in Fig. 2.2. This data is sent
to the storage server responsible for securely storing the data. Depending on
the application requirements, this could be a centralized or distributed storage
solution. The data may be accessed by users, wishing to see the live or recorded
data of a desired location, e.g. live video feeds are often sent to a special
monitoring room, and this live or stored data may also be watched on hand-held
devices or a workstation. As stated earlier, we refer to such users as observers.
In order to authorize access of the recorded videos, the control unit handles
access requests from the observers and allows them to access data as per the
specified policy.
Figure 2.2: Architecture of a video surveillance system
2.2.2.1 Camera and Video Characteristics
Each camera in the surveilled area is associated with a location where it is de-
ployed. The location coordinates (physical location) are mapped to semantic
division of locations (logical location), suitable for a given application, e.g. for
a video surveillance system covering New York City, the five boroughs, Manhat-
tan, Brooklyn, Queens, Bronx and Staten Island, could define a coarse grained
division of logical locations. These regions could be further divided into sub-
regions corresponding to the neighborhoods that constitute each borough. De-
pending upon the type of camera used, a camera orientation may be moved into
2.2 Video Surveillance 19
different directions, e.g. left, right, where each direction provides a different field
of view and hence records different information to be viewed. Once recorded,
a video may be shown with different quality and information-levels to different
users in different circumstances. For example, the resolution of the video may
be changed to lower resolution while hiding the privacy sensitive regions, e.g.,
faces, such that the behavioral information of people recorded in the video is
shown to the observer but their identity is not revealed.
The information contained in the video may be extracted in the form of annota-
tions, using the previously mentioned video analytics techniques. The annota-
tions extracted from the video may include the objects (e.g. humans, vehicles)
and events (e.g. fire, burglary) contained in the video. These annotations and
other information like the location and time of video recording are part of the
video metadata. This metadata is stored linked to the videos in order to allow
retrieval of videos based on metadata information. In order to allow content-
based searching and retrieval of videos, longer videos are normally segmented
into smaller video units, called video shots, and each video shot is associated
with the metadata [79].
2.2.2.2 Example System
In order to show the importance of current situation (circumstances) in control-
ling access to video surveillance data and to clarify the difference between static
and dynamic access control, we discuss an example system below.
Consider the video surveillance system deployed in the region of Manhattan,
for instance. This system consists of several cameras which are deployed in the
major public places all over the region. The captured data is continuously mon-
itored manually, along with the technological assistance by the system which
generates an alarm upon detection of an anomalous event e.g. crossing a moni-
tored fence. The observers are associated with different areas of the Manhattan
region, e.g. Manhattan_south, Manhattan_north, and on generation of an
alarm they investigate closely what happened and send a patrol or call the po-
lice, if required. The observers may access the data in the monitoring room
or on their hand-held devices when they are approaching the place of incident.
However, notice that the observers are normally pre-associated with the specific
areas and are already granted access to watch videos of those areas, independent
of the alarm generation. This is called static access control where observers are
always allowed to access the data, independent of the current circumstances
(e.g. alarm, location of observer). Such an access control leads to privacy issues
and increases the chances of performing voyeurism by the observers.
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2.2.2.3 Dynamic Access Control
An alternative approach could make use of dynamic access control where access
to the data is granted to the nearest available mobile observers only upon de-
tection of an event. Considering the proportionate access principle, observers in
the monitoring room may be given regular access with less privileges (e.g. low
resolution) in normal situations and higher privileges in an emergency situation.
Using these techniques can prove to be immensely useful in public video surveil-
lance. Allowing access of data to certain individuals only in case a specific event
occurs or in an emergency situation, addresses the privacy concerns raised be-
cause of continuous video surveillance. Suppose there is a fire incident reported
near Times Square. Upon detection of this emergency situation, along with the
observers assigned to this location, the nearest fire-brigade and police stations
are also informed about the event and the system allows access to video data to
the respective employees of these stations. Allowing access to the video stream
to the fire-brigade and police station would help them understand the severity
of the situation and to come prepared with appropriate tools and man-power
to better combat such situations. Although the system should allow advanced
functionalities such as searching, tracking an individual and automatically iden-
tifying an individual, however, appropriate access control mechanisms (cf. § 2.4)
must be adopted in order to minimize the chances of performing voyeurism by
the observers, reduce privacy invasion and to make these systems widely accept-
able.
In the following, we discuss the importance of privacy and the concerns raised
by civil libertarians regarding usage of mass video surveillance.
2.3 Privacy Concerns
The current and potential capabilities of video surveillance systems are quite
attractive for law enforcement officials worldwide and they see video surveillance
as an effective mechanism to fight against security threats. Critics, however,
argue that being pervasive in nature video surveillance poses a threat to many
democratic rights of the non-criminals and it might force law-abiding people
to change their daily routines in order to avoid being caught by the camera.
Few privacy awareness initiatives like the Isee project in Manhattan [10] and
the Observing Surveillance Project in Washigton [103] identified locations of
CCTV cameras to help people avoid being captured by the cameras. Advent of
technology with its capacity to collect and analyze information about individuals
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increased interest in the right of privacy. Below we discuss the privacy concerns
raised by the extensive use of video surveillance.
2.3.1 Threats to Privacy
Though there does not exist a universal definition of privacy, it is often described
as how far society can intrude into personal affairs of an individual. A well-
known definition of privacy given by Alan Westin [150], author of “Privacy and
Freedom”, is: “the desire of people to choose freely under what circumstances
and to what extent they will expose themselves, their attitude and their behavior
to others”. In many privacy theories it is considered an individual right. For
example Thomas Emerson [47] states that privacy is “based upon premises of
individualism, that the society exists to promote the worth and the dignity of
the individual. . . The right of privacy. . . is essentially the right not to participate
in the collective life — the right to shut out the community”.
Presently, most of the countries in the world recognize the right of privacy
in their legislation. In some countries, for example the United States, where
the right of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution, the courts
have ruled inferring this right from other provisions. Existing legislations to
protect the privacy of citizens in the context of lawful video surveillance vary
greatly among different countries with respect to the different aspects of video
surveillance that are being regulated. For example, there are different rules for
limiting the storage time of recorded images, the need for notification signs in
the surveillance area and the possible requirement of a court warrant in order
to perform surveillance on a particular person. For a classification of legislation
relevant to video surveillance in different countries and the guidelines to achieve
legal compliance, see Appendix-A.
The boundary between what we reveal and what we do not and control over that
boundary, are among the most important attributes of civilization [89]. Many
people do not feel comfortable in exposing their behaviors to strangers even if
they do not fear disapproval or hostility by the society. Thus there are certain
democratic rights which are at stake because of extensive video surveillance.
Firstly, the right of people to freely express their thoughts and to associate
freely to share those thoughts is in danger. People might not feel comfortable to
express their views or to take part in protests against the government policies if
they knew they might be identified for this activity later on. Second such right at
stake is the right of anonymity which is closely related to privacy. Many people
expect to remain anonymous in public places such as entering an infertility clinic
or a psychiatrist’s office. The presence of video cameras in public places would
capture all such activities and would allow the officials to see daily activities of
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any individual.
2.3.2 Counter Arguments
Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Worry About
A typical argument that is often presented in discussions about privacy issues
is: “If you have got nothing to hide, you have got nothing to worry about” [147].
A similar argument was presented as a slogan by the British government in a
campaign to support video surveillance [121]. Frequently encountering such an
argument in news interviews and discussions, Daniel Solove [135] states that he
decided to ask the readers of his blog to provide their opinions in response to
this argument. Some interesting comments he received in response include:
• This is not about hiding something, this is about it being none of other
people’s business
• I am doing nothing wrong and do not need to justify my position. If you
need to investigate my activities, get a warrant to do so
• I do not have anything to hide, but I do not have anything I feel like
showing you, either
The reasoning of the argument nothing to hide depends on the fact that pri-
vacy is violated only if something illegal or embarrassing is revealed about an
individual. Hence the majority of people not involved in such activities has
nothing to worry about. Rephrasing the argument in a generic manner that
"all law-abiding citizens should have nothing to hide" reveals that nothing to
hide argument is misleading and is based on a wrong assumption that privacy is
about hiding wrong-doings. Concealment of bad things is just one aspect of pri-
vacy among many other aspects like lack of transparency and accountability and
usage of collected data for purposes other than the informed ones. The nothing
to hide argument attempts to hide the existence of a problem altogether [136].
No Privacy at Public Places
In a similar context, another point which is frequently debated is, when you
are in a public space such as in a mall or a street, every step you take may
be watched by someone anyway so what difference does it make whether you
are watched by a person or a camera. The fundamental difference is symmetry.
When you are being watched by a person you can watch them back however,
when you are being watched but cannot watch them back forms an asymmetrical
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relationship. Consider a one-sided mirror between an employee and employer’s
room to understand the situation. Thus the core of the debate is not the fact
that whatever you do may be watched by someone rather the opposite that there
may be a particular person who is watching everything you do, facilitated by
the automated large-scale video surveillance without much effort and cost [147].
2.3.3 Misuse of Video Surveillance
A potential threat in video surveillance systems is voyeurism – exploitation of
video surveillance system by the authorized personnel for targeted collection of
data on activities or behaviors of an individual [96]. According to a report by
BBC News [19] a few council workers in Liverpool spied on a woman’s apart-
ment using a modern pan-tilt-zoom CCTV street camera. Such misuse can
be extended to spy on government officials or celebrities. For example, in an-
other incident which started a whole new debate about use of CCTV, a security
guard used a museum’s CCTV camera to spy on the German Chancellor Angela
Merkel’s private apartment [34].
Another potential problem of video surveillance system is its discriminatory use
by the officials against a particular individual or community based on the ethnic,
racial, gender or religious grounds. For instance, Norris & Armstrong [95] found
in their study about CCTV surveillance in the UK that black people are twice
as likely to be a target of surveillance as compared to white people and similarly
men are three times more likely to be surveilled than women, not because of
their involvement in crime or disorder but simply based on categorical suspicion.
Despite posing a threat to privacy and dangers of its misuse by the officials,
the usefulness of video surveillance systems cannot be denied. What is mainly
needed is that these systems must be designed in ways that not only protect pri-
vacy and freedom, while protecting the people against security threats, but they
must also be able to prevent or detect any abusive usages by using techniques
such as logging, encryption and access control mechanism.
2.4 Access Control
As mentioned earlier, we focus on addressing the security and privacy in video
surveillance through the use of dynamic access control mechanism. This section
describes the most influential access control paradigms and the current focus of
research in the area of access control.
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Access control models are of critical interest in computer security and have
been used as an important protection mechanism since the advent of multi-user
computing. The access control system determines whether or not a request to
access a resource is to be granted. The requesting entity is typically referred to
as a subject (a program or process representing a user) whereas the resources to
be accessed are called objects. The terms user and subject are used alternatively
in this thesis.
Since the introduction of the access control matrix in the late 1960’s, several
access control models have been proposed. Out of these, the most successful
in terms of practice are: Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Ac-
cess Control (MAC), Role-based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute Based
Access Control (ABAC). DAC allows the creator (owner) of an object to make
decisions about who is to be given what permissions on that object. In order to
have a centralized access control system, managed by the system owner rather
than the object owner, MAC allows to apply further constraints that are be-
yond the control of object owner, e.g. by classifying both subjects and objects
into different security levels. MAC enforces constraints on the information flow
and addresses the problem of unauthorized access on copies of objects, faced by
DAC. A subjects request is granted only if the object to be accessed belongs to
a specific class which is accessible by the security level assigned to the subject.
In contrast to MAC which targets military settings, RBAC addresses primarily
the access control requirements of commercial organizations. RBAC was intro-
duced in early 90’s by Ferraiolo et al. [43] to address the problems faced by
the then dominant DAC and MAC models. Sandhu et al. [124] later proposed
a framework of RBAC models, RBAC96, categorizing RBAC into conceptual
models. After further modifications, RBAC was approved as NIST standard
ANSI/INCITS 359-2004 [50]. While RBAC offers several advantages, it has cer-
tain limitations too (discussed below). A relatively new access control paradigm,
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) [161] has been identified to overcome
these limitations of RBAC [38].
Below we describe the currently dominant RBAC and ABAC access control
paradigms. We also discuss few solutions using these approaches and the issues
with these approaches followed by the need to combine RBAC and ABAC.
2.4.1 Role-Based Access Control
RBAC is the most popular access control model and has been a focus of research
since last two decades. In RBAC, the roles encapsulate permissions and users
are assigned to roles in order to obtain a permission, as shown in Fig. 2.3.
The RBAC model [50] comprises of the following four components: USERS,
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ROLES, OPS, OBS and PRMS representing the sets of users, roles, operations,
objects and permissions, respectively. A user is a human being represented by
a program or a process. A role represents a certain job function, within an
organization, associated with a set of tasks that the role is entitled to perform.
An operation allows a user to execute a function, e.g. read, write, delete, on
objects. An object is an entity that represents information or a system resource.
Examples of an object include files, database tables, printers, CPU cycles etc. A
permission is an authority to perform an operation on objects. Each permission
defines the operation, an element of the set OPS, that can be performed on
a particular object, an element of the set OBS. A session relates a user to a
subset of roles assigned to the user. The natural notion of role allows using
role hierarchies and it also supports the prevention of the conflict of interest
by specifying the separation of duty (SoD) constraints. Static separation of
duty (SSD) constraints are defined on user-role assignment and role hierarchies
whereas dynamic separation of duty (DSD) constraints are defined on the roles
which may be activated by a user during a session. Once a user is authenticated,
the user can request to create a session by activating a set of roles that the user
is entitled for. In case the activation request is approved, the user obtains all
the permissions relevant to the activated roles.
USERS ROLES
PRMS
OPS OBS
ssd
S
es
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on
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ro
le
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Role 
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Figure 2.3: NIST Role-Based Access Control [50]
Table 2.1 provides the sets and functions used in RBAC. A fundamental concept
in RBAC is to assign the users to the roles and the permissions are assigned to
roles. This provides a way to assign multiple permissions to a user by simply as-
signing a role to the user. A user can be assigned to one or more roles, and a role
can be assigned to one or more users. This many-to-many relationship between
users and roles is represented by URA. Similarly, relationship between roles and
permissions is represented by RPA. A session can be associated with a single
user whereas a user can create one or more sessions. The function user_sessions
returns the set of sessions associated with a given user. The function session_-
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roles returns the roles activated in that session and the function session_user
gives us the unique user to whom a given session belongs.
Table 2.1: Sets and functions used in RBAC
• USERS, ROLES, OBS, and OPS (users, roles, objects and operations respectively).
• URA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, a many-to-many mapping of user-to-role assignment.
• assigned_users: (r:ROLES) → 2USERS, the mapping of role r onto a set of users.
Formally: assigned_users(r) = { u ∈ USERS | (u, r) ∈ URA}.
• PRMS = 2 (OPS×OBS), the set of permissions.
• RPA ⊆ PRMS × ROLES, a many-to-many mapping of permission-to-role assignment.
• assigned_permissions(r: ROLES) → 2PRMS, the mapping of role r onto a set of
permissions. Formally: assigned_permissions(r) = { p ∈ PRMS | (p, r) ∈ RPA}.
• SESSIONS, the set of sessions.
• user_sessions(u: USERS)→ 2SESSIONS, the mapping of user u onto a set of sessions.
• session_roles(se: SESSIONS)→ 2ROLES, the mapping of session se onto a set of roles.
Formally: session_roles (sei) ⊆ { r ∈ ROLES | (session_user(sei), r) ∈ URA}.
• avail_session_perms(se: SESSIONS) → 2PRMS, the permissions available to a user
in a session.
2.4.1.1 RBAC Advantages
RBAC is simple to manage and facilitates reviewing permissions assigned to a
user, due to encapsulating privileges into roles [54]. It makes the task of pol-
icy administration less cumbersome, as every change in a role is immediately
reflected on the permissions available to users assigned to that role [74]. The
role-based approach fits into organizational structure quite naturally because
the employees in organizations typically assume job functions which are associ-
ated with well-defined responsibilities and tasks [63]. According to a report by
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [104], the adoption of
RBAC in commercial and government organizations is continuously increasing.
As discussed earlier, we need to consider the current circumstances, also called
context, e.g. occurrence of an event, generation of an alarm, user’s current
location etc., when a user’s access request is to be evaluated in video surveillance
systems. Below we discuss how context is handled in RBAC and the issues faced.
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2.4.1.2 Context in RBAC
Due to the advent of pervasive systems, access control has become more complex
as access decisions may depend on the context in which access requests are made.
The contextual information represents a measurable primitive and may entail
such information being associated with a user, object and environment [37]. For
example, an access control policy may depend on the user’s current location, the
object being currently in a specific state, and the time of day when the access
is requested. Such information is captured via user attributes, object attributes
and environment attributes (cf. § 4.1). However, standard RBAC does not take
into account the situations where contextual attributes are required parameters
in granting access to a user. Several efforts have been reported which extend
RBAC to include contextual information such as location, time, system load,
etc. Few of the key works are mentioned below.
The solution presented by Moyer et al. [88] extends traditional RBAC by pre-
senting novel concept of using environment and object roles in addition to sub-
ject roles in RBAC. The motivation behind using the notion of role is to exploit
features associated with roles such as role-hierarchy and separation of duties.
Zhang et al. [162] present context-aware access control mechanism for pervasive
computing environments. The solution extends RBAC to make use of environ-
mental information and introduces context agents which are associated with
each subject and resource in order to keep track of contextual information. Kim
et al. [71] extend RBAC targeting ubiquitous computing where the roles of the
users are adjusted considering the contextual information. A state checking
agent collects users context and verifies it against state checking matrix (SCM)
to determine if the assigned roles should be active or deactive. Bertino et al. [22]
attempt to formulate a framework which can be used to model geographical
(spatial) information. It extends RBAC to deal with location information while
granting access. The users are assigned geographically bounded roles which are
activated if user’s location lies in the restricted boundary. A model to express
temporal constraints on enabling of roles and user-role assignment has also been
proposed [21]. Ray et al. [119] propose a model that extends RBAC with spatio-
temporal information. The model enables enforcing spatio-temporal constraints
on role-activation and permissions. Solution proposed by Kulkarni et al. [75]
extends RBAC by combining the already existing approaches including context
based user to role assignment [68], context based permission assignment [92] and
applying context when evaluating access request [118]. Filho et al. [29] extend
RBAC for medical information systems and propose a solution which considers
contextual information not only related to a user but also related to the owner of
a resource (patient). Such a setting assigns utmost value to the owner’s priority
and allows, for instance, a patient to specify that any doctor may access his
information in emergency cases. Several other solutions extending RBAC with
28 Background
contextual information have also been proposed [36, 60, 68, 120, 5].
The above-mentioned solutions, however, typically require creation of a large
number of closely related roles, causing a role-explosion problem. Moreover,
a fundamental limitation of these approaches, inherited by RBAC, is that the
permissions are specified in terms of object identifiers, referring to individual
objects. In situations where a user may have similar access rights to large num-
ber of objects, e.g. in the hundreds of thousands, a permission must be created
for each object, which leads to a permission-explosion problem. Solutions to
address the issues of role-explosion and permission-explosion have also been
proposed [55, 57, 69] which we discuss in § 4.4.
2.4.2 Attribute-Based Access Control
During the last few years, ABAC [161, 42] has been emerging as an alternative
approach to RBAC. It is argued that ABAC has the capability to overcome
the limitations of RBAC, such as incorporation of contextual information in
making of access control decisions [74]. An attribute is a name:value pair that
can represent just any information relevant to an entity including user, object
and environment. The access control policy in ABAC is formed using rules
which are constructed using the attributes of users, objects and environment.
For a user request to be granted, there must exist a rule in the access control
policy that authorizes a user to access an object by specifying the attributes
associated with the user, object and environment. Although the ABAC model
was first introduced by Yuan et al. [161], the use of attributes for users and
objects has been recognized in the literature since the inception of distributed
and internet-based applications (e.g.,[26, 155, 24, 4]).
A reasonable amount of research has been carried out following ABAC ap-
proach. Realizing the well-known problem of role-explosion in RBAC, Yuan et
al. [161] argue that service oriented architecture (SOA) in web services envi-
ronment requires a dynamic and fine-grained access control model. Damiani et
al. [42] proposed an attribute-based framework for open environments. Hai-bo
et al. [131] discuss that attribute-based approach is well-suited for web-services
because of its distributed and dynamic nature. Covington et al. [37] propose to
use contextual attributes for authorizing access without relating them with an
identity or role. Park et al. [108] divided attributes into two categories: non-
mutable and mutable. They developed a mechanism where values of mutable
attributes may be updated based on operations performed by the user. In a
quest to propose a formal reference model for ABAC, similar to the one that
exists for RBAC, Jin et al. [66] worked on defining the core components in an
ABAC model in order to provide foundations for a widely agreed-upon reference
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ABAC model.
ABAC approach is considered more flexible as compared to RBAC, since it
can easily accommodate contextual attributes as access control parameters [74].
However, the administrative advantages of RBAC such as reviewing the permis-
sions associated with a user are lost as ABAC is typically much more complex
than RBAC in terms of policy review. Thus analyzing the policy and reviewing
or changing user permissions are quite cumbersome tasks in ABAC [38]. We
discuss the features and limitations of RBAC and ABAC in § 4.3.2, in more
detail.
2.4.3 Combining RBAC and ABAC
On one hand, both RBAC and ABAC have their particular advantages and
disadvantages. On the other hand, both have features complimentary to each
other. This fact led to announcement of NIST initiative [74] to integrate RBAC
and its various extensions with ABAC in order to combine the advantages offered
by both RBAC and ABAC.
The NIST initiative identified three possible ways in which roles and attributes
may be combined. The first option is dynamic roles, where attributes determine
the roles to be activated for a user. Al-Kahtani et al.[6] and Kern et al.[70] ex-
plored this option for automated user-role assignment, in large organizations,
using attribute-based rules. These solutions consider only user attributes and
do not address the issues of role-explosion and permission-explosion. In the
second approach, roles and attributes may be combined in an attribute-centric
manner. In this approach, the roles are not associated to permissions; rather
they are treated as just one of many attributes. This approach is essentially
the same as ABAC and does not inherit any benefit from RBAC. In the third
approach, called role-centric, roles determine the maximum permissions avail-
able to a user, and attributes are used to constrain these permissions. Kuhn
et al.[74] identify this approach as a direction for future research, since it may
retain the advantages of RBAC while adding the much needed flexibility.
Our AERBAC model combines roles and attributes using the role-centric ap-
proach. We discuss AERBAC model and few other solutions responding to the
NIST initiative in Chapter 4. Later, we define an access control mechnism for
video surveillance systems in Chapter 5, based on the AERBAC model. The
existing access control approaches proposed for video surveillance systems and
other relevant domains e.g. multimedia applications, are discussed in § 3.3.3
and § 5.4 where we also compare then with our approach.
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2.5 Summary
This chapter discussed different forms of surveillance and a taxonomy of video
surveillance systems. The capabilities of modern video surveillance systems
and the privacy concerns due to usage of video surveillance systems were also
discussed. We also described the major access control paradigms and the advan-
tages and limitations of the currently dominant RBAC and ABAC access control
models. Several extensions of RBAC to overcome its limitations and some re-
search efforts using ABAC approach were also reported. Finally the need to
integrate RBAC and ABAC, as initiated by NIST, and different strategies to
combine these two approaches were discussed.
Chapter 3
Security and Privacy:
Requirements and
Challenges
In this chapter, we present a general model of video surveillance to help iden-
tify a list of security and privacy requirements in a video surveillance system.
We provide an overview of existing solutions proposed to fulfill the major re-
quirements identified through our video surveillance model and point out their
problems. We identify a potential gap where research efforts need to be put in
by pointing out challenges that need to be considered while designing security
solutions in this regard. Out of the identified challenges, we chose to work on
dynamic access control in video surveillance systems. Thus we also identify fea-
tures desired in an access control model suitable for video surveillance systems,
towards the end of this chapter.
3.1 Video Surveillance Model
In this section, we generalize the architecture, presented in § 2.2.2, into an ab-
stract model of video surveillance as a method to identify the manifold security
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and privacy requirements in a video surveillance system. Fundamentally, a video
surveillance system must include elements to capture video, to store/record
video and to display video to the users, as well as a mechanism to transport
video data between these elements. Figure 3.1(a) shows the main elements of
our model, which includes four components, namely: video-capture, -transport,
-monitoring, and -storage. The video-capture component includes the cameras,
their local infrastructure, and the area which can be captured by the cameras.
Once the data is captured, it needs to be securely transported; this is typically
done over the Internet, so we have included this as a component in our model. It
is important that video transport is done in a way that ensures the confidential-
ity and integrity of data while in-transit. The transport component considers
transport of data from cameras to storage servers, between storage servers, and
when transferring the live or stored video data to the observers. The monitoring
component includes the different elements that are necessary to allow somebody
to watch the video. The monitoring component must consider all security and
privacy concerns that arise when the captured data (live or stored) is watched by
the observers. It also includes any automatic or manual processing (e.g. mask-
ing the identity revealing regions) for the purpose of observing live or stored
data, therefore when the stored data is watched by the observers, it falls under
the monitoring component. Finally, the storage component is responsible for
securely storing the data.
Figure 3.1: Video surveillance model
The four components identified in Fig. 3.1(a), allow us to identify the domain
and scope for many of the security and privacy requirements that may arise in
video surveillance systems. We do, however, also need to consider the different
stakeholders and interests in order to identify all the security and privacy re-
quirements in video surveillance systems. There are two principal stakeholders
in a video surveillance systems, the owner, who commissions and is responsible
for the system, and the people who are being watched by the system; these are
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shown as principal opposing forces in Fig. 3.1(b). In practice, however, normally
owners do not operate the video surveillance systems themselves, but instead
delegate this task to another organization, e.g. a guard company; this organiza-
tion is referred to as the operator. Similarly, most people are unable to determine
whether video surveillance is fair and warranted or excessive, so it is typically an
elected government which regulates video surveillance through legislation and
guidelines. This means that, in practice, the video surveillance operator and
the government become the real opposing forces in a video surveillance system.
Note that the term observer used earlier holds a subset of responsibilities of the
operator. The term observer represents a user who wishes to access the data
captured in a video surveillance system, whereas operator may have additional
responsibilities such as maintaining the system and ensuring legal compliance
as per government regulations.
People are the core of our model, because they may have certain expectations
from each component of the video surveillance system, whereas the other entities
strive to live up to the expectations of the people. It is the combined respon-
sibility of the owner and the operator to ensure the security of the system and
the privacy of the people as it is defined by the government. Privacy of people
should be protected both from outside attackers and the personnel within the
owner and operator organizations. The operator is responsible for performing
his duties while being least intrusive as far as the privacy of people is concerned.
Based on our model, requirements capturing consists of two stages. In the first
stage, we map the requirements from the perspective of each of the stakeholders
for each of the four components in the model. In the second stage, we remap
these requirements in terms of privacy and security aspects. The first stage
ensures that we identify the requirements that can be specified by the people
and/or the government, owner and operator in the form of security and privacy
related functionalities and features in the system.
Based on the requirements specified by the people/government, owner and oper-
ator, we then derive further requirements from the implementation point of view.
For instance, the proportionate access requirement specified by the owner is di-
vided into multiple requirements including data hiding, dynamic access control
and voyeurism protection when considered in the implementation perspective.
Table 3.1 presents the security and privacy requirements in video surveillance
identified as a result of the first stage.
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Table 3.1: Security and privacy requirements in different phases of video
surveillance corresponding to all the stakeholders. The last column
derives implementation requirements from the ones on left
Stakeholders/
Phase
People/
Government
Owner Operator Implementation
requirements
Capture c1.
c2.
c3.
Consent
Signage
Anonymity
c4.
c5.
c6.
No data
missing
Availability
Video
capturing
properties
None c7. Security of
software and
hardware
infrastructure
Transport t1.
t2.
t3.
Confidential-
ity
Integrity
Authenticity
t1.
t2.
t3.
Confidential-
ity
Integrity
Authenticity
None t4.
t5.
t6.
t7.
Camera
authentication
Data encryption
Key management
No deletion of data
Monitoring m1.
m2.
m3.
Privacy
safeguards
Authorized
access
Public access
to their data
m4.
m5.
m6.
m2.
Continuous
monitoring
Proportionate
access
Occasional
access
Authorized
access
m7.
m8.
m9.
Data
freshness
Time-
stamping
Easy to
search
m10.
m11.
m12.
m13.
m8.
Dynamic access
control
Data hiding
Voyeurism
protection
User management
Time-stamping
Storage s1. Secure
storage
s2.
s3.
Secure data
storage as
per law
Deletion af-
ter retention
period
None s3.
c7.
t2.
t5.
t6.
Deletion after
retention period
Security of
software and hard-
ware infrastructure
Integrity
Data encryption
Key management
Using our model, the first stage produces a large number of requirements. How-
ever, it contains certain overlapping and repetitive requirements too. This is be-
cause our model identifies each requirement in the perspective of the individual
stakeholders. Thus in the second stage, we remap those requirements consider-
ing the conventional security and privacy aspects that allows us to combine the
repetitive requirements together. Table 3.2 depicts this mapping. We briefly
describe these requirements in greater details below.
Privacy:
Consent and Signage: Consent (1a in Table 3.2) of the people who can po-
tentially be recorded by the video surveillance system needs to be obtained in
advance, either explicitly or implicitly. One way to obtain consent is by inform-
ing the people about the video surveillance through signage (1b) i.e. displaying
clear and visible symbols in the area where video surveillance takes place.
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Table 3.2: Remapping of the requirements in Table 3.1 in terms of privacy &
security aspects
Components/
P&S Aspects
Capture Transport Monitoring Storage
Privacy 1.
Privacy
1a.
1b.
1c.
1d.
Consent
(c1)
Signage (c2)
Anonymity
(c3)
Video
capturing
properties
(c6)
None 1e.
1f.
1g.
1c.
Privacy safeguards
(m1)
Data hiding (m11)
Voyeurism protec-
tion (m12)
Anonymity (c3)
1g. Voyeurism
protection
(m12)
Security
2.
Confid-
entiality
Covered by 7a,
below
2a.
2b.
Data en-
cryption
(t5)
Key
managem-
ent (t6)
None 2a.
2b.
Data en-
cryption
(t5)
Key
manage-
ment (t6)
3.
Integri-
ty
Covered by 7a,
below
3a.
3b.
No deletion
of data (t7)
Integrity
(t3)
3c. Data freshness
(m7)
3b. Integrity
(t3)
4.
Authen-
ticity
Covered by 7a,
below
4a.
4b.
Camera
aut-
hentication
(t4)
Time-
stamping
(m8)
4b. Time-stamping
(m8)
None
5.
Availa-
bility
5a. No data
missing (c4)
None 5b.
5c.
Easy search (m9)
Continuous
monitoring (m4)
Covered by 7a,
below
6.
Authori-
zed
access
None None 6a.
6b.
6c.
6d.
6e.
6f.
Public access to
their data (m3)
Occasional access
(m6)
Proportionate
access (m5)
Dynamic access
control (m10)
User management
(m13)
Logging (m14)
None
7.
Others
7a. Security of
software
and
hardware
infrastruc-
ture (c7)
None None 7a.
7b.
Security
of soft-
ware and
hardware
infrastruc-
ture (c7)
Deletion
after reten-
tion period
(s3)
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Anonymity, Data Hiding and Privacy Safeguards: As the system is supposed to
monitor the behavior of the people, it should strive to maintain the anonymity
(1c) of the people by hiding their identity using certain privacy safeguarding
mechanisms (1e). Therefore the system must implement data hiding (1f) tech-
niques which obfuscate the identity-revealing regions in the images when the
observers monitor video streams in a normal situation. Needless to say, these
data hiding techniques should be reversible such that identity could be revealed
if required, for example while investigating a crime.
Video capturing properties (1d): The owner needs to determine whether cam-
eras with advanced functionalities such as pan-tilt-zoom, night-vision and high-
resolution are really required to be used, with respect to the purpose of the
surveillance conducted.
Voyeurism protection (1g): In order to restrict voyeurism, advanced function-
alities such as searching, identifying and tracking an individual are only to be
made available when an observer explicitly requests them. While granting these
privileges the system logs the request along with the information about the
circumstances.
Confidentiality:
The people and owner desire that the data is accessible only to the intended
recipients. Confidentiality ensures privacy protection against outsiders mainly
when data is in transit, whereas privacy is a much broader concept that covers
privacy protection against insiders too. Confidentiality can be ensured by using
appropriate data encryption algorithms (2a) and taking care of key management
(2b) issues. Because of the nature of the system, the encryption mechanism
should be efficient enough enabling the data to reach the other end in real-time.
Integrity:
Any unauthorized change in the data should be detectable. Appropriate mea-
sures should be taken to ensure the integrity (3b) of data. Moreover, it should
not be possible to delete chunks of data (3a) while leaving other data intact so
as to hide the data captured in a specific time interval.
Data freshness (3c): The operator requires newly captured data in live stream-
ing rather than previously captured data being replayed.
Authenticity:
Camera authentication (4a): In order to ensure the authenticity of the captured
data, each camera may be required to authenticate itself to the server.
Time-stamping (4b): The recorded data must include verifiable time-stamping
helping to ensure that the data was captured at a specific time and also to search
videos specifying the time interval later on.
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Availability:
The services offered by the system should of course be available when needed.
If surveillance takes place upon detection of an event e.g. motion detection
then such a mechanism is to be made perfectly reliable such that no event goes
uncaptured i.e. data missing should not be possible (5a).
Easy search (5b): The operators require that advanced functionalities such as
searching, identifying and tracking an individual are available whenever required
so they can effectively perform their duties.
Continuous monitoring (5c): The owner requires that the captured data is
continuously monitored manually and/or by using automated tools.
Authorized access:
Public access to their data (6a): Certain countries, for example Canada and
France, allow an individual to watch their own images captured by the surveil-
lance system. Therefore, people should be able to get access to the images
containing them, through a predefined procedure.
Occasional access (6b): As discussed in § 2.2.2, occasional access to the data
might need to be given to certain public organizations; the system needs to build
a mechanism to enable such access.
Proportionate access (6c): In order to protect the privacy of people, the owner
requires that the proportionate access principle is implemented in the system
and that the observers are given the minimum access to the data required to
fulfill their duties. This can be achieved by implementing dynamic access con-
trol.
Dynamic access control (6d): The system must take the context pertinent to a
situation into account when authorizing access to data so that different access
levels (e.g. blurred, hiding identity of people, original images) are maintained in
different situations (e.g. normal, emergency) and privacy of people is preserved
to the maximum extent. In short, the access level should change appropriately
depending upon the situation.
User management (6e): This involves all the issues related to the users of the
system including user enrollment, permission assignment, changing permissions,
permission revocation, user deletion etc.
Logging (6f): All activities performed by the observers should be securely
logged, especially those permissions requested explicitly.
Others:
Security of software and hardware infrastructure (7a): It is to be ensured that
the security of the underlying infrastructure is well protected against the attacks
exploiting software vulnerabilities or physical access to the hardware.
Deletion after retention period (7b): Different countries have different regula-
tions regarding the period of time the captured data can be kept by the operator
(cf. Appendix-A). Depending upon the regulations of the region where video
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surveillance takes place, the captured data must be automatically deleted as
soon as the retention period expires.
Considering the concerns of each stakeholder involved in video surveillance sys-
tem, it is reasonable to expect that our model has identified a comprehensive
set of security and privacy requirements, though a complete set of requirements
is not guaranteed. As mentioned previously, there exists a large amount of work
on protecting privacy in video surveillance. The next section briefly summa-
rizes the major types of available techniques for protecting privacy, followed by
the state of the art of security research in video surveillance system and the
associated challenges.
3.2 Privacy in Video Surveillance
A pervasive video surveillance system may be exploited by the observers for
unauthorized collection of data on the activities of an individual [34]. As stated
earlier, in the United Kingdom, a report discovered that observers have used
video surveillance for voyeurism [96]. Possibilities for such misuse are further
increased with the advent of modern video surveillance systems that facilitate
rapid data retrieval enabled by indexing and searching and advanced imag-
ing technology allowing high-resolution and zooming-in. Moreover, pervasive
surveillance networks may enable linking the activities of a target in multiple
video streams [87].
Considering the above-mentioned issues, several techniques to protect the pri-
vacy of the observed individuals have been proposed. In order to hide the iden-
tity of observed subjects, identity revealing sensitive areas are first determined
and then removed or de-identified depending upon the approach used. Several
types of techniques to hide privacy-sensitive areas have been proposed. A simple
technique is to fully remove the sensitive regions; this technique not only hides
the identity but in some cases also the behavior, see for example [40] [41] [139].
Another type of approach is to reduce the level of detail of privacy-sensitive
areas, with the help of blurring or pixilation, leaving the subject unidentifiable
yet the behavior remains recognizable, see [122] [127] [160] to name only a few.
The third approach, called abstraction, is to remove the sensitive regions and
replace them with dummy objects such as silhouettes or skeletons. Some of the
key works in this area are [130] [61] [73]. Yet another technique proposed in lit-
erature, called scrambling, is to encrypt the sensitive regions with a key allowing
the area to be decrypted only by authorized personnel possessing the key, see
for instance [46] [27] [32]. As compared to other techniques, this approach offers
the benefit of perfectly reconstructing the original image.
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3.3 Security in Video Surveillance
A study of the relevant literature, reveals that many solutions, discussed be-
low, addressing the security requirements including integrity, authentication
and confidentiality have been proposed in multimedia systems e.g. video on
demand and business video conferencing. However the factors involved in video
surveillance systems are quite different than multimedia systems hence these
solutions cannot be directly applied in video surveillance systems, although a
few commonalities exist. In video surveillance systems, the security aspects are
to be addressed when data is transferred from camera-to-server, server-to-server
and server-to-handheld devices or monitoring room, due to the communication
over public networks. We discuss here why the security requirements in video
surveillance systems are important and identify the challenges to be addressed
when designing security solutions for these requirements.
3.3.1 Integrity and Authenticity
An important security consideration is integrity protection and authentication
of recorded video data. This is important for two reasons [14]: i) to accept the
recordings as evidence in a court of law, and ii) to avoid framing an individual,
e.g. by tempering with the recordings of a crime scene. Two major techniques to
address integrity exist [128]: using cryptographic hash functions along with digi-
tal signatures or by making use of watermarks in the video recordings. Solutions
proposed in multimedia systems mostly use cryptographic techniques [128] [137].
The integrity protection solution is desired to be robust against certain mod-
ifications such as scaling and compression and images should be verifiable de-
spite such benign modifications [137]. In order to ensure authenticity, cameras
need to authenticate themselves to the server. Some of the key solutions pro-
posed in this respect require to use Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in each
camera [153] [152] [151]. This approach is prohibitively expensive in terms of
re-installation of existing cameras with TPM-enabled cameras. Furthermore,
performance and scalability remain issues to be resolved too.
3.3.2 Confidentiality
Similar to integrity and authentication, there are several solutions presented
for confidentiality mainly targeting multimedia applications [82] [80] [133]. In
order to fulfill these requirements, the existing solutions essentially use cryp-
tography. However, the conventional cryptographic algorithms used in these
40 Security and Privacy: Requirements and Challenges
solutions are not especially designed to encrypt video data [81]. Their usage
on video data, although compressed, requires significant processing power, for
instance, an MPEG-2 video stream requires a bit rate ranging between 4 to
9 Mbps [62]. Because of the huge amount of data and real-time requirement,
efficient usage of cryptography is far from the desired efficiency level in con-
ventional multimedia applications [81], whereas its usage in video surveillance
introduces further challenges. In video surveillance systems, unlike multimedia
applications, there are several video producers (cameras) with limited process-
ing capabilities. A major challenge, therefore, is to devise encryption algorithms
which may efficiently encrypt the large amounts of continuously produced video
data, transferred in real-time to the server side, by the cameras. Another rele-
vant issue is key management. Along with encrypting the data from each camera
with a different key, the keys may also need to differ for each chunk of data, for
instance different key for each 24 hours of data recorded by a camera.
A few solutions addressing confidentiality in video surveillance systems have also
been proposed [126] [83] [33]. In order to protect the privacy of individuals and
to ensure efficient retrieval of data, modern video surveillance systems extract
metadata such as object identification, number of objects and the object types
contained in the video streams in real-time [58]. This data is normally extracted
at the server, therefore the server must be able to access decrypted data. Solu-
tions proposed in [126] and [33] fail to consider this aspect and share the keys
among users requiring them to collaborate when data is to be decrypted. An-
other reason for the server to access plain data contents is to be able to send
modified video streams (low resolution, obfuscated privacy regions) to different
users depending on their access authorization, discussed later in this section.
Once metadata has been extracted at the server, another interesting research
issue is to securely store the data along with the associated metadata in a man-
ner that it is possible to efficiently retrieve metadata and its associated video
streams later, based on query language, for example.
3.3.3 Authorized Access
Another important challenge which we believe requires major research effort is
access authorization in video surveillance systems. Controlling the access to
data is of critical importance, as the potential capabilities offered by modern
video surveillance systems such as searching for an individual or an event, and
monitoring the activities of an individual spanning over multiple locations [87],
makes it very easy to invade the privacy of individuals. Clearly video surveillance
is expected to become more pervasive and this leaves us with only two choices:
either entrust the observers or to devise a mechanism for watching the watchers
and minimizing the chances to use such systems abusively [28].
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Similar to the above-mentioned security requirements, there exist several solu-
tions regarding access control mechanisms for online and other payment-based
video databases [23] [24] [107]. Bertino et al. [23] argue that an effective and
efficient access control mechanism in video databases requires advancements in
extraction of meaningful metadata. Furthermore, such mechanism must take
benefit of the indexing structure used to store the video data. With advance-
ments in indexing and metadata extraction techniques in video databases, we
believe that the research efforts now need to focus on devising access control
techniques for video surveillance systems. Below we discuss research efforts that
discuss access control explicitly for video surveillance systems. We discuss other
access control approaches relevant to video surveillance systems such as access
control in multimedia databases and satellite images and compare them with
our proposed model, in § 5.4.
There are only a few research attempts that focus on the challenge of access
control in video surveillance. Senior et al. [130] present the idea of using mul-
tiple privacy levels in video surveillance systems where different observers are
provided different levels of information and actions to be performed, depend-
ing on the access privileges of the observer. Different information levels may
include, for example, access to behavioral information while hiding the iden-
tity of individuals in the video by replacing the objects contained in the video
with silhouettes. Similarly different levels of actions to be performed include
restrictions over playback, zooming-in and searching functions, offered by the
system. The authors suggest using a privacy-preserving console manager that
makes use of encryption and access control mechanisms and shows the data to
the observer by revealing information components from video streams as per the
authorization level of the observer. In order to use this approach, a large-scale
video surveillance system requires an access control model specifically designed
to meet requirements of such systems. However, the paper presents only the
concept of privacy-preserving console manager without providing details of the
access control mechanism.
Moncrieff et al. [87] argue that using static security policies in video surveil-
lance is either too intrusive for privacy or it hinders the usability of the system.
They identify the challenge of utilizing the video surveillance system by expos-
ing sufficient need-specific data to the observers while preserving the privacy of
people. The authors suggest that one possible way of protecting privacy in video
surveillance while retaining its useful functionality is to use dynamic access con-
trol mechanisms. They propose to incorporate the context of the requester in
the access authorization, where privacy is maintained using data hiding tech-
niques in normal situations, whereas a request to data in certain situations, e.g.
emergency cases, would enable the users to access full information with less fo-
cus on protecting privacy. Similar to the above-mentioned solution [130], this
paper also does not provide an access control mechanism. The main contribu-
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tion of this paper is to identify the challenge of a dynamic access control in video
surveillance while leaving the designing of dynamic access control model as a
goal to be achieved in future research. The requirements that we identified in
our video surveillance model also emphasize this challenge and demand that the
context of the requester is taken into consideration while granting the access.
We take on this challenge of designing a dynamic access control model and pro-
pose a mechanism that preserves privacy of people without underutilizing the
efficacy of the system (cf. § 3.4 and Chapter-5).
Birnstill & Pretschner [25] propose the use of usage controlled mechanism in
video surveillance in order to protect the privacy of recorded people. They
propose to use two different operational modes called default and alarm. The
default mode aims to protect the privacy by showing only the site map view
of the surveillance area with type and location of objects. The alarm mode is
activated upon triggering of an alarm and shows the video streams without hid-
ing the privacy-sensitive regions. However, the authors neither define an access
control model nor do they discuss the structure and language that may be used
to specify the authorization policy. They assume that the access control policy
is already in place and discuss the architectural and enforcement requirements
in order to apply such a policy.
To the best of our knowledge, Thuraisingham et al. [145] present the first formal
access control model that targets video surveillance environments. The solution
makes use of metadata extracted from video data. This metadata represents the
objects and events contained in a video stream, in addition to the timestamp and
location where it was captured. It presents a grammar that allows representing
video streams using the associated metadata. Access privileges for observers can
be specified using predefined credential expression templates based on their id,
group or other characteristics, e.g. area associated with a user. The solution,
however, offers a static access control model and does not allow the access
privileges of an observer to be changed dynamically based on the changing
situation.
Finally, in a large-scale video surveillance systems requiring occasional access by
multiple public organizations such as the police and fire-brigade, management of
users is also a challenge. This may require using federated identity management
allowing each participating organization to manage its own users. Existing
federated identity and access management solutions like SAML [98] and WS-
Federation [99] may be investigated for this purpose.
Table 3.3 provides a list of future challenges in security of video surveillance
systems. Each challenge refers to the related requirements given in Table 3.2.
Based on our model and the discussion, it is evident that many security require-
ments in video surveillance systems still require further research in this domain.
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Protecting the privacy of individuals without compromising the functionality
of the system demands an access control mechanism that makes use of privacy
enhancing technologies in order to hide the privacy sensitive regions in the video
frames while making them available when required. Clearly there exists a gap
demanding further research in this domain in order to satisfy the security re-
quirements in video surveillance systems and to increase their acceptability in
society.
Table 3.3: Future research challenges in security of video surveillance systems
Security aspect Future research challenges
1. Confidentiality 1.1. Novel efficient real-time encryption algorithms for large-scale
video data from multiple sources (2a)
1.2. Duration-specific key management techniques for data pro-
duced by several cameras (2b)
1.3. Secure storage of video data and the associated metadata
while enabling efficient retrieval (5b)
2. Integrity &
Authenticity
2.1. Integrity protection solutions having robustness against be-
nign modifications (3b, 3c)
2.2. Scalable and efficient authenticity mechanisms for large-scale
video surveillance data (4a, 4b)
3. Authorized
access
3.1. Multiple privacy levels in the video surveillance data, mak-
ing use of existing privacy enhancing techniques, with each level
accessible to different access privileges (1c, 1e, 1f, 6c)
3.2. Dynamic access control that enables preserving the privacy of
people yet exposing maximum data to the observers when needed
(6b, 6c, 6d)
3.3. Novel access control mechanisms utilizing the indexing struc-
ture of video data and the extracted metadata (6a)
3.4. Federated identity and access management solutions for au-
thorizing access of video surveillance data (6b, 6c)
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Out of the challenges identified above, in this thesis, we focus on addressing the
challenge of dynamic access control in video surveillance systems. We chose this
area due to the lack of existing research in this area and due to the requirement of
an access control mechanism by our industrial collaborator, Milestone Systems,
Denmark. Considering the requirements identified for authorized access in § 3.1,
including proportionate access and occasional access of data, we describe a few
scenarios below. In order to address the challenge of dynamic access control in
video surveillance, we point out the features desired in an access control model
suitable for video surveillance systems, using these scenarios.
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3.4.1 Scenarios
Suppose a modern video surveillance system is deployed in the region of Man-
hattan in New York city where cameras are deployed in the major public places
all over the region. The Manhattan region administration staff is allowed to
regularly monitor video data recorded in different regions of the city. When
granting access to video data, the information related to user and resources is
also taken into consideration. To better illustrate the diverse and complex re-
quirements of access control in video surveillance, we outline some practically
relevant application scenarios below.
Scenario-1: Carol and Dave are working as patrolling observers in Manhattan
region administration. Assume that the region of Manhattan is divided into
multiple smaller regions, e.g. Manhattan_north, Manhattan_south etc. In
order to reduce the privacy invasion and to minimize the possibility of voyeurism,
the patrolling observers are granted access to video data of the smaller region,
Manhattan_north for example, from which they are passing by, determined
based on observer’s current location. In normal circumstances, the observers
are given lower privileged access, e.g., the faces are blurred in the video, to
protect the privacy of people in the videos.
Scenario-2: Suppose the video surveillance system is equipped with event de-
tection such as detection of crossing a forbidden fence, leaving luggage behind,
fire detection, etc. The event detection may be implemented by exploiting
techniques from the fields of pattern recognition and computer vision or by in-
corporating other sensors deployed on the camera locations e.g., fire detectors.
Let us assume a fence is crossed at a certain location in Manhattan_south.
Upon detection of this incident, an alarm goes off and system tries to find the
nearest patrolling observer. Carol is currently patrolling in Manhattan_north
and is the closest patrolling observer. Carol is granted access to the video data
surrounding the region where the alarm is generated, in addition to the video
data located in her patrolling region. Based on this incident, Carol’s access
privileges are elevated and she may access video data, for instance, without hid-
ing the privacy sensitive regions of recorded people in the videos related to the
alarm activated region.
Scenario-3: Suppose there is a fire incident reported in Times Square. Upon
detection of this emergency situation, along with the regular observers assigned
to this location, the nearest fire-brigade and police station, called the collabo-
rating organizations (CO), are also informed about the event and the system
allows access of data to the responding employees of the COs. Allowing access
to the video data for these COs helps the emergency response teams understand
the severity of the situation and to come prepared with appropriate tools and
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man-power to better combat such situations.
From scenarios 1 and 2, we observe that the users are not always stationary but
they may also access videos using mobile devices. Traditional video surveillance
systems are typically monitored in a closed room whose access is physically
controlled. Modern video surveillance systems are monitored over a variety of
devices using Internet and hence require logical access control mechanisms to
control access to data. This implies that the relevant information, e.g. user’s
location and time of access, plays an important role in granting access to videos
and needs to be evaluated at the time of request evaluation. In addition to the
observer’s location and time of access, the videos are also associated with a par-
ticular location and time of recording. Furthermore, the information influencing
the access to resources may also include occurrence of an anomalous event in a
surveilled region.
The third scenario requires that the access control mechanism allows granting
occasional access to video data from a specific region for responding individuals
from COs based on, for instance, occurrence of an incident. Allowing access
to the data to certain individuals only in case a specific incident occurs or an
emergency situation, addresses the privacy concerns raised because of continuous
video surveillance. Using this technique can prove to be immensely useful in
public video surveillance to increase its wider acceptability in public.
3.4.2 Desired Access Control Features
Based on the above scenarios, we observe that changes in security characteristics
may arise from resource (e.g. type of camera), user (e.g. location) and envi-
ronment (e.g. incident). In order to address the challenge of utilizing the video
surveillance systems by exposing sufficient need-specific data while preserving
the privacy of people, access control model should effectively be able to imple-
ment the security and privacy policies. Such privacy policies may imply that
only site-map view of recorded location with silhouettes, or low resolution video
data with blurred faces is accessible to a user under normal circumstances, but
this may be elevated to higher resolution with clearly visible faces in emergency
situations. As video data contains different layers of information, different users
must be given different information and set of actions to be performed on the
video data, depending on the given circumstances.
From the scenarios, it is evident that the access control policies are dependent
on various factors. In addition to the features related to policy specification and
enforcement, certain features related to policy administration are also desired
in such large-scale systems. Below we provide a list of features in terms of
46 Security and Privacy: Requirements and Challenges
functionalities both for policy specification and enforcement (i.e. 1-4), as well
as for policy administration (i.e. 5 & 6) desired in an access control model for
video surveillance systems.
1- Metadata-based permissions: Unlike the access control models which refer to
objects based on their identifiers, the access control policy in video surveillance
system may refer to objects not only by their identifier but also other charac-
teristics associated with them. These characteristics include location and time
when the video was recorded and contents of the data e.g., semantic objects con-
tained within the video. Such type of information is normally captured using
attributes associated with objects. Hence we need an access control mechanism
which allows to use object attributes in policy specification.
2- User context: A user’s access to resources may be dependent on several
parameters associated with the user. Thus the attributes may also be associated
with users such as duty-timing and location of the user. Therefore, the context
of the user needs to be considered when the user is allowed access to a resource.
3- Environmental information: Authorization can be influenced by time of ac-
cess or occurrence of an incident, e.g. fire, act of terrorism, etc. Such type
of information is typically referred to as environmental information [36] and is
captured via environmental attributes. The model should support incorporating
such information in the access control policy.
4- Dynamic attributes: Attributes whose value can change quite frequently, e.g.
location of user, occurrence of an incident, are called dynamic attributes. The
access control mechanism must be appropriate for such dynamic attributes and
must retrieve the current values of these attributes at the time of making an
access control decision.
5- Simplified Auditing: An important administrative feature required in such
systems is auditability. In order to allow auditability, the model should facilitate
to review which permissions a user may exercise in what circumstances. This
allows determining the risk exposure for a given employee or job position by
looking at the set of permissions available to that job position or employee.
6- Modification visualization: Another relevant administrative feature is that
the access control model should facilitate changing permissions assigned to a
user and to analyze the effect of policy changes, e.g. adding or removing a
privilege. It should be easy to visualize effect of a modification in the policy,
i.e., who would be affected by a certain change in the policy.
In contrast to many traditional applications, video surveillance environment is
typically characterized by specification of policies based on multiple user at-
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tributes rather than simply user identity or role, support for content-dependent
(metadata) authorizations, and authorizations being influenced by the contex-
tual information associated with a user or environment. The requirements de-
mand that the model must also provide features such as auditability typically
offered by role-based access control solutions. Considering these features, in
the next chapter, we present a general-purpose dynamic yet role-oriented access
control model which is suitable for not only video surveillance systems but also
other applications sharing similar requirements. In Chapter-5, we present an ac-
cess control mechanism using this general-purpose model for video surveillance
systems.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an abstract model that allows to identify the se-
curity and privacy requirements in video surveillance systems. Our model used
a two-stage process to capture requirements. In the first stage, we point out
the requirements in each component of our model including data transport and
monitoring from the perspective of different stakeholders, e.g. people and oper-
ating organization. The second stage remapped these requirements considering
the conventional security and privacy aspects in order to remove repetitive re-
quirements. We then discussed the existing solutions regarding these security
and privacy requirements and outlined the challenges which need to be ad-
dressed. Finally, the access control features desired in video surveillance are
deduced with the help of few scenarios. In the next chapter, we develop an
access control model considering these features.
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Chapter 4
Attributes Enhanced
Role-Based Access Control
Model
In the previous chapter, we identified the features desired in access control model
for video surveillance systems. Our study of existing access control models in-
dicates that no access control model offers these features (cf. § 5.4). Motivated
by these required features in video surveillance systems and the NIST initia-
tive [74], we first develop a general-purpose access control model that combines
the advantages of RBAC and ABAC in a role-centric manner (cf. § 2.4.3). The
reason to develop a general-purpose access control model is to provide a model
that is suitable for not only video surveillance environments but for also other
applications sharing similar requirements.
This chapter presents our Attributes Enhanced Role-Based Access Control (AER-
BAC) model and its formal specification. We also present algorithms for two
different ways in which access requests may be processed. Moreover, we evalu-
ate AERBAC by comparing it with RBAC and ABAC, and elaborating each of
these models with respect to the features required by video surveillance systems.
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4.1 Overview of AERBAC Model
This section presents an overview of the AERBAC model. Figure 4.1 depicts
our access control model and its components. The entities users, roles, objects
(OBS) and operations (OPS) have the same semantics as in RBAC (cf. § 2.4.1).
Users and objects in our model are associated with attributes too. We also
incorporate environment attributes to fully capture the situation in which access
needs to be authorized. In addition to the components of the model, the dotted-
box in Fig. 4.1 represents the modules of the architectural design required to
enforce this model. Below, we first describe the attributes and then discuss
semantics of different components involved in AERBAC, including permissions,
conditions, sessions and request evaluation.
UA
USERS URA ROLES
PRMS
OPS ObjExpRPA
ssd
OBS
CONDITIONS
S
e
ssio
n
_
ro
le
s
Role 
Hierarchies
dsd
Context Manager
Permit/Deny
Check 
Access
OA
EA
SESSIONS
. 
.
.
Figure 4.1: Attributes enhanced role-based access control (AERBAC) model
Attributes: Attributes capture the properties of specific entities (e.g. user).
We define an attribute function for each attribute that returns the value of
that attribute. Each attribute is represented by a range of finite sets of atomic
values1. For example, the range of branch attribute is a set of branch names
semantically relevant for the application domain. User attributes (UA) capture
the properties of the user who initiates an access request. Examples of typical
user attributes are title, affiliation, specialization, location, security clearance
etc. Object attributes (OA) are used to define the properties of the resources
protected by the access control policy. Examples of typical object attributes
include type, owner, status, location, time of object creation etc. Environment
attributes (EA) capture external factors of the situation in which the access takes
place. Temperature, time of day, occurrence of an event, system mode or other
information which not only pertains to a specific object or user, but may hold
1For handling continuous data such as temperature, the elements of the finite set comprise
of ranges of intervals.
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for multiple entities, at the same time, are typically modeled as environment
attributes.
An attribute may be either static or dynamic. The values of static attributes
rarely change e.g. designation, department, type etc. On the other hand,
dynamic attributes have values that may change frequently and unpredictably,
so they may even change during the lifetime of a session. This means that
they may need to be checked more frequently, depending on the application
requirements. Examples of such attributes include officer in command, loca-
tion, occurrence of an incident etc. Dynamic attributes are also referred to as
contextual attributes in the literature [37].
Permissions and conditions: Our aim is to provide a dynamic, yet easy
to manage solution to enforce the access control model. In our model, this
is done by incorporating attributes associated with user, objects and environ-
ment. In contrast to the traditional approaches in RBAC, the permissions in
AERBAC refer to objects indirectly, using their attributes. A permission refers
to a set of objects sharing common attributes, e.g. type, label or status, using
a single permission, in contrast to separate permissions for each unique object
(cf. § 4.3.1). This is particularly relevant in those domains where several objects
share common attribute values and helps in significantly reducing the number
of permissions associated with a role.
In AERBAC, a permission consists of an object expression and an authorized
operation on the object set denoted by the expression. Object expressions are
formed using the attributes of objects. Each permission is associated with one
or more conditions, which must be evaluated to be true in order for the user
to exercise that permission. A condition associated with a permission may
contain attributes of all entities including users, objects and environment. In
some applications, it is required to compare user and object attributes – for
example, in a bank, a manager of a branch is allowed to access only those
accounts belonging to his own branch. The proposed model allows to perform
such comparisons using conditions.
An example of a permission, using typical attributes e.g. label, status and clear-
ance, is: p= ( (oLabel(o) = ’secret’ ∧ oStatus(o) = ’active’), read) which states
that a role having this permission can perform read operation on the objects
which are labeled secret and whose status is currently active. Here oLabel and
oStatus are object attribute functions that return the values of respective at-
tributes for a given object. Suppose that the permission p is constrained by
a condition c= (uClearance(u) = ’secret’ ∧ time_of_day() ≤ uDutyExpire(u))
where uClearance and uDutyExpire are user attribute functions that return
the attribute values of a given user, whereas time_of_day() is an environment
attribute function. This condition implies that, in order to be granted the per-
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mission p, the user clearance must be secret and the time of access must be
before the end of user’s duty timing.
Context manager: As mentioned above, the values of dynamic attributes can
change quite frequently. The Context Manager is responsible for propagating
the updated values of dynamic attributes of the users, objects and environment.
Depending on the application, such a change may require re-evaluation of an
already granted permission. We discuss continuous enforcement of access control
for such dynamic attributes in § 5.2.1.
Session: A session contains a list of permissions, along with their associated
conditions, assigned to the roles activated by the user. As described earlier, the
permissions are different from standard RBAC permissions in terms of referring
to the objects using their attributes and being tied with the conditions that are
evaluated every time a permission is to be exercised. Hence, the CheckAccess
function in RBAC needs to be re-defined.
Access request: An important consideration, in environments motivating the
proposed approach, is that the user’s request may also be based on the attributes
of the objects. For instance, a user might want to view all objects containing
some specified characteristics e.g., objects with oType = ’classified’ and oDept =
’admin’. For a user request to be granted, there must exist an object expression
in the user’s session that denotes the requested objects, and the condition tied
to that object expression must be evaluated to be true. There are different
possibilities in which such a request may be evaluated and we discuss them
later in the chapter (cf. § 4.2.1).
4.2 Formal AERBAC Model
In this section, we present the formal model that incorporates the attributes
of the user, object and environment into RBAC in a role-oriented fashion. We
define the sets and functions used in AERBAC in Table 4.1. The upper part of
the table shows the sets and functions defined in NIST RBAC [50] (cf. § 2.4.1)
which are also applicable to AERBAC. The user-to-role assignment (URA) rela-
tion captures the mapping of assignment of roles to users. Each user can create
more than one sessions thereby activating a subset of roles, assigned to that
user, in each session. The function session_user(se) returns the user to whom a
given session se belongs. The function avail_session_perms(se) returns the set
of permissions available to a user in a given session.
We provide further sets and functions needed for AERBAC in the lower part of
Table 4.1. UATT, OATT and EATT represent sets of attribute functions for
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Table 4.1: Sets and functions used in AERBAC
• USERS, ROLES, OBS, and OPS (users, roles, objects and operations respectively)
• URA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, a many-to-many mapping of user-to-role assignment;
• SESSIONS, the set of sessions;
• user_sessions(u: USERS) → 2SESSIONS, the mapping of user u onto a set of sessions;
• session_roles(se: SESSIONS)→ 2ROLES, the mapping of session se onto a set of roles.
Formally: session_roles(sei) ⊆ { r ∈ ROLES | (session_user(sei), r) ∈ URA};
• avail_session_perms(se: SESSIONS) → 2PRMS, the permissions available to a user in
a session.
• UATT, OATT and EATT represent finite sets of user, object and environment attribute
functions respectively.
• For each att in UATT ∪ OATT ∪ EATT, Range(att) represents the attribute’s range,
a finite set of atomic values.
• attType: UATT ∪ OATT ∪ EATT → {setType, atomicType}, specifies attributes as
set or atomic valued.
• OBJ_EXP = Set of all object expressions formed using the language given in Table
4.2.
• COND = Set of all conditions formed using the language given in Table 4.2.
• PRMS = 2 (OPS × OBJ_EXP), the set of permissions.
• RPA ⊆ ROLES × PRMS × COND
• Each attribute function in UATT, OATT and EATT returns either atomic or set values.
∀ua ∈ UATT. ua : USERS→
{
Range(ua) if attType(ua) = atomicType
2Range(ua) if attType(ua) = setType
∀oa ∈ OATT. oa : OBS→
{
Range(oa) if attType(oa) = atomicType
2Range(oa) if attType(oa) = setType
∀ea ∈ EATT. ea→
{
Range(ea) if attType(ea) = atomicType
2Range(ea) if attType(ea) = setType
users, objects and environment, respectively. The notion we used for attribute
representation is adapted from [66]. We use first order logic to make formal
descriptions, and follow the convention that all unbound variables are universally
quantified given as Range(att). Each attribute can be of type set or atomic which
is determined using the attType function. Based on the type of attribute, each
attribute function returns either an atomic value or a set of values, for that
attribute. Attribute functions in UATT and OATT take as an argument a user
and an object, respectively. Each attribute function in EATT may or may not
require an argument, depending on the attribute and the target system. For
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Table 4.2: Language to form object expressions and conditions
ϕ ::= ϕ ∧ ϕ|ϕ ∨ ϕ|(ϕ)| set setcompare set | atomic ∈ set | atomic atomiccompare atomic
setcompare ::= ⊂ | ⊆ | *
atomiccompare ::= < | = | ≤ | 6=
To define an object expression, set and atomic are as follows:
• set::= setoa(o:OBS) | ConsSet
• atomic::= atomicoa(o:OBS) | ConsAtomic
• setoa ∈ {oa | oa ∈ OATT ∧ attType(oa) = setType}
• atomicoa ∈ {oa | oa ∈ OATT ∧ attType(oa) = atomicType}
For condition specification, set and atomic are as follows:
• set::= setua (session_user(se)) | setoa(o:OBS) | setea() | ConsSet
• atomic::= atomicua (session_user(se)) | atomicoa(o:OBS) | atomicea() | ConsAtomic
• setua ∈ {ua | ua ∈ UATT ∧ attType(ua) = setType }
• atomicua ∈ {ua | ua ∈ UATT ∧ attType(ua)= atomicType }
• setoa ∈ {oa | oa ∈ OATT ∧ attType(oa) = setType}
• atomicoa ∈ {oa | oa ∈ OATT ∧ attType(oa) = atomicType}
• setea ∈ {ea | ea ∈ EATT ∧ attType(ea) = setType}
• atomicea ∈ {ea | ea ∈ EATT ∧ attType(ea) = atomicType}
instance, in a banking system with multiple branches, an environment attribute
function would require the branch name to return the value of an environment
attribute, e.g., current-mode, in that branch. The role-permission assignment
(RPA) relation captures permissions that are assigned to a role when a given
set of conditions are fulfilled. Clearly, the permission set may change for a role
if the conditions vary between requests.
As discussed earlier, permissions in AERBAC are specified using object expres-
sions and are associated with conditions. The language to define an object
expression and a condition is given in the first part of Table 4.2. The language
specifies that a set can only be compared with another set while an atomic
value can either belong to a set or can be compared with another atomic value.
The second part of the table specifies how instances of set and atomic may be
formed to define an object expression and a condition. In order to define an
object expression, we may use only the object attributes. On the other hand,
for specifying a condition, we may use attributes of all entities (i.e. users, ob-
jects, environment) each of which is either atomicType or setType. ConsSet and
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ConsAtomic represent a set of constant values and a constant atomic value,
respectively.
4.2.1 Access Decisions
The main role of the access control mechanism is to verify whether a user u,
requesting to perform an operation op, on an object o, is authorized to do so. As
mentioned earlier, a user request can either explicitly specify an object, by listing
its identifier, or can implicitly denote a set of objects by using the attributes
of the objects. If the user request is not for a specific object but rather a set
of objects, the system must consider the given criteria to return the requested
objects. Once a user submits an access request, the request is to be evaluated
against the policy. The function checkAccess in RBAC needs to be modified
such that it takes the user request as input, processes the request as per the
format of a given request, and returns the result. In the following, we elaborate
on evaluation of both identifier-based and attribute-based requests.
a) Identifier-based request: In identifier-based request, the user specifies the
identifier of the object to be accessed. The evaluation of this type of request is
straight-forward. In this case, the input of the function checkAccess consists of a
session se, an operation m, and an object obj. Recall that a permission consists
of an object expression and an operation and is constrained by a condition. The
checkAccess function returns true if and only if i) there exists a permission p, in
the avail_session_perms of session se, that contains an object expression which
evaluates to true for obj, ii) m matches op, and iii) the corresponding condition
c evaluates to true.
b) Attribute-based request: Using the second form of request, the user may
specify the attributes of the object in his/her request, rather than the unique
identifier of an object. Specifying the object attributes in the request implies
that the user wishes to access all those objects which have the specified attribute
values. Attribute-based requests may be formulated in different ways. We dis-
cuss two possible ways to formulate and process such requests: i) resource query
evaluation, and ii) attribute values evaluation. In resource query evaluation, the
reference monitor receives an attribute-based request from the user. From this
request, a query is formed to retrieve the objects from the object database. Af-
ter objects retrieval, it is checked whether or not the user is allowed to access
each retrieved object. Whereas in attribute-values evaluation approach, the ref-
erence monitor first evaluates whether the user is allowed to access the objects
represented by the given attribute-values. If the user is authorized to do so, the
objects represented by the user request are retrieved from the object database.
Otherwise, the user request is denied. Figure 4.2 graphically illustrates both of
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Figure 4.2: Attribute-based request evaluation approaches
these approaches. Below we elaborate further on these approaches and present
algorithm for each approach.
b.1) Resource query: In this approach, the user request contains an expres-
sion similar to the object expressions. An example user request could be: Req
= <se, (oType = ’secret’ ∧ oDept = ’admin’ ∧ oStatus = ’inactive’), write>
which states that the owner of the session se wishes to exercise the write oper-
ation on the objects denoted by the given object expression. The checkAccess
function receives as input the access request Req and returns the authorized
objects to the user, if request is granted, otherwise the request is denied. The
given expression is converted to a query and the resulting objects are retrieved
from the resource database. Next step is to find the applicable object expres-
sions by matching the user’s requested operation with the ones mentioned in the
permission set existing in the user’s session. Once the object expressions are
shortlisted, they are evaluated one-by-one for each object returned by the query.
If an object expression and its corresponding condition evaluate to true for an
object, the object is added to the list of authorized objects that are granted to
the user. Finally, the user is granted access to all those objects in the authorized
list. Figure 4.3 presents the algorithm for this approach. Since the object ex-
pressions are to be evaluated for each returned object, this approach may prove
to be expensive in cases where several objects are returned by the query formed
based on user’s request.
b.2) Attribute values: An alternative strategy is to evaluate the user’s re-
quest against the object expressions before retrieving the actual objects from the
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Algorithm 1
Input: An access request: Req = <se, re, m >consisting of session identifier
se, request expression re, and operation m.
Output: 1) Grant and return authorized objects, 2) Deny otherwise
Begin:
1: relevant_expressions = φ;
2: object_set = φ;
3: authorized_objects = φ;
4: object_set = search_objects*(re);
5: if object_set 6= φ then
6: for all perm<object_exp, op>∈ avail_session_perms do
7: if m = op then
8: relevant_expressions ← relevant_expressions ∪ object_exp;
9: end if
10: end for
11: for all object ∈ object_set do
12: for all object_exp ∈ relevant_expressions do
13: if evaluate†(object_exp, object) then
14: if eval_cond‡(condition, object, session_user(se)) then
15: authorized_objects ← authorized_objects ∪ object;
16: break;
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: end if
22: if authorized_object 6= φ then
23: return authorized_objects;
24: end if
25: return Deny;
End
* search_objects(re) returns a set of objects existing in the resource database
that are denoted by the constraints specified in expression re, in the request.
† evaluate(object_exp, object) returns TRUE if object_exp evaluates to true
for the given object, else returns FALSE.
‡ eval_cond(condition, object, session_user(se)) returns TRUE if given
condition evaluates to true for the given object attributes and the attributes
of the user and the environment.
Figure 4.3: Algorithm for access request evaluation using resource query
resource database. In this approach, rather than providing an expression, the
user specifies his/her access request by specifying the object attribute values of
the desired objects. The checkAccess function receives as input the user request
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Req and returns the objects denoted by object attribute values given in Req,
if the request is granted, otherwise the request is denied. To process the user
request, all those object expressions that use the attributes mentioned in the
user’s request and when the operation specified in that permission matches with
requested operation, are identified in the user’s session. Object expressions that
include an attribute not specified by the user request are not relevant. Next,
for each shortlisted object expression, the attribute functions in the object ex-
pression are given the user provided attribute values. For instance, if a user
specifies the following object attribute in his/her request: (oType = ’classified’;
oDept = ’pg’; oStatus = ’active’) and suppose we find an object expression as
follows: (oType(o) = ’classified’ ∧ oDept(o) ∈ {pg, ug, admin}). Upon picking
the values of the object attribute functions oType and oDept from user given
attribute values we get: (’classified’ = ’classified’ ∧ ’pg’ ∈ {pg, ug, admin})
which would evaluate to true. As soon as an object expression and its corre-
sponding condition return true, the user’s request is granted and the rest of
the object expressions are ignored. When an expression returns true we form a
query based on the object attribute values specified in the user request and the
user is granted access to all those objects returned by the query. The algorithm
for this approach is given in Fig. 4.4.
Note that we never evaluate an object expression which uses an object attribute
that is not given in the user’s request. This is because we replace the object
attribute functions with the user given attribute values, hence any object expres-
sion involving those object attributes not given by the user cannot be evaluated.
The query to get the authorized objects is formed using the object attributes
mentioned in the user’s request. Once an object expression returns true, this
query may restrict the list of returned objects based on any additional attributes
mentioned in the user’s request. In the example above, the returned result is
restricted based on additional object attributes ostatus which are mentioned in
the user’s request but does not exist in the expression which enables the request.
This approach is superior to resource query in terms of making an access de-
cision by evaluating only the object expressions, without having to retrieve
objects from the resource database. This is important, since many requests can
be denied at this point without the overhead of object retrieval and condition
evaluation. As a user is allowed to specify only the object attribute values rather
than the object expression, in this form of user request, an obvious assumption
is that the multiple object attributes mentioned in the user request are always
combined using logical conjunction operator.
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Algorithm 2
Input: An access request: Req = < se, obj_att_values, m> consisting of
session identifier se, object attribute values obj_att_values, and operation m.
Output: 1) Grant and return authorized objects, 2) Deny otherwise
Begin:
1: relevant_expressions = φ;
2: authorized_objects = φ;
3: for all perm < object_exp, op > ∈ avail_session_perms do
4: if m = op ∧ check_relevancy*(obj_exp, obj_att_values) then
5: if evaluate† (object_exp, obj_att_values) then
6: if eval_cond‡(condition, obj_att_values, session_user(se) then
7: authorized_objects = get_objects††(obj_att_values);
8: end if
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: if authorized_object 6= φ then
13: return (Grant, authorized_objects)
14: end if
15: return Deny
End
* check_relevancy(object_exp, obj_att_values) returns TRUE if the
given object_exp uses only those object attribute functions referred in
obj_att_values
† evaluate(object_exp, obj_att_values) returns TRUE if the given object_exp
evaluates to true when the object attribute functions are replaced with
obj_att_values
‡ eval_cond(condition, obj_att_values, session_user(se)) returns TRUE if the
given condition evaluates to true for the given object attributes and the at-
tributes of the user and environment
†† get_objects(obj_att_values) returns a set of objects existing in the resource
database that satisfy obj_att_values
Figure 4.4: Algorithm for access request evaluation using attribute values
4.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the AERBAC model in order to illustrate the use-
fulness of our model. With the help of two examples, we show how our model
addresses the role-explosion and permission-explosion problems, faced when us-
ing RBAC. Using these examples, we then compare our model with RBAC and
ABAC with respect to the features desired in an access control model for video
surveillance systems (cf. § 3.4.2).
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4.3.1 Example Configurations
We consider two examples in our discussion. First example is about an online
movie store which streams movies to its subscribed users. We consider different
scenarios in this example to show how the number of roles are multiplied with the
increase in the number of attributes. The second example considers a banking
system, where an employee in a branch is typically allowed to access resources
within his/her own branch. We configure these examples using the RBAC model
to show the role- and permission-explosion issues we face while using RBAC.
We then show the configuration using AERBAC to illustrate how our model
strengthens RBAC by enhancing it with attributes and combines the benefits
of both RBAC and ABAC.
Example-1. Online movie store
Scenario-1: Based on the age of the user and the rating of the movie, the sys-
tem decides whether or not a user is allowed to watch a movie. An informal
description of the policy rules for scenario-1 is as follows:
• Adult users can watch all movies
• Juvenile users can watch only movies with ‘PG’ and ‘G’ ratings
• Children can watch movies having ‘G’ ratings only
To express the abovementioned policies using RBAC, we need three roles with
each having access to movies with relevant ratings. Table 4.3 lists the per-
missions for each role. In each role, all permissions have to be specified using
identifiers of the individual movies.
Table 4.3: Roles and permissions in scenario-1
Roles Permissions
Adult (view, movieR_1), (view, movieR_2),
. . .
(view, movieR_n)
Juvenile (view, moviePG_1), (view, moviePG_2),
. . .
(view, moviePG_n)
Child (view, movieG_1), (view, movieG_2),
. . .
(view, movieG_n)
A user in the Adult role is allowed to watch movies of ‘R’ as well as ‘PG’ and
‘G’ ratings. Therefore, the Adult role is inherited from the Juvenile role and the
Juvenile role is inherited from the Child role in order to inherit the permissions
from Juvenile and Child roles, as shown in Fig. 4.5.
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Adult
Juvenile
Child
Figure 4.5: Role hierarchy for scenario-1
Scenario-2: Let us assume that newly released movies can only be seen by pre-
mium users. With this small change, the number of roles, needed to express
this policy, are doubled. The roles we need are: Adult-premium, Adult-regular,
Juvenile-premium, Juvenile-regular, Child-premium and Child-regular. Table 4.4
shows the permissions assigned to each of these roles. The role hierarchy in this
case is given in Fig. 4.6.
Table 4.4: Roles and permissions in scenario-2
Roles Permissions
Adult_premium (view, movieR_New_1), (view, movieR_New_2),
. . .
(view, movieR_New_n)
Adult_regular (view, movieR_Old_1), (view, movieR_Old_2),
. . .
(view, movieR_Old_n)
Juvenile_premium (view, moviePG_New_1), (view, moviePG_New_2),
. . .
(view, moviePG_New_n)
Juvenile_regular (view, moviePG_Old_1), (view, moviePG_Old_2),
. . .
(view, moviePG_Old_n)
Child_premium (view, movieG_New_1), (view, movieG_New_2),
. . .
(view, movieG_New_n)
Child_regular (view, movieG_Old_1), (view, movieG_Old_2),
. . .
(view, movieG_Old_n)
Scenario-3: Let us assume that out of the newly released movies, few chosen
movies can be watched by regular users, but only during promotional season.
To express this environmental condition, we need three additional roles (Adult_-
regular_promo, Juvenile_regular_promo, Child_regular_promo) which will be
allowed to be activated by users only during promotional season, using role-
activation constraints in RBAC. Table 4.5 shows permissions for these roles.
Figure 4.7 provides the modified role hierarchy for this scenario.
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Adult_premium
Adult_regular
Juvenile_regular
Juvenile_premium
Child_premium
Child_regular
Figure 4.6: Role hierarchy for scenario-2
Table 4.5: Roles and permissions for promotional period in scenario-3
Roles Permissions
Adult_regular_promo (view, movieR_Chosen_1), (view, movieR_Chosen_2),
. . .
(view, movieR_Chosen_n)
Juvenile_regular_promo (view, moviePG_Chosen_1), (view, moviePG_Chosen_2),
. . .
(view, moviePG_Chosen_n)
Child_regular_promo (view, movieG_Chosen_1), (view, movieG_Chosen_2),
. . .
(view, movieG_Chosen_n)
Adult_premium
Adult_regular
Juvenile_regular
Juvenile_premium
Child_premium
Child_regular
Adult_regular_promo
Juvenile_regular_promo
Child_regular_promo
Figure 4.7: Role hierarchy for scenario-3
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4.3.1.1 Role- and Permission-explosion in RBAC
In RBAC, the number of roles increases exponentially as the number of user
and environment attributes grow [54], as we can observe in the above discussion.
Note that the object attributes do not influence the number of roles since the
object attributes are transformed into user attributes to distinguish between
users who may access an object with a specific attribute value. For instance, in
the above example, movies with rating ‘R’ are accessible to users whose age is
greater than 18. In worst case, the number of roles required for K attributes
with V values each can be calculated as KV . However, the number of attribute
values is not necessarily the same for each attribute. For example, in the above-
mentioned scenarios, there are two user attributes (age, member-type) and one
environment attribute (promo-period). The possible values for age attribute
in this example are: >10, >13 and >18. The values of member-type could be
either ’regular’ or ’premium’, whereas the values of promo-period (environment
attribute) could be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Therefore, the number of maximum roles
in worst case, for given example, can be calculated as:
⇒ V (age)× V (member-type)× V (promo-season)
⇒ 3× 2× 2 = 12
Note that V(att) above represents the possible number of values for an at-
tribute of a user or environment. In scenario-3, since the promo-period affected
only regular users, thus the total number of roles was 9, when considering age,
member-type and promo_period attributes, as shown in Fig. 4.7.
Assuming that roles are formed using all user and environment attributes, a
general formula to calculate the maximum number of roles in worst case is:
roles = [VUA1 × VUA2 × . . .× VUAn ]× [VEA1 × VEA2 × . . .× VEAm ]
roles =
n∏
i=1
VUAi ×
m∏
j=1
VEAj (4.1)
where VUAi and VEAi represent the number of possible values for a user and
environment attribute, respectively.
On the other hand, the number of permissions in a role is directly proportional to
the number of objects relevant to that role. The following expression represents
the relation between the permissions and objects in a role:
↑ permissionsrolei ∝ ↑ objectsrolei (4.2)
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This expression implies that the increase in the number of permissions in a role
is directly proportional to the increase in the number of objects relevant to that
role. Thus, with the growth in the number of objects, the number of permissions
also grows since the permissions in RBAC are specified using identifiers of the
objects. In the above example, the number of permissions in each role depends
on the number of movies related to that role.
Configuration using AERBAC
To address the issues of role- and permission-explosion in RBAC, AERBAC
integrates roles and attributes in a novel way by using the attributes of the
objects in the permissions, rather than using identifiers of individual objects,
and attributes of all entities in conditions. Below, we configure the scenarios
discussed above for the online movie streaming example using AERBAC model.
Scenario-1: Using AERBAC, the policies in scenario-1 can be specified as given in
Table 4.6. Rather than using the identifier of the objects, we use object attribute
function Rating(o:OBS) that takes a movie object as input and returns the
rating of that movie. This allows us to refer to all movies having a specific rating
using a single permission. There are no conditions associated with permissions
as no user and environment attributes are used in this scenario.
Table 4.6: Roles and permissions using AERBAC in scenario-1
Roles Permissions Conditions
Adult (view, Rating(movie) = ’R’) None
Juvenile (view, Rating(movie) = ’PG’) None
Child (view, Rating(movie) = ’G’) None
Scenario-2: Using AERBAC, the policies in scenario-2 can be specified as given
in Table 4.7. The object attribute function Release(o:OBS) returns whether a
given movie is new or old. The user attribute function Member_type(u:USERS)
returns whether a given user is a regular or premium user. The permissions
allowing access to newly released movies are constrained by conditions which
ensure that only premium users can watch these movies.
Scenario-3: Using AERBAC, the policies in scenario-3 can be specified as given in
Table 4.8. The conditions in this scenario ensure that the chosen movies can be
watched by all users only if it is promotional season. Here, the object attribute
function Chosen(o:OBS) returns whether a given movie has been chosen to be
shown during promotional season. Whereas Promo_season() is an environment
attribute function that returns whether the promotional season is active or not.
Using AERBAC, the hierarchy of roles stays the same for all three scenarios as
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Table 4.7: Roles and permissions using AERBAC in scenario-2
Roles Permissions Conditions
Adult
(view, Rating(movie) = ’R’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’old’)
None
(view, Rating(movie) = ’R’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’new’)
(Member_-
type(user) =
’premium’
Juvenile
(view, Rating(movie) = ’PG’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’old’)
None
(view, Rating(movie) = ’PG’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’new’)
(Member_-
type(user) =
’premium’
Child
(view, Rating(movie) = ’G’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’old’)
None
(view, Rating(movie) = ’G’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’new’)
(Member_-
type(user) =
’premium’
given in Fig. 4.5.
Note that, in AERBAC, we use an attribute function for each attribute to
get the value of that attribute. For instance, member-type is a user attribute
whereas Member_type(u:USERS) is a user attribute function that returns the
value of this attribute for a given user. As compared to RBAC approach, we do
not need to make frequent changes in the permission-set assigned to a role in
AERBAC each time a new movie needs to be added or removed. For example,
to remove a chosen movie from the list of objects accessible to a role, we would
simply change the value of chosen attribute for that object rather than making
changes in the permission-set of the role. Thus our model helps to avoid making
frequent changes in the permission-set of a role, in cases where the objects are
added/removed frequently.
Addressing role- and permission-explosion
As shown in the example configuration above, we address the problems of
permission-explosion and role-explosion by using object expressions and con-
ditions. Using AERBAC, the number of roles does not increase with the growth
in the number of user or environment attributes. As shown in the example, the
roles in AERBAC depend on the job-function/task and, unlike RBAC, we do
not need to create similar roles based on user or environment attributes. The
following expression represents the relation between roles and attributes of the
user and the environment:
↑ roles 6∝ {↑ UAV ∨ ↑ EAV } (4.3)
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Table 4.8: Roles and permissions using AERBAC in scenario-3
Roles Permissions Conditions
Adult
(view, Rating(movie) = ’R’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’old’)
None
(view, Rating(movie) = ’R’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’new’)
Member_-
type(user) =
’premium’
(view, Rating(movie) = ’R’ ∧
Chosen(movie) = ’yes’)
Promo_season() =
’yes’
Juvenile
(view, Rating(movie) = ’PG’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’old’)
None
(view, Rating(movie) = ’PG’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’new’)
Member_-
type(user) =
’premium’
(view, Rating(movie) = ’PG’ ∧
Chosen(movie) = ’yes’)
Promo_season() =
’yes’
Child
(view, Rating(movie) = ’G’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’old’)
None
(view, Rating(movie) = ’G’ ∧
Release(movie) = ’new’)
Member_-
type(user) =
’premium’
(view, Rating(movie) = ’G’ ∧
Chosen(movie) = ’yes’)
Promo_season() =
’yes’
UAV and EAV above represent number of attribute values for user attributes and
environment attributes, respectively. The expression implies that the increase
in the number of roles is not directly proportional to the increase in user or
environment attribute values.
In AERBAC, the number of maximum permissions does not depend on the
number of objects rather it depends on the number of object expressions which
are formed using object attributes. The number of maximum object expres-
sions which can be used in a role’s permissions, for the given example, can be
calculated as:
⇒ obj_expsrolei = V (rating)× V (release)× V (chosen)
⇒ obj_expsrolei = 3× 2× 2 = 12
Note that V(att) above represents the possible number of values for an object
attribute. Making an assumption, similar to the one in equation (4.1), that
object expressions in a role are formed using all object attributes, a general
formula to calculate the maximum number of object expressions in a role is:
obj_expsrolei =
n∏
i=1
VOAi (4.4)
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where VOAi represents the number of possible values for an object attribute.
Using the above equation, the maximum number of permissions in a role can be
calculated as follows:
permissionsrolei = obj_expsrolei × operations (4.5)
where operations specify the number of elements in the set OPS.
In the above example, we achieve significant reduction using AERBAC, as com-
pared to RBAC, in the number of roles and the number of permissions. Notice
that the number of roles in worst case, in RBAC, should not be confused with
the number of object expressions in worst case, in AERBAC. In RBAC, we need
to have 9 roles – each having a large number of permissions depending on the
number of objects relevant to that role. Whereas, in AERBAC, we need three
roles and the total number of permissions are 9 in all three roles.
Example-2. Banking system
AERBAC allows to directly compare object attributes with user attributes us-
ing conditions. Comparing object attributes directly with user attributes may
significantly reduce the number of permissions specified for a role as well as the
number of roles. Consider the example of a banking system. A bank typically
has several branches hence the possible values for branch attribute includes hun-
dreds of branch locations in that bank. An employee, say Manager, of a branch
is allowed to access account information of customers related to his own branch
only.
RBAC deals with such a situation by creating a separate role for each position
of each branch, e.g., Manager-branch-A, Manager-branch-B etc. Sample roles
and permissions for this example are given in Table 4.9. The permissions in
each role specify the allowed operations on the specific objects existing in that
branch.
Configuration using AERBAC
Using AERBAC, we may deal with this issue by directly comparing object
and user attributes in the condition associated to a permission. Table 4.10
gives set of permissions for the Manager role using AERBAC. In this example,
we use three object attribute functions: oType(o:OBS), oStatus(o:OBS) and
Object_branch(o:OBS) which return the type, status and branch name for a
given object, respectively. The user attribute function, User_branch(u:USERS)
returns the branch name for a given user who has placed an access request. Using
AERBAC, we do not need to create separate Manager role for each branch,
68 Attributes Enhanced Role-Based Access Control Model
Table 4.9: Roles and permissions in example-2
Roles Permissions
Manager_branch_1
(read, branch_1_type_1_object_1),
(read, branch_1_type_1_object_2),
. . .
(read, branch_1_type_1_object_n)
(write, branch_1_type_1_active_object_-
1), (write, branch_1_type_1_active_ob-
ject_2), . . .
(write, branch_1_type_1_active_object_n)
Manager_branch_2
(read, branch_2_type_1_object_1),
(read, branch_2_type_1_object_2),
. . .
(read, branch_2_type_1_object_n)
(write, branch_2_type_1_active_object_-
1), (write, branch_2_type_1_active_ob-
ject_2), . . .
(write, branch_2_type_1_active_object_n)
rather we use condition to check whether the branch of the user accessing an
object is same as the branch to which that object is associated.
Table 4.10: Roles and permissions using AERBAC in example-2
Roles Permissions Conditions
Manager
(read, oType(object) = ’1’) (User_branch(user)
= Object_branch(object) )
(write, (oType(object) = ’1’ ∧
oStatus(object) = ’active’))
(User_branch(user)
= Object_branch(object) )
We can see that the administrative complexity using AERBAC is much re-
duced for the examples given above. These are quite typical examples in many
real-world applications. In practice, security architects solve these problems by
combining RBAC with other solutions such as context-based or ABAC. The re-
sulting solution is an ad hoc model which requires specialized administration for
each such application [56, 125]. Moreover, solutions which extend RBAC to deal
with the issues discussed above have also been proposed. However, our model is
the first one to include object expressions in the permissions rather than identi-
fiers or types/groups of objects. We discuss these solutions and compare them
with AERBAC in § 4.4.
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4.3.2 AERBAC Features
In this section, we evaluate AERBAC against the desired features, identified in
last chapter (cf. § 3.4.2), for an access control model in video surveillance system.
In the light of above example configurations, we compare the AERBAC model
to RBAC and ABAC models and discuss which of these features are offered by
each of these models.
1- User context: One of the factors contributing to role-explosion in RBAC is
the inclusion of user attributes into the access control decisions [54]. Users in the
same job role may be permitted to perform the same operations but on different
sets of objects which are decided based on user’s attributes or their relationship
with the objects. For instance, as seen in the banking system example earlier,
a user in the manager role should be allowed to access accounts related to his
own branch only. Another example is related to health-care system where a
doctor is allowed to access data relevant to his own patients, rather than all
patients. This may result in creating a separate role, for each possible value
of such attribute, with the same operations but different objects, causing the
role-explosion issue.
ABAC offers flexibility and can easily incorporate attributes associated with the
users [38]. AERBAC also allows incorporating user attributes into the access
control model. Contrary to RBAC, AERBAC does not cause the problem of
role-explosion because of associating conditions with the permissions, as shown
in the configuration of the online movie streaming, and banking system examples
above.
2- Environmental information: As seen in the example configurations,
RBAC cannot easily handle environmental constraints such as time and the
occurrence of an event and hence does not provide a fine-degree of granularity
as demanded by many applications [74]. Standard RBAC [50] allows enforcing
constraints either on the assignment of roles to users or on activation of roles in a
session. In certain cases, it may be required to put constraints on the individual
permissions assigned to a role. For instance, a user may be allowed to activate
manager role in a bank, however the permission to update accounts in manager
role may only be exercised during 1400 – 1600 hrs. In order to enforce such
constraints and provide finer-grained access, standard RBAC requires creating
separate roles which may be activated during specified time periods. Creat-
ing separate roles for such contextual constraints has two drawbacks. First, it
causes the role-explosion issue due to the creation of separate roles with few per-
missions and users assigned. Second, it requires reactivation of such roles each
time a user wants to exercise the permission in that role when the contextual
constraints are fulfilled.
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Dynamically changing environmental constraints can be easily handled using
ABAC approach [38]. It allows representing such constraints using a rule-based
policy which enables fine-grained access to resources. In AERBAC, we add
environment attributes to capture such information. By using conditions to
enforce such constraints at permission-level, AERBAC provides a mechanism to
incorporate these dynamically changing attributes in a role-centric manner yet
without requiring to create a large number of roles.
3- Metadata-based permissions: In RBAC, the permissions comprise of
operations that can be performed on objects. The objects are specified using
their identifiers which causes permission-explosion in applications having a large
number of objects, as seen in the online movie streaming example (cf. § 4.3.1).
In AERBAC, the permissions comprise of operations and object expressions
which are formed using object attributes. Using object expressions reduces the
number of permissions to be specified in a role, as illustrated in the online movie
streaming example. Referring to objects based on their attributes also allows
permissions to denote those objects which will be created in the future.
4- Dynamic attributes: In RBAC, the value of an attributes is verified at
the time of creating a session. For instance, the value of promotional-period
in Scenario-3 of Example-1 above, is checked at the time of activating adult_-
regular_promo role. Once a session is created, the user can exercise all the
permissions in that session without considering the fact that the value of a
dynamic attribute can be changed during the lifetime of a session. Contrary to
RBAC, ABAC retrieves the current values of dynamic attributes at the time of
making an access control decision while evaluating a relevant policy rule. By
associating conditions with permissions, AERBAC also verifies the values of
dynamic attributes, mentioned in that condition, every time a user requests to
exercise a particular permission.
5- Simplified auditing: RBAC permits simplified auditing by providing a
convenient mechanism to review the permissions available to a user by having
a role assigned to a user [54].
When ABAC is used in a large organization having a large number of policy
rules, it may not be practically feasible to audit what permissions have been
granted to a user. In ABAC, any combination of attributes may essentially grant
an access and hence it requires analyzing all policy rules with an exhaustive
enumeration of attributes used in each policy rule [38]. AERBAC makes it
simpler to audit what permissions may be granted to a user because of being
role-centric yet constraining permissions with conditions. When auditing for a
particular position or employee, we need to consider only the policy rules given
in the roles assigned to that position or employee.
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6- Modification visualization: RBAC enables security administrators to vi-
sualize the users who will be affected by adding, deleting or modifying a per-
mission [48] due to the permission being assigned to a role and the role to users.
One of the issues in the ABAC approach is that the consequences of a newly
added or removed policy rule are not easy to visualize [48]. It is not clear what
set of users will be effected by a change in the policy. For instance, removing a
policy rule may essentially affect those users whom we wish to remain authorized
to access a particular resource, but they are no more authorized since a policy
rule is removed. In AERBAC, it is relatively easy to visualize what is the impact
of adding or removing a policy since policy specification is at the level of roles.
Therefore, a change in policy can effect only those users who are assigned to a
role being modified.
4.3.2.1 Additional Features
Besides the features desired in the access control mechanism for video surveil-
lance systems, AERBAC model also offers following features by virtue of being
a role-centric approach.
7- Privilege management: Privilege management deals with provisioning
and revocation of privileges to/from a user. Controlling all access through roles
decreases the overall cost of security management and makes administration
of permissions efficient in terms of time and effort [39]. Roles represent job
functions and can be well understood by their names. Once engineered, the
provisioning or revocation of roles assigned to a user becomes an easy task and
can be assigned to users even by non-expert personnel. This is where the RBAC
approach really starts providing economic benefits.
In contrast, assigning and revoking of privileges in ABAC is considered a com-
plex task [48], as compared to RBAC, since revoking a user attribute can have
implications on other privileges that the administrator wishes to remain as-
signed to the user. Although AERBAC involves the overhead of assigning user
attributes too when assigning a role to a user. However, the assignment of at-
tributes and their values is dependent on the specific role being assigned and
hence becomes a simple task. Revoking a role in AERBAC de-assigns all the
permissions associated with that role, even though the user still holds rest of
the attributes needed to exercise those permissions.
8- Separation of duty (SoD): In order to avoid conflict of interest, SoD is
one of the most common constraint used in large-scale organizations. RBAC
facilitates enforcement of SoD constraint [39] by defining conflicting roles which
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should never be assigned together to a user (static SoD) or activated together by
a user (dynamic SoD). In a similar manner, SoD constraints can be enforced in
AERBAC too. On the other hand, enforcing SoD constraint in ABAC requires
to use negative privileges which does not only causes difficulty in terms of policy
management but it may also lead to policy conflicts demanding for a mechanism
to resolve such conflicts.
9- Enforcement of least privileges: The principle of least privilege or need-
to-know helps ensure that users have sufficient permissions needed to perform
their duties while not being overentitled. This principle guarantees required
productivity while reducing the security risk caused by an individual. The
RBAC and AERBAC models provide an effective mechanism to enforce the
principle of least privilege by assigning users to roles (the need element) and
roles to permissions (the know element). By enforcing this principle, the risk of
unauthorized system access is greatly minimized. No methodological mechanism
to enforce the principle of least privilege exists in ABAC.
Table 4.11: Comparing AERBAC with RBAC and ABAC
Features RBAC ABAC AERBAC
1- User context 7 3 3
2- Environmental
information
7 3 3
3- Metadata-based
permissions
7 3 3
4- Dynamic attributes 7 3 3
5- Simplified auditing 3 7 3
6- Modification
visualization
3 7 3
7- Privilege
management
3 7 3
8- Separation of duty 3 7 3
9- Least privileges 3 7 3
Table 4.11 gives a summary of the features offered by RBAC, ABAC and AER-
BAC models, as discussed above. A tick-mark implies that the model supports
the given feature, whereas a cross-mark in the table means that the given fea-
ture is not well-supported by the model. For example, though RBAC can be
used to handle environmental information, it requires creating a large number
of roles causing administrative issues.
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4.3.3 Limitations of AERBAC
In AERBAC, we attempt to combine the benefits of both RBAC and ABAC
while avoiding their respective disadvantages. Although AERBAC achieves
many features desired in an access control model, AERBAC has a few limitations
too. Some of these limitations are introduced by AERBAC, e.g. complexity of
attribute management, while inheriting few from RBAC such as ambiguity in
role hierarchies. Below we discuss these limitations.
1- Role and attribute engineering: The process of developing a role struc-
ture for a target organization is referred to as role engineering. This seemingly
simple task of role engineering is one of the most challenging and time con-
suming part of implementing RBAC in an organization. The role engineering
process also involves identifying the exact set of permissions suitable for the or-
ganization. As AERBAC is an extension of RBAC and incorporates attributes
into RBAC, this process also involves figuring out the attributes in AERBAC,
in addition to roles, adding further complexity in the role engineering process.
It is to be noted, however, that the overhead of attribute engineering offers
several advantages too. As we discussed in the online movie streaming exam-
ple (cf. § 4.3.1), AERBAC incorporates user and environment attributes in a
manner that reduces the role-explosion. Similarly, object attributes are used
to address the permission-explosion problem. This implies that once the roles,
attributes and permissions are figured out, the implementation of the solution
using AERBAC is not hard due to significantly less number of roles and per-
missions.
2- Complex permission management: After the completion of role en-
gineering and implementation, the management phase deals with day-to-day
operations such as maintaining the role-permission assignments and assignment
of roles and other attributes to the users. When assigning roles to a user,
AERBAC also involves assignment of relevant attributes to the user along with
the role, rather than simply the role as opposed to RBAC. However, when
comparing to RBAC we observe that offering the same set of permissions in
RBAC typically requires more number of roles and complex role hierarchies, as
shown in scenario-2 & 3 in the online movie streaming example presented earlier
(cf. § 4.3.1).
Similarly, when new objects are added in the object database using AERBAC,
we need to associate the newly added object with attributes too. However,
comparing to RBAC, we do not need to explicitly add a permission in those
roles which may access this object, because of using attribute-based permissions
in AERBAC. Due to this, the role-permission assignments are rarely modified.
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3- Permission overview: As the permissions in AERBAC consist of object
expressions and operations, therefore, when reviewing the permissions accessible
to a user, we get the object expressions (containing attributes) denoting the
objects rather than the object identifiers, as compared to RBAC. In order to
get the identifiers of the objects available to a user, we may retrieve those objects
from the object database by forming queries using the given object expressions
in the permissions. Each object expression will form the maximum number of
objects available to a user but constrained by the condition associated with each
permission.
Another possibility is to pre-compute the list of objects accessible to a role,
based on permissions in that role. However, this may prove to be expensive, as
with addition of each object, the permissions in a role have to be re-evaluated
to check if the added object is accessible to a role. Note that, the condition
associated with the permission, granting the access to the objects, will still need
to be evaluated at run-time in order to verify the dynamic user attributes, e.g.
location, and environment attributes, e.g. system-load.
4- Role and attribute semantics: There must exist consensus among the
stakeholders involved in a large enterprise or cross-organization implementation
of AERBAC. Each stakeholder must associate the same set of permissions for a
given role and semantics for a particular attribute. Reaching such an agreement
may be a challenge especially in applications having a large number of roles and
attributes.
5- Ambiguity in role hierarchies: Creating role hierarchies in AERBAC
requires to have a clear understanding of the complex job function hierarchies
in a given organization. Using role hierarchies may result in under- or over-
entitlement of a user and hence requires studying the consequences of the de-
veloped role hierarchy. For instance, it might seem reasonable to inherit the
role project-manager from the role programmer thereby inheriting the permis-
sions assigned to the programmer role. However, a project manager might not
have the required technical knowledge thus allowing him to update executables
violates need-to-know principle (over-entitlement).
4.4 Comparison with Related Work
In response to the NIST initiative, Jin et al [67] present the first formal ac-
cess control model called Role-centric Attribute-Based Access Control (RABAC)
model using the role-centric approach. They extend RBAC with user and ob-
ject attributes and add a component called permission filtering policy (PFP).
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The PFP requires specification of filtering functions in the form of Boolean ex-
pression consisting of user and object attributes. Their solution is useful to
address the role-explosion problem and as a result facilitates user role assign-
ment. However, their approach does not incorporate environment attributes and
is not suitable for systems involving dynamic attributes, e.g., location and time,
due to verification of such attributes at the time of session creation only. Also,
our approach is significantly different in the sense that we make a fundamental
modification in RBAC by using attributes of the objects in the permissions, ad-
dressing the issue of permission-explosion, faced while using RABAC. Alshehri
et al. [8] present an access control model that integrates attributes and roles.
It is different than AERBAC in that it uses roles as simply user attributes
and roles are not associated with permissions. Hence this approach does not
take full benefit of the notion of role and does not allow inheritance of permis-
sions – due to absence of role hierarchies – and enforcement of separation of
duty constraints. Moreover, there is no concept of session rather each object
is assigned a policy which is evaluated when access to that particular object
is requested, similar to the mechanism used in access control lists. Huang et
al [63] present a framework to integrate RBAC with attributes. The approach
consists of two levels: underground and aboveground. The underground level
makes use of attribute-based policies to automate the processes of user-role and
role-permission assignment. The aboveground level is the RBAC model, with
addition of environment attributes, constructed using attribute-based policies.
Their work is different than AERBAC in that it focuses on automated construc-
tion of RBAC. Xu and Stoller [158] focus on migration of RBAC-based systems
to ABAC in order to avoid limitations of RBAC. They present a solution to
mine attribute-based policies from an already configured RBAC model.
As discussed in § 2.4, several efforts have been reported which extend RBAC to
include the context of access [88, 92, 60, 162, 71, 68, 22, 119, 75, 29]. However
these approaches do not allow comparing user and object attributes as con-
straints on permissions. Most of these solutions typically require creation of a
large number of closely related roles, causing the role-explosion problem. Ge et
al. [55], and Giuri et al. [57] focus on resolving the issue of role-explosion by pro-
viding the mechanism of parametrized privileges and parametrized roles. How-
ever, the permissions in these solutions refer to objects using their identifiers.
Few approaches propose a variant of RBAC categorizing the objects into groups
or types in an attempt to resolve the permission-explosion issue [88], [35], [69].
Grouping the objects allows to associate a single attribute with each object.
The permissions are then specified using the group attribute – referred to as
object roles in [36] & [88], views in [69] and object classes in [35] – where each
permission refers to a set of objects in that group. Moreover, as the number
of object attributes grow, the number of groups increase exponentially. This
makes the task of policy administration cumbersome as a security administra-
tor needs to form the potential groups in advance, based on all possible values
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of the object attributes.
Another area of research relevant to AERBAC is content-based access control,
where access to a resource is dependent on the information contained within the
resource. Prior literature mainly uses attribute-based approaches to handle this
requirement [24], [4]. However, these approaches suffer from the ABAC limita-
tions, discussed earlier. Using a combination of roles and attributes may help
in simplifying the management and policy modification, as discussed in § 4.3.
4.5 Summary
This chapter presented a general-purpose access control model that integrated
the RBAC and ABAC models in order to bring together the features offered
by both these models. Contrary to the traditional RBAC approaches, the per-
missions in AERBAC consist of operations and object expressions which are
formed using object attributes. The object expressions allowed us to represent
a set of objects using each permission and enabled content-based access control.
The model is context-aware since the condition associated to every permission
is verified each time a permission is requested. Two distinct algorithms to eval-
uate access requests were also presented. It was demonstrated that the prob-
lems of role-explosion and permission-explosion faced in RBAC are resolved in
AERBAC. An evaluation of AERBAC model against RBAC and ABAC is also
provided with respect to the access control features desired in video surveillance
systems. The chapter also discussed the limitations of AERBAC model. Finally
a comparison of AERBAC was performed with the other solutions proposed as
response to NIST initiative and certain other relevant approaches.
Chapter 5
Access Control in Video
Surveillance
As discussed in the earlier chapters, modern video surveillance systems equipped
with advanced functionalities, e.g. semantic object-detection and rapid data
retrieval, allow the observers to traverse the data in an efficient way. Such
systems give substantial powers to the observers who may profile the activities
of an individual which results in compromising the privacy of people recorded
by the system. We have also discussed the camera and video characteristics
(cf. § 2.2.2) and observed that the semantic objects and events are extracted
from the videos; such information as well as the location and time of recordings,
called metadata, is stored along with the videos, using MPEG-7, for example.
In contrast to the traditional systems whose access is physically controlled, as
they are watched in a closed monitoring room, the videos in modern systems can
also be accessed ubiquitously over small hand-held devices. Due to the potential
capabilities offered by modern video surveillance systems such as searching and
tracking the activities of an individual spanning over multiple locations [87], it
becomes critically important to control the access to data in such systems. To
develop an access control mechanism, earlier in § 3.4.2, we deduced the features
desired for access control in video surveillance. Table 5.1 presents a summary of
these required features. Our study of existing access control models, proposed
for video surveillance (cf. § 3.3.3) and related domains such as multimedia ap-
plications (cf. § 5.4), indicates that these models do not meet our requirements.
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Table 5.1: Summary of features desired for access control in video surveillance
Feature Description
Metadata-based
permissions
The access control mechanism should allow specification of per-
missions based on metadata information, e.g. camera deployment
area, semantic objects contained in video, etc.
User context The context of the user such as user’s location and response-area
needs to be considered when determining user’s access request.
Environmental
information
Environmental information such as occurrence of an incident or
time of access may also influence an access control decision.
Dynamic
attributes
As dynamic attribute values, e.g. user’s location, occurrence of
an incident, can change quite frequently; the access control mech-
anism must consider the current values of these attributes when
making an access control decision.
Simplified auditing The mechanism should facilitate to review which permissions a
user or role may exercise in what circumstances.
Modification
visualization
Visualizing the effect of a modification in the policy, i.e. which
users will be affected by a change, must be facilitated by the mech-
anism.
In this chapter, we present a Role-Oriented Access control Mechanism for Video
Surveillance systems (ROAMVS) which is based on the AERBAC model dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. This instantiation necessitates a discussion of
the following artifacts of the access control mechanism. First, we extend AER-
BAC with spatial and temporal constraints and define how subjects and objects
in video surveillance systems may be specified using the proposed mechanism.
Secondly, the actions such as read and write, used in conventional systems, are
not relevant for video surveillance data. In order to provide actions semanti-
cally relevant for video surveillance data and to enable multilevel access control
that reveals different levels of information to different users, we define privilege
modes by combining video properties with actions. Finally, ROAMVS allows
derivation of permissions from explicitly stated ones, due to hierarchical rela-
tions between the attributes of different entities, in addition to role hierarchies.
We have also developed a prototype implementation of the proposed mechanism
using eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [102] to demon-
strate the feasibility of our approach in video surveillance applications.
5.1 Access Control Mechanism
As stated earlier, time and location play an important role in determining an
access control decision. Our proposed mechanism allows to use spatial (loca-
tion) and temporal constraints in the access control policy. In this section,
we first describe a summary of how location and temporal constraints can be
formed. These constraints are then used in defining resource object expressions
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(cf. § 5.1.2) and in specification of conditions (cf. § 5.1.5) associated with permis-
sions of a role. We then describe the characteristics of objects to be protected
and users to be authorized, and formalize these concepts. We also discuss for-
mation of privilege modes that consist of video properties and actions and show
creation of roles and permissions following our ROAMVS approach.
5.1.1 Representing Location and Time
Due to the relevance of location and time in access control, the incorporation
of such information into access control has been a subject of significant bodies
of work [5, 12, 21, 77, 119]. These models introduce the notions to represent
location and time and the operators that can operate on location or time, which
are fairly similar across models. This section briefly summarizes the commonly
used concepts necessary for formal representation of time and location and de-
fines the formation of spatial and temporal constraints. The notation we use
to formalize location and time uses set theory conventions and is adapted from
access control models presented in [5, 12, 21].
5.1.1.1 Spatial Constraints
Location of a user or object can be obtained through a trusted device. For in-
stance, GPS can be used to accurately collect the coordinates of a mobile user.
Collection of location information is beyond the scope of this work, rather we
discuss the use of such information once collected. The location information is
of two types: physical and logical. Physical location is the raw geographic loca-
tion returned by the device, e.g. represented as a point in a three-dimensional
geometric space. Logical location is application-dependent and is a symbolic rep-
resentation against a group of physical locations. Examples of logical locations
are New York, Times Square, engineering lab etc.
Let PL be the set of all physical locations and LL be the set of all logical
locations. In order to convert physical locations to logical locations and vice-
versa, mapping functions are defined. Let Ω and Ψ be the mapping functions
that define the correspondence from elements of PL to the elements of LL and
from elements of LL to the elements of PL, respectively. For instance, apply-
ing the function Ω to the physical position of a camera might return Times
Square from the LL set. Let FL be the set of location functions where each
function receive an entity and returns the logical location of that entity. For
instance, cam-area(o) is a location function that returns the logical location
of a given camera. One location can be related to another location and this
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relation is normally determined using a location operator. In the literature,
the commonly used location operators include contains, equals and overlaps
that check whether a given location contains, is equal to, or overlaps another
location, respectively. Let LOP = {contains, equals, overlaps} be the set of
these location operators. Using the sets given above, a location constraint in
our access control mechanism can be specified as given in Definition-1, below.
Definition-1 [Location constraints]. Given a set of logical locations LL, a
set of physical locations PL, a set of location functions FL, and a set of location
operators LOP, a location constraint is defined as follows:
• pli lop lli , where pli ∈ PL, lli ∈ LL, and lop ∈ LOP
• lli lop llj , where lli, llj ∈ LL, and lop ∈ LOP
• loc(x) lop lli , where loc ∈ FL, lli ∈ LL, and lop ∈ LOP
• If lc1 and lc2 are location constraints and lop ∈ LOP, then lc1 ∧ lc2, lc1
∨ lc2, and lc1 lop lc2 are also location constraints.
5.1.1.2 Temporal Constraints
Temporal information can be either a time instant or a time interval. A time
instant is a discrete point on the time line, whereas a time interval is a continuous
set of time instances. When a user requests access, the time of request – i.e.
a time instant – is evaluated against the temporal constraints defined in the
policy. Below we describe how a temporal constraint is formed.
Let T ′ be the set of time instances, for example, an element of T ′ is: 2015.07.08.11 :
23 : 56. Whereas time intervals are normally divided into two distinct types:
non-recurring and recurring. A non-recurring time interval is a range of time
which does not repeat, e.g. 2015.06.26 − 2015.07.08. A recurring time inter-
val specifies a range of time which repeats periodically, e.g., the daily recurring
interval 09:00−17:00 repeats itself every day. Based on the repetitive period,
recurring intervals are divided into four sub-types [21]: daily, weekly, monthly
and yearly. The monthly and yearly intervals may be further divided into sub-
categories based on the unit time intervals used in each type: day, week, month.
A time interval is represented as:
{x1, x2, ... xn}.unit.period, where xi represents a unit time interval.
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Daily interval: A daily interval represents a range of time in a day, denoted by
ΓD, and uses the following format: hours:minutes:seconds− hours:minutes:seconds,
e.g. 09:00:00−17:00:00.
Weekly interval: A weekly interval represents the days in a week, denoted by
ΓWd, and is defined as follows:
ΓWd = {x1, x2, ... xn}.day.week, where 1 ≤ xi ≤ 7
For instance, {2, 4, 6}.day.week implies Monday, Wednesday, and Friday every
week.
Monthly interval: A monthly interval represents the days or weeks in a month
during which access is granted. Day interval in a month and week interval in a
month are denoted by ΓMd and ΓMw respectively, and are defined as follows:
ΓMd = {x1, x2, ... xn}.day.month, where 1 ≤ xi ≤ 31
ΓMw = {x1, x2, ... xn}.week.month, where 1 ≤ xi ≤ 5
Using the above definitions, {1, 15}.day.month represents first and fifteenth days
of each month, and {2, 3}.week.month represents second and third week of ev-
ery month.
Yearly interval: A yearly interval is used to specify the days, weeks or months
in a year during which access is granted. For yearly intervals, we may define
day interval in a year (ΓYd), week interval in a year (ΓYw) and month interval
in a year (ΓYm) as follows:
ΓYd = {x1, x2, ... xn}.day.year, where 1 ≤ xi ≤ 366
ΓYw = {x1, x2, ... xn}.week.year, where 1 ≤ xi ≤ 53
ΓYm = {x1, x2, ... xn}.month.year, where 1 ≤ xi ≤ 12
For example, {30, 40}.week.year specifies that access is granted for thirtieth and
fortieth weeks of every year.
Let ΓI = {ΓD ∪ ΓWd ∪ ΓMd ∪ ΓMw ∪ ΓYd ∪ ΓYw ∪ ΓYm} represent the set
of intervals. In the literature, the commonly used temporal operators include
before, after and during that check whether a given temporal term occurs before,
after or during another temporal term, respectively. Let T OP = {before, after,
during} be the set of these temporal operators. Using the sets given above, a
temporal constraint in our access control mechanism can be specified as given
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in Definition-2, below.
Definition-2 [Temporal constraints]. Given a set of discrete time points
T ′, a set of time intervals ΓI, and set of temporal operators T OP, a temporal
constraint is defined as follows:
• ti top tj , where ti, tj ∈ T ′, and top ∈ T OP
• ti top tr , where ti ∈ T ′, tr ∈ ΓI, and top ∈ T OP
• ti top tj , where ti, tj ∈ ΓI, and top ∈ T OP
• If tc1 and tc2 are temporal constraints and top ∈ T OP, then tc1 ∧ tc2,
tc1 ∨ tc2, and tc1 top tc2 are also temporal constraints.
The spatial and temporal constraints, defined above, will now be used in forming
resource object expressions and in specifying the conditions, as discussed below.
5.1.2 Protected Resource Objects
The objects to be protected by the access control model in video surveillance
systems can be divided into two categories: i) live camera feeds, ii) recorded
video, collectively referred to as resource objects in this chapter. Each of these
categories have attributes associated with them. For instance, the attributes
associated with live camera feeds may include cam-id, cam-type, cam-area, and
loc-type. Cam-id is the unique identifier of each camera, cam-type defines the
type of camera, e.g., pan-tilt-zoom, covert camera, auto-mobile camera etc.,
cam-area specifies the logical location where the camera is deployed in, e.g.,
Times Square, Brooklyn_east etc., and loc-type states the type of location where
the camera is deployed, e.g., bus-stop, shopping mall, street etc.
We assume that the videos are stored together with the metadata associated
with them. As mentioned earlier, longer videos are normally segmented into
smaller video units, called video shots. Each video shot is stored along with
the metadata, using solutions such as MPEG-7. The metadata information also
includes the starting and ending timestamps of the video shot. Thus, the at-
tributes associated with resource objects also include the annotations extracted
from the videos using the video analytics algorithms that extract semantic data
contained in the videos. The semantic data extracted from the video includes
both the semantic objects, e.g., humans, cars, bicycles etc., and semantic events,
e.g., vandalism, fire, bullet-fire etc., contained in the video. Note the difference
between the terms semantic objects and resource objects. The term semantic
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object represents the objects contained in a video, e.g. vehicle, human etc.,
whereas resource objects represent the objects – live camera feeds and recorded
videos – whose access is to be protected using access control mechanism. It
should also be noted that the term objects used earlier in this thesis, partic-
ularly in Chapter-4, is semantically similar to the term resource objects. We
user the term resource objects, in this chapter, to distinguish between semantic
objects and resource objects.
The semantic objects and semantic events extracted from the video depend
on the specific application of video surveillance and may range from simple
events e.g., motion-detection, crossing a fence to complex events like explosive
detection, luggage left behind, nozzle-fire etc. Some of these annotations may be
extracted by the camera such as object detection and motion detection, whereas
others maybe extracted by an intermediate server when it receives the videos
from the cameras. The events may also be reported manually or using physical
non-camera sensors deployed near cameras which may report events such as
burglary or fire.
Storing the metadata information linked to the videos provides two advantages:
i) it enables to retrieve the videos using metadata, ii) this information may be
used in specifying the access control policy. It is important to note that the
access control policy needs to refer to resource objects based on their attributes,
as stated in § 3.4.2 (summarized in Table 5.1), rather than simply using their
identifiers. Hence, in the access control policy, the resource objects may be
denoted by attributes – including extracted annotations – associated with them.
For example, a user may be granted access to all videos from Manhattan area
recoded during 10am − 12am which contain a bicycle.
An important consideration in video surveillance systems is that an event or
object detected in a video stream may cause to activate an environment attribute
and hence may affect the access to further live videos. For example, once a cross-
fence event is detected in a specific area, the access privileges of users in this area
may be elevated to higher privileges, e.g. a patrolling observer may be given
access to unblurred videos in order to recognize and apprehend the culprit.
Below we formalize the resource object attributes which are then used in defin-
ing resource object expressions and in specification of conditions.
Definition-3 [Resource object attributes]. Let OIV be the set of vari-
ables ranging over the resource object identifiers. Let OA = {oa1, oa2, ... oan}
be the set of resource object attributes. We define these attributes to be either
atomic- or set-valued, where an atomic object attribute may hold a single value
whereas a set-valued attribute may hold multiple values. Let OAV = {oa1(v11,
84 Access Control in Video Surveillance
v12, ... v1k), oa2(v21, v22, . . . v2l), ... oan(vn1, vn2, ... vnm)} be the set of possible
values for each resource object attribute. Let OAT T be the set of resource object
attribute functions defined for elements of OA. Each attribute function takes
an element x ∈ OIV and returns the value(s) of the given attribute. Let OP be
a set of operators defined over the attributes.
Note that the set of operators OP above includes the spatial and temporal
operators defined earlier (Definition-1 & Definition-2 ) as well as any other
semantically relevant operators defined for attributes, in the application.
In the access control policy, we use resource object expressions to represent the
set of resource objects which a role is authorized to access. The resource ob-
ject expressions consist of resource object attributes which may also include the
metadata information. The resource object expressions are formed as defined
in Deinition-4, below.
Definition-4 [Resource object expression]. Given the set of variables
ranging over resource object identifiers OIV, the set of resource object attribute
values OAV, the set of resource object attribute functions OAT T , and the set
of operators OP, a resource object expression is built from atoms which can be
defined as follows:
• p(x), where x ∈ OIV, and p ∈ OAT T
• p(x) op v, where x ∈ OIV, p ∈ OAT T , v ∈ OAV, and op ∈ OP
• If roe1 and roe2 are resource object expressions and op ∈ OP, then roe1
∧ roe2, roe1 ∨ roe2, and roe1 op roe2 are also resource object expressions.
[Examples: Resource object expressions]. The following are examples of resource
object expressions:
1. roe1: {("Brooklyn" contains cam-area(o)) ∧ (timestamp(o) during ([08:00:00
− 16:00:00] ∧ {2,3,4,5,6}.day.week))}. This is an expression denoting the
resource objects from ’Brooklyn’ area with timestamp between 8AM to
4PM during weekdays (Monday – Friday).
2. roe2: (loc-type(o) = "mall") ∧ (timestamp(o) after 2015.03.10.11:00:00)
∧ (timestamp(o) before 2015.03.12.23:59:59) ∧ ("Manhattan" contains
cam-area(o)). This resource object expression denotes those objects which
have location type ’mall’, belong to the area ’Manhattan’, and were recorded
during 11PM on March 10, 2015 and 12PM midnight on March 12, 2015.
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3. roe3: (cam-area(o) equals "Brooklyn_east") ∧ (semanticObjects(o) in-
cludes "red-car"). This expression refers to the resource objects from the
’Brooklyn_east’ area which contain a red-colored car in the sematic ob-
jects extracted from the videos.
4. roe4: (loc-type(o) = "bus-stop") ∧ (semanticEvents(o) includes "fire").
This expression specifies the objects having location type ’bus-stop’ with
fire-incident detected in the videos.
Note that the above resource object expression examples also include spatial and
temporal constraints, as defined in previous section, since the resource objects
are associated with spatio-temporal attributes too. This implies that the set
of resource object attribute functions OAT T also includes functions related to
spatial and temporal attributes which take an object and return either spatial
or temporal attribute value for that object. The functions timestamp() and
cam-area() are examples of such attribute functions.
5.1.3 Authorized Users
In many applications, identity or role of a user is sufficient to determine whether
or not access to a particular object is to be granted. Unlike these applications, in
video surveillance, we need to consider other attributes of user too, e.g. location,
while evaluating a user’s access request. There exist two main types of users
in video surveillance: those who need regular access to the data, called regular
observers, and those who need to access data only occasionally, called responding
observers, as discussed in scenarios (cf. § 3.4.1).
A major difference between regular observers and responding observers is that
the former work proactively for serving the purpose of surveillance while the
latter work reactively in response to occurrence of an anomalous event. The
examples of regular observers include observers in the monitoring room and pa-
trolling observers. Whereas, a patrolling observer responding to an incident,
or a fire-man responding to a fire-alarm are examples of responding observers.
The important factors in granting access to regular observers are attributes of
both user and resource object, as well as environment attributes. The regular
observers may be given low privileged access in normal circumstances and high
privileged access in case of an emergency. On the other hand, the respond-
ing observers are granted occasional access mainly based on occurrence of an
incident.
As the proposed access control mechanism is based on the AERBAC model,
the role of a user is the core user attribute that determines the set of permis-
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sions allowed to the user. Examples of other user attributes, in addition to the
role, include user duty timings, user response area, location of a user, etc. The
permissions are decided based on user’s role and certain other user, object and
environment attributes.
Definition-5 [User attributes]. Let UIV be the set variables ranging over
user identifiers, let UA = {ua1, ua2, ... uan} be the set of user attributes where
each attribute is either atomic- or set-valued. Let UAV = {ua1(v11, v12, ... v1k),
ua2(v21, v22, . . . v2l), ... uan(vn1, vn2, ... vnm)} be the set of possible values for
each element defined in UA. Let UAT T be the set of user attribute functions
defined for each element in UA, where each attribute function may take an ele-
ment x ∈ UIV, and returns the value(s) of the given attribute.
As discussed in Chapter-3, the organization responsible for operating and work-
ing of the video surveillance systems is named the operator. It is to be noted
that it may not be feasible for the operator to assign specific roles and other
attributes to all the users in the system, including those from Collaborating Or-
ganizations (CO), e.g., police and fire-brigade employees. Doing so would make
the task of administration cumbersome as it puts responsibility of reassigning
and revoking of attributes for CO users on the operator. A more feasible alter-
native is that the COs assign attributes to a responding employee when the need
arises. The video surveillance operator may inform the COs about an incident
and its location and the relevant CO in turn finds its employees near the inci-
dent location and assigns them the relevant roles and other required attributes.
The responding observers may then access the data from incident location as
long as the operator can verify the attributes presented by the responding ob-
servers. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [101] may be used for
secure exchange of attributes between COs and the video surveillance operator.
5.1.4 Environment Attributes
As discussed in § 4.1, attributes that capture the external factors of the situation
in which the access takes place are called environment attributes. Current-time,
temperature, occurrence of an incident or other information which not only per-
tains to a specific object or user, but may hold for multiple entities is typically
modeled as environment attribute. The state of the environmental attributes
may be captured via hardware (e.g. sensors) or software mechanisms, including
automatic event detection in videos, that monitor and report changes in the
environment.
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Definition-6 [Environment attributes]. Let EA = {ea1, ea2, ... ean} be the
set of environment attributes where each attribute is either atomic- or set-valued.
Let EAV = {ea1(v11, v12, ... v1k), ea2(v21, v22, . . . v2l), ... ean(vn1, vn2, ... vnm)}
be the set of values for each element defined in EA. Let LIV be the set variables
ranging over location identifiers, and EAT T be the set of environment attribute
functions defined for elements of EA, where each attribute function may take
either null or an element x ∈ LIV, and returns value(s) of given attribute.
The above definition formalizes environment attributes which are now used,
along with resource object attributes (Definition-3 ) and user attributes (Defnition-
5 ), in specification of conditions.
5.1.5 Condition Specification
Being based on AERBAC, a permission in ROAMVS is constrained by one or
more conditions, which must be evaluated to be true in order for the user to
exercise that permission. Unlike resource object expressions which are formed
using only resource object attributes, a condition associated with a permission
may contain attributes of all entities i.e. users, resource objects and environ-
ment.
Definition-7 [Condition expression]. Given the resource object, user and
environment attributes as formalized in Definition-3, Definition-5, and Definition-
6, respectively, let us suppose p, g ∈ {OAT T ∪ UAT T ∪ EAT T }, x ∈
{OIV ∪ UIV ∪ LIV}, op ∈ OP, and v ∈ {OAV ∪ UAV ∪ EAV},then a
condition expression is defined as follows:
• p(x) op v is a condition expression
• p(x) op g(x) is a condition expression
• If ce1 and ce2 are condition expressions and op ∈ OP, then ce1 ∧ ce2, ce1
∨ ce2, and ce1 op ce2 are also condition expressions.
[Examples: Condition expressions]. Examples of condition expressions include:
1. ce1: userArea(u) contains cam-area(o) ∧ time-of-day() during userDuty(u).
This expression specifies that in order to exercise the associated permis-
sion, the camera area must be contained by the current area of the user
and the time of access must lie within user’s duty timings.
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2. ce2: userAssignedArea(u) equals "Manhattan_west" ∧ "Manhattan_-
west" ∈ AlarmedRegions(). This condition expression shall be evaluated
to be true if user has been assigned to ’Manhattan_west’ and alarm has
gone off in that region.
5.1.6 Privilege Modes
Access control for video surveillance requires operations that are semantically
meaningful for video surveillance data. In order to achieve the goal of max-
imum utilization of a video surveillance system while protecting the privacy
of the individuals recorded, different users may be allowed to access the data
with different levels of privacy protection depending on the current contextual
information. We achieve this by allowing the users to access video data by speci-
fying the properties of the video and the actions which may be performed on the
video data. Properties of the video data may include frame-rate, video resolu-
tion, privacy protection, etc. Whereas the actions may include annotations, view,
zoom-in, play-back, search and identify. The annotations action allows a user to
observe the metadata associated with the videos, such as location, timestamp,
semantic objects and events contained in the video, etc. The view action allows
to watch the videos. The zoom-in and play-back actions allow zooming into a
certain video and playing back a video, respectively. The search action allows
to search for an individual, object or a set of video segments, and identify allows
to find the identity of an individual in a video, if known by the system, e.g.
using remote biometrics [64]. An example lattice of video properties is depicted
in Fig. 5.1. In this lattice, we use different possible values for video properties
including the frames per second (FPS), the video resolution and the privacy
protection property. The privacy protection property that hides the identity
revealing regions (e.g. faces) of the objects in video, recorded by video surveil-
lance, may be either silhouettes, blurred or clear. Silhouettes privacy property
replaces the semantic objects in the video with dummy figures, blurred privacy
property blurs the identity revealing regions, whereas clear privacy property
shows the video without protecting the privacy. Several other alternatives of
these video properties may be possible.
A privilege mode for the video surveillance data is formed by joining a set of
actions with a combination of video properties values. This allows combining
together different actions and the properties of the video data, to be assigned
as a single operation to a user. Suitable privilege modes should be devised
corresponding to video properties and actions performed on video data, as per
application requirements. For example, a privilege mode in normal circum-
stances may allow to access video data with following video properties: 14 FPS,
320x240 resolution and with blurred privacy-sensitive regions, while the actions
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Figure 5.1: An example lattice of video properties
allowed may include view, annotations, and playback actions. As part of our
mechanism, we devise four different privilege modes which can be applied on
video data: low-access, default, high-access and full-access. Table 5.2 shows
these privilege modes, each consisting of a unique combination of video proper-
ties and allowed actions. Note that the video properties, the privilege modes,
and the actions that may be performed on videos given here are not supposed
to be exhaustive in nature. For instance, the action to change the direction of
a camera is not included in the given privilege modes. Depending on the appli-
cation requirements, other privilege modes may be defined based on the used
actions and video properties.
Table 5.2: Privilege modes with video properties and actions
Privilege
mode
Semantics
Video properties Actions
low-access 6 FPS, 320x240, silhouettes view
default 14 FPS, 320x240, blurred view, annotations, play-back
high-access 26 FPS, 640x480, clear view, annotations, play-back, zoom-
in
full-access 26 FPS, 640x480, clear view, annotations, play-back, zoom-
in, search, identify
The privilege modes can have ordering relationships among them, in terms of
increasing power, indicating that a privilege mode is subsumed by the other.
We represent this ordered privilege mode relationship by ≺p, such that pmi ≺p
pmj indicates that privilege mode pmj subsumes the privilege mode pmi. We
define the order of given privilege modes to be: low-access ≺p default ≺p high-
access ≺p full-access. Based on changed circumstances, e.g., occurrence of an
incident such as fire, the privilege mode allowed to a user may be shifted from
low privilege mode (e.g. default) to a high privilege mode (e.g. high-access).
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Example roles and permissions
Now that we have defined the necessary concepts used in our ROAMVS ap-
proach, Table 5.3 presents a few example roles along with assigned permissions
and their corresponding conditions. As discussed earlier, the permissions com-
prise of resource object expressions and privilege modes (i.e. operations) and
condition associated to a permission must be true in order for the user to exercise
that permission. Resource object expressions can only contain resource object
attributes comparing them with potential attribute values. In order to perform
direct comparisons between resource object attributes and user attributes, con-
ditions are used, which may also use environment attributes. For example, in
Table 5.3, the permission in Room_observer role allows a user assuming this role
to access all types of cameras (e.g. covert, overt) from all types of locations (e.g.
bus-stop, street) with default privilege mode. This permission is constrained by
a condition which states that the user can exercise this permission when the
accessed camera is deployed in the area where user is currently located and the
time of access is between 8AM and 4PM.
Table 5.3: Example roles with permissions and associated conditions
Role Permissions Conditions
Room_observer [(loc-type(o) = all ∧ cam-
type(o) = all), default]
[userArea(u) contains cam-
area(o) ∧ current-time() during
(08:00:00 − 16:00:00)]
Patrolling_observer
[(loc-type(o) ∈ {bus-stop,
shopping-mall, street} ∧
semantic-objects(o) includes
{human, vehicle}), default ]
[userArea(u) contains cam-
area(o) ∧ current-time() during
(08:00:00 − 16:00:00)]
[(cam-type(o) ∈ {covert, overt}
∧ loc-type(o) ∈ {shopping-mall,
street}), high-access]
[userResponseArea(u) contains
cam-area(o) ∧ env-mode(cam-
area(o)) = alarm]
External_observer [(loc-type(o) = shopping-mall
∧ cam-type(o) = overt), full-
access]
[userResponseArea(u) contains
cam-area(o) ∧ env-mode(cam-
area(o)) = emergency]
5.1.7 Attribute Hierarchy and Derived Permissions
ROAMVS is based on AERBAC which itself is an extension of RBAC; hence
users are assigned to roles and roles are assigned permissions. Notice that the
permissions in ROAMVS refer to the objects using resource object expressions.
Therefore, in ROAMVS, permissions may be implicitly derived from the explic-
itly specified ones based on hierarchies of resource object attributes, partial order
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defined on the set of privileges and obviously due to role hierarchies. Hence there
exist three distinct categories of derived permissions: resource object attribute
hierarchy, privileges order derivation and role hierarchy. We do not discuss role
hierarchies since they are semantically similar to role hierarchies in RBAC i.e.
a role X which is senior to a role Y inherits all the permissions assigned to the
role Y . Below we discuss derived permissions based on partial order among the
privilege modes and the resource object attribute hierarchy.
5.1.7.1 Privilege Mode Derivation
As described in the previous section, one privilege mode may subsume another
privilege mode. Permissions may, therefore, be derived based on existence of
partial order among the privileges defined in the application.
The partial ordering among the privilege modes allows certain permissions to
a role which are not explicitly assigned to that role. Suppose a permission
p =< oek,mj >, where oek is a resource object expression and mj is a privilege
mode. Suppose there exists a privilege mode mi, such that mi ≺p mj then
the derived permission p′ =< oek,mi > is also available to a role having the
permission p. For instance, the permission specified in External_observer role,
in Table 5.3, allows a user in this role to access all resource objects – of type
overt, and shopping_mall as their location type – with full-access privilege
mode. Due to the order of privilege modes defined in our mechanism i.e. low-
access ≺p default ≺p high-access ≺p full-access; a user in External_observer
role can also access the resource objects – denoted by the attributes specified in
the permission – with low-access, default, or high-access modes, in addition to
full-access privilege mode.
5.1.7.2 Attribute Hierarchy
Attributes that are used in resource object expressions may also be linked hi-
erarchically. For instance, an attribute representing the location of a resource
object may have a semantic hierarchy, e.g., Brooklyn_east is a sub-region of
Brooklyn which is in turn a sub-region of New York city, as shown in Fig. 5.2.
Similarly, there may exist hierarchies between other resource object attributes
including the semantic object and events contained in the videos. An example
of the semantic object hierarchy is shown in Fig. 5.3. An example hierarchy
among semantic events is given in Fig. 5.4. Note that these figures provide
example hierarchies and may differ from application to application. Based on
the attribute hierarchy, a permission that allows to access resource objects as-
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Figure 5.3: Semantic object hierarchy example
sociated with New York region allows derivation of additional permissions for
resource objects associated with more specific resource object location, in this
case resource objects associated with Manhattan region, as per the example
hierarchy defined in Fig. 5.2.
It must be noted that a resource object expression normally contains multiple
object attributes hence a derived permission allows to access only those resource
objects which are represented by a more specific object attribute but further
constrained by additional object attributes which exist in that resource object
expression.
We represent hierarchy of object attributes using: oax ≺oa oay which repre-
sents that object attribute oax is more specific than oay. Due to the existence
of attribute hierarchy, a resource object expression may be a sub-expression of
another resource object expression which consists of resource object attributes
higher in the hierarchy. We represent this relationship as oe′ ≺oe oe which
denotes that resource object expression oe′ is a sub-expression of oe. Suppose
there exists a permission p =< oe,mi > where resource object expression oe
consists of object attributes oai, oaj and oak. Suppose there exists another
resource object expression oe′ which consists of object attributes oai , oaj , and
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oal, such that oal ≺oa oak, then oe′ is a sub-expression of oe. Hence the per-
mission p′ =< oe′,mi > is a derived permission from p and is also available to
a role which has been assigned the permission p.
Due to the derived permissions, our approach allows a larger set of permissions
associated to a role comprised of relatively few permissions explicitly assigned
to that role.
Semantic 
Events
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Glass 
break
Protest
Luggage 
behind
ExplosionFire
Cross 
fence
Figure 5.4: Semantic event hierarchy example
5.2 Access Control Decisions
Access control deals with verifying whether a user requesting access to a certain
resource object using a specific privilege can be granted access, according to
the access control policy. Note that, in ROAMVS, the access control policy is
specified in a role-oriented fashion. Each role is assigned a set of permissions
which may be exercised by a user assuming that role, provided that the condition
associated with the requested permission is fulfilled. Each permission comprises
of resource object expression and privilege mode. In order to process an access
request, we do not consult the whole authorization policy base, rather only the
permissions available in the user’s session are evaluated.
In video surveillance systems, the resource object to be accessed may be either
live camera feeds or videos recorded earlier. An important consideration in
video surveillance environments is that the user’s request may also be based
on the attributes of the resource objects. For instance, a user might want to
access all live feeds with specified characteristics e.g., cameras with loc-type =
street and cam-area = Brooklyn_west. Hence, the authorization process should
consider both the possibility of an object identifier or object attributes in the
request. As discussed in previous chapter, AERBAC allows to specify an access
request using a resource object identifier as well as resource object attributes
(cf. § 4.2.1). We also discussed the algorithms for evaluation of identifier-based
and attribute-based requests. Identifier-based request is evaluated in the same
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manner as given in previous chapter. However, attribute-based requests are
evaluated slightly differently, due to the nature of resource objects and the
permission derivation.
Specifying the object attributes in the request implies that the user wishes
to access all those resource objects which have the specified attribute values.
As mentioned above, a user may be interested in accessing either live feeds
or recorded videos. We may distinguish between requests for live feeds and
recordings based on attributes specified in the request. For instance, if a request
specifies the timestamp for which the data is required, it implies that the user is
interested to access recordings. On the other hand, if no timestamp is mentioned
in the request, the user rather requires live feeds.
In Chapter-4, we discussed two algorithms for attribute-based request evalua-
tions: i) resource query evaluation, ii) attribute-values evaluation. Below we
provide slightly modified versions of these algorithms, distinguishing between
live and recorded videos and allowing derivation of permissions, to show how
user requests will be evaluated using ROAMVS in the video surveillance envi-
ronments.
Resource Query Evaluation
In this approach, the user request contains an expression that denotes a set of
resource objects to be accessed. The access request can be represented as a
triple: Req =< se, re,m >, where se is the session identifier, re is the request
expression, and m states the requested privilege. An example user request could
be: Req =<se, (cam-type = ptz ∧ loc-type = street ∧ cam-area = Brooklyn),
default> which states that the owner of the session se wishes to exercise the
default privilege on the resource objects denoted by the given request expression.
The request evaluation steps in this approach are given by the algorithm in
Fig. 5.5.
The algorithm receives as input the access request Req and returns all the re-
source objects that are relevant to the request expression and that owner of
session se is allowed to access according to the permissions in session se. The
given expression is examined, by liveOrRec() function, to determine whether
the user intends to access live feeds or recordings. This is done by checking
the resource object attributes mentioned in the request. Once determined, the
searchObjects() function converts the expression into a query and retrieves the
resource objects, represented by the given expression, from the resource objects
database. Next step is to find the applicable resource object expressions by
matching the user’s requested privilege with the ones mentioned in the permis-
sion set existing in the user’s session, and by verifying whether the resource
object expression is relevant to the requested object category (live feeds or
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Algorithm 3
Input: An access request: Req = <se, re, m >comprising of session identifier
se, request expression re, and privilege mode m.
Output: 1) Grant and return authorized resource objects, 2) Deny otherwise
1: relevant_expressions = φ;
2: object_set = φ;
3: authorized_objects = φ;
4: obj_category = liveOrRec∗(re);
5: object_set = searchObjects∗∗(re, obj_category);
6: if object_set 6= φ then
7: for all perm<res_object_exp, op>∈ avail_session_perms do
8: if m p pm AND isRelevant†(res_object_exp, obj_category) then
9: relevant_expressions← relevant_expressions ∪ res_object_exp;
10: end if
11: end for
12: for all object ∈ object_set do
13: for all res_object_exp ∈ relevant_expressions do
14: if evaluate††(res_object_exp, object) then
15: if evalCond‡(condition, object, session_user(se)) then
16: authorized_objects ← authorized_objects ∪ object;
17: break;
18: end if
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: end if
23: if authorized_object 6= φ then
24: return authorized_objects;
25: end if
26: return Reject;
∗liveOrRec(re) receives the request expression re and determines whether user
is interested to access live feeds or recorded videos. It returns the category (live
feeds or recordings) that user intends to access.
∗∗searchObjects(re, obj_category) returns a set of resource objects existing in
the resource database that are denoted by the constraints specified in expression
re, in the request.
†isRelevant(res_object_exp, obj_category) returns TRUE if value of
obj_category is "live" and res_object_exp comprises of camera attributes,
or if value of obj_category is "recordings" and res_object_exp comprises of
recorded video attributes, and FALSE otherwise.
††evaluate(res_object_exp, object) returns TRUE if res_object_exp evaluates
to true for the given object, else returns FALSE.
‡evalCond(condition, object, session_user(se)) returns TRUE if given condition
evaluates to true for the given object attributes and the attributes of the user
and the environment.
Figure 5.5: Evaluation of attribute-based request using query result evaluation
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recordings). Once the resource object expressions are shortlisted, they are evalu-
ated, using the function evaluate(), one-by-one for each resource object returned
by the query. If a resource object expression and its corresponding condition
evaluate to true for an object, the object is added into the list of authorized_ob-
jects to be granted to the user. Finally, user is granted access to all the objects
in this list.
As discussed above, the resource object expressions are to be evaluated for
each returned object, therefore, this approach may prove to be expensive in
cases where several resource objects are returned by the query formed based
on user’s request. A possible variation in attribute-based request processing
may be to provide a list of representative thumbnails for the resource objects
returned against the user request. The user can then select one of the returned
objects and authorization policy is consulted for the selected object, or the user
submits a more detailed request based on the intermediate result. However,
the information returned, e.g., where and how many cameras are deployed in a
region, may itself be classified, and hence may also need authorization before
such information can be returned to a user. The next approach, attribute-values
evaluation, addresses these issues.
Attribute-values Evaluation
In attribute-values evaluation, user’s request is evaluated against the resource
object expressions, existing in the user’s session, before retrieving the actual
objects from the resource objects database. In this approach, rather than pro-
viding an expression, user specifies his/her access request by specifying the at-
tribute values of the desired resource objects. The user request comprises of
three elements: Req = <se, object_attribute_values, m>, where se is the ses-
sion identifier, object_attribute_values specifies the attributes of the requested
resource objects, and m states the requested privilege. The algorithm receives
as input the user request Req and returns the resource objects denoted by ob-
ject attribute values given in Req, if request is granted, otherwise the request is
denied. An example user request could be: Reqi = <se, (cam-type = covert;
loc-type = mall; cam-area = Manhattan_center), high-access>. To process the
user request, all those resource object expressions existing in the user’s ses-
sion are identified in which: i) the privilege mode specified in the permission
matches with requested privilege, ii) the resource object expression is relevant to
the requested object category (live feeds or recordings), iii) the resource object
expression uses only the attributes mentioned in the user’s request (attribute_-
relevancy()). Resource object expressions that include an attribute not specified
by the user request are not relevant. After shortlisting the resource object ex-
pressions, the attribute functions in each resource object expression is given the
object attribute values from the user request. Suppose we find a resource object
expression: (loc-type(o) = mall ∧ cam-area(o) = Manhattan_center) relevant
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Algorithm 4
Input: An access request: Req = < se, obj_attribute_values, m> comprising
of session identifier se, object attribute values obj_attribute_values, and priv-
ilege mode m.
Output: 1) Grant and return authorized resource objects, 2) Reject otherwise
Begin:
1: authorized_objects = φ;
2: obj_category = liveOrRec∗(obj_attribute_values);
3: for all perm < res_object_exp, op > ∈ avail_session_perms do
4: if m p pm ∧ attributeRelevancy∗∗(res_object_exp, obj_attribute_-
values, obj_category) then
5: if evaluate† (res_object_exp, obj_attribute_values) then
6: if evalCond‡(condition, obj_attribute_values, session_user(se)
then
7: authorized_objects = get_objects‡‡(obj_attribute_values);
8: break;
9: end if
10: end if
11: end if
12: end for
13: if authorized_object 6= φ then
14: return authorized_objects
15: end if
16: return (Reject)
End
∗liveOrRec(re) receives the request expression re and determines whether user
is interested to access live feeds or recorded videos. It returns the category (live
feeds or recordings) that user intends to access.
∗∗attributeRelevancy(res_object_exp, obj_attribute_values, obj_category)
returns TRUE if the given res_object_exp uses only those object attribute
functions referred in obj_attribute_values and which belong to same category
as obj_category
†evaluate(res_object_exp, obj_attribute_values) returns TRUE if the given
res_object_exp evaluates to true when the object attribute functions are re-
placed with obj_attribute_values
‡eval_cond(condition, obj_attribute_values, session_user(se)) returns TRUE
if the given condition evaluates to true for the given object attributes and the
attributes of the user and environment
‡‡get_objects(obj_attribute_values) returns a set of resource objects existing
in the resource objects database that satisfy obj_attribute_values
Figure 5.6: Evaluation of attribute-based request using attribute-values eval-
uation approach
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to the user request Reqi, given above. Upon picking the values of the object
attribute functions loc-type and cam-area from user given attribute values we
get: (mall = mall ∧ Manhattan_center = Manhattan_center) which would
evaluate to true. As soon as a resource object expression and its corresponding
condition return true, the user’s request is granted and rest of the resource
object expressions are ignored.
When an expression returns true, the get_objects() function forms a query based
on the attribute values specified in the user request and the user is granted access
to all those resource objects returned by the query. This query may restrict the
list of returned objects based on any additional attributes mentioned in the
user’s request. In the example above, the returned result is restricted based on
additional object attribute cam-type which is mentioned in the user’s request
but does not exist in the resource object expression which enables the request.
The algorithm for this approach is given in Fig. 5.6.
5.2.1 Enforcement Architecture
A simplified architecture to enforce the proposed mechanism is shown in Fig. 5.7.
The video data is captured by the deployed cameras at their respective locations.
The video server is responsible to manage cameras and receive videos from
cameras and acts as an interface among cameras, storage server and the access
control module. The annotations extracted from the video data are stored,
linked to the videos, by the storage server. The videos may be accessed by
users, wishing to view the live or recorded videos of a desired location, i.e.
live video feeds are often viewed in a special monitoring room, and these live
or recorded videos may also be viewed on hand-held devices or a workstation.
The reference monitor receives a user request and evaluates the request as per
user’s session and the format of the access request. The context manager is
responsible to monitor and store the contextual information related to users,
resource objects and the environment.
Once the criteria in the authorization policy are fulfilled, the retrieved videos are
post-processed by the video filtering module before delivering to the user. Post-
processing is done to enable different levels of access to the data according to the
user authorizations as mentioned in the policy. Post-processing may include, for
example, hiding the privacy sensitive regions in the live feeds or recorded videos
when showing them to a user, and removing video segments that the user is not
authorized to access from the requested time-period, etc. The access levels are
determined based on attributes of the user, environment, and resource object
(including the semantic objects and events extracted as annotations from the
video).
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Figure 5.7: System architecture for controlling access in video surveillance
Continuous Enforcement
Continuous enforcement of access control [108] ensures whether the contextual
attributes involved in a permission and its corresponding condition continuously
hold the same value, during permission execution, which they had at the time
of granting a requested permission. For instance, the logical location of a user
may change from one area to another. Another example is change in an environ-
ment attribute (e.g. emergency) from active to de-active or vice-versa. Different
mechanisms to re-evaluate a granted permission have been discussed in the lit-
erature [78]. One possibility is to re-evaluate a granted permission periodically
after specified intervals of time [108]. Another possibility is to re-evaluate when-
ever a change in a contextual attribute is detected [65]. It is important to note
that not every change in contextual attribute should trigger re-evaluation of the
permission. Rather it should be re-evaluated only if the change causes modifi-
cation in the semantic value of an attribute. For instance, the physical location
of a user may change very frequently but the logical location would change only
when the user moves out of the boundary of a specific region. Thus, in this
case, the re-evaluation should be triggered only when the user’s logical location
is changed. The context manager needs to keep track of the updated contextual
information by monitoring the attributes that may change during the active ses-
sion of a user. When such a change is detected, the context manager reports to
the reference monitor about the change so that the policy may be re-evaluated.
Our approach facilitates such frequent checking of ongoing updates in the at-
tributes by re-evaluating the permissions in the user’s session, based on his/her
roles activated in the session. The proposed mechanism may significantly reduce
the number of authorization rules to be evaluated since we do not evaluate the
whole policy as opposed to the earlier approaches [23, 24].
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5.3 XACML Profile and Implementation
The eXtensibel Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [102] is the most
widely used policy specification language for access control. It is standardized by
the Organization for Advancement of Structured Information Systems (OASIS).
In this section, we present an XACML profile for the access control mechanism
we proposed for video surveillance systems. We have also implemented a proto-
type system to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach.
XACML has three major constructs: policy-set, policy, and rule. A rule is
defined by the triple: target, effect and condition. Target in a rule restricts
the circumstances where the rule is applicable, effect specifies the outcome of
the decision (e.g. permit, deny), and the condition is a boolean expression on
the set of attributes which has to be satisfied for applying the rule’s effect. A
policy consists of a target and a set of rules. The target in a policy states the
circumstances when the policy is applicable. A policy-set is a larger construct
and contains a set of policies.
The core and hierarchical XACML profile of RBAC [100] defines a profile for
the use of XACML to meet the requirements of RBAC. Because the under-
lying model, AERBAC, we used for access control in video surveillance, is a
role-oriented model; our profile is also role-oriented. The roles are special at-
tributes in our access control mechanism and are assigned permissions, similar
to RBAC. We use two generic XACML policies: a Permission <PolicySet> and
a Role <PolicySet>. Permissions are expressed in a permission <PolicySet>
which defines a set of permissions assigned to a role. Recall that, in our access
control mechanism, a permission consists of a resource object expression and a
privilege mode, and is constrained by a condition that has to be true in order
for the user to exercise that permission. Resource object expressions are formed
using resource object attributes whereas conditions may use object, user and
environment attributes.
In XACML, we specify the permissions and conditions as a rule using both
<Target> and <Condition> elements. Conditions on the permissions are spec-
ified using <Condition> element. A permission <PolicySet> may also contain
<PolicySetIdReference> to another permission <PolicySet> in order to inherit
permissions from another role. Note that direct comparison of two attributes in a
<Target> is currently not supported by the XACML. It supports comparing an
attribute with an attribute value but does not allow comparing two attributes,
e.g. userDepartment == resourceDepartment cannot be compared in <Target>
element. Such comparisons can be performed only using a <Condition>.
Role <PolicySet> binds the holder of a specified role to the permissions as-
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signed to that role by pointing to a permission <PolicySet> using the reference
<PolicySetIdReference>. Like RBAC, the policies should be stored in the pol-
icy repository in such a way that the role <PolicySet> instances are always
used as initial policy while the permission <PolicySet> instances should only
be reachable via the corresponding role <PolicySet>. This ensures that only
subjects having a specific role can access the permissions assigned to that role,
specified through permission <PolicySet>.
5.3.1 Prototype Implementation
Together with the language, the OASIS standard [102] also defines architectural
components for enforcing XACML policies. A core component of this archi-
tecture is the Policy Decision Point (PDP) which evaluates an access control
request against the set of XACML policies and returns the decision. There ex-
ist multiple open-source implementations of XACML PDP: Sun’s XACML [138],
XACML Light [2], XACML Enterprise [3], and Balana XACML [157]. Among
these, we chose Balana XACML implementation because of its modular and eas-
ily extendible architecture. It is based on Sun’s XACML implementation and
is the only open-source implementation that supports the latest specification of
XACML i.e. XACMLv3.0.
In order to use logical location hierarchy, timestamps in the videos and partial
order defined over the privilege modes in the access control policy, we extended
XACML and defined following functions:
- mvaas:functions:location-contained-by takes two logical locations as input and
returns true if the first logical location is contained by the second logical location,
according to the location hierarchy defined over the list of logical locations
relevant to the application.
- mvaas:functions:mode-equal-or-superior takes two privilege modes as input
and returns true if the first privilege mode is equal or superior in order than the
second privilege mode, according to the partial order defined over the available
privilege modes.
- mvaas:functions:timestamp-interval-allowed takes four arguments as input and
returns true if the timestamp-interval represented by the first two arguments is
within the timestamp-interval represented by the last two arguments.
- mvaas:functions:time-in-range has been defined as an additional function in
Sun’s XACML implementation. It takes as input three time values and returns
true if the first time value falls in between the second and third time values.
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- mvaas:functions:day-in-given-weekdays takes two arguments as input and re-
turns true if the first argument value (day) falls in the range of days specified,
as formalized in § 5.1.1. We achieve this by converting the current date to day
of the week and then verify whether this day of the week falls in one of the given
days.
Figure 5.8 shows the role and permission policy-sets for the Patrolling_observer
role using a reduced form of XACML: the presentation is a simplified version
of XACML as the namespaces are removed, and the attributes, functions and
algorithms names are shortened. The example policy allows a subject assuming
Patrolling_observer role to access all camera feeds of loc-type = street, and cam-
type = point-tilt-zoom with high-access mode, provided that the camera exists
in the region where the user is currently located and access time is between
09:00 and 17:00 hrs during weekdays (Monday – Friday).
1 <!-- Role policy set -->
2 <PolicySet PolicySetId ="RPS:patrolling_observer:role" PolicyCombiningAlgId ="
permit -overrides">
3 <Target >
4 <AnyOf >
5 <AllOf >
6 <Match MatchId ="string -equal">
7 <AttributeValue DataType =" string">patrolling_observer </
AttributeValue >
8 <AttributeDesignator Category ="access -subject" AttributeId ="
subject:role"
9 DataType =" string"/>
10 </Match >
11 </AllOf >
12 </AnyOf >
13 </Target >
14 <!-- Use permissions associated with the patrolling_observer role -->
15 <PolicySetIdReference >PPS:patrolling_observer:role </ PolicySetIdReference >
16 </PolicySet >
17 <!-- ==================================== -->
18 <!-- Permission policy set -->
19 <PolicySet PolicySetId ="PPS:patrolling_observer:role" PolicyCombiningAlgId ="
permit -overrides">
20 <Target/>
21 <!-- Permissions specifically for the patrolling_observer role -->
22 <Policy PolicyId =" Permissions:specifically:for:the:patrolling_observer:
role" RuleCombiningAlgId ="permit -overrides">
23 <Target/>
24 <!-- Permission to view feeds from cameras of location -type = street AND
camera -type = pan -tilt -zoom with high access mode; in case the camera
lies in the same area as of user and access time is within subject ’s
duty -timings -->
25 <Rule RuleId ="view -alarm -mode" Effect =" Permit">
26 <Target >
27 <AnyOf > <AllOf >
28 <Match MatchId ="string -equal">
29 <AttributeValue DataType =" string">street </ AttributeValue >
30 <AttributeDesignator Category =" resource" AttributeId =" object:
location -type" DataType =" string"/>
31 </Match >
32
33 <Match MatchId ="string -equal">
34 <AttributeValue DataType =" string">pan -tilt -zoom </ AttributeValue
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>
35 <AttributeDesignator Category =" resource" AttributeId =" object:
camera -type" DataType =" string"/>
36 </Match > </AllOf > </AnyOf >
37 <AnyOf > <AllOf >
38 <Match MatchId =" function:mode -equal -or-superior">
39 <AttributeValue DataType =" string">high -access </ AttributeValue >
40 <AttributeDesignator Category =" action" AttributeId ="action -id"
DataType =" string"/>
41 </Match > </AllOf > </AnyOf >
42 </Target >
43 <!-- Object ’s area must be contained by subject ’s area AND current time must
fall in the user ’s duty timings AND specified week days -->
44 <Condition >
45 <Apply FunctionId ="and">
46 <Apply FunctionId =" function:location:contained -by">
47 <Apply FunctionId ="string -one -and -only">
48 <AttributeDesignator DataType =" string" AttributeId =" object:
area" Category =" resource"/>
49 </Apply >
50 <Apply FunctionId ="string -one -and -only">
51 <AttributeDesignator DataType =" string" AttributeId =" subject:
current:area" Category ="access -subject"/>
52 </Apply >
53 </Apply >
54 <Apply FunctionId =" function:time -in-range">
55 <Apply FunctionId ="time -one -and -only">
56 <AttributeDesignator Category =" environment" AttributeId ="
current -time" DataType ="time"/>
57 </Apply >
58 <AttributeValue DataType ="time " >09:00:00 </ AttributeValue >
59 <AttributeValue DataType ="time " >17:00:00 </ AttributeValue >
60 </Apply >
61 <Apply FunctionId =" function:day -in-given -weekdays">
62 <Apply FunctionId ="date -one -and -only">
63 <AttributeDesignator Category =" environment" AttributeId ="
current -date" DataType ="date"/>
64 </Apply >
65 <AttributeValue DataType =" string ">{2,3,4,5,6}.day.week </
AttributeValue >
66 </Apply > </Apply >
67 </Condition >
68 </Rule >
69 </Policy >
70 </PolicySet >
Figure 5.8: XACML policy for the Patrolling_observer role
We extended Balana XACML implementation with context manager which is
responsible for keeping record of roles and other attributes of user, resource ob-
ject and environment. When a request is evaluated by the PDP, the required
attribute values are retrieved with the help of Attribute Finder Modules (AFM).
We extend Balana XACML implementation with following AFMs: i) role at-
tribute finder module which finds the currently active roles of a user, ii) user
attribute finder module which finds the value of a given user attribute for a
given user, iii) environment attribute finder module which finds an environment
attribute active at a given location, and iv) resource object attribute finder
module which finds the value of a given attribute for a given resource object.
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This prototype demonstrates the implementation feasibility of the proposed ac-
cess control mechanism. Video filtering module, given in Fig. 5.7, is orthogonal
to this prototype and may be added to post-process the retrieved videos in order
to provide different levels of information in a video to different users.
5.4 Comparison with Related Work
This section compares the existing solutions relevant to access control in video
surveillance systems with the mechanism that we proposed. As discussed in § 3.3.3,
very few research efforts have focused on the challenge of access control in video
surveillance. However, a reasonable amount of work has been done in related
disciplines including multimedia applications and satellite data that defines ac-
cess authorizations using contents of the data itself. Below we discuss few such
prominent efforts and compare them with the proposed mechanism. More-
over, we explain why the existing access control approaches in the area of video
surveillance as well as multimedia and satellite applications do not provide the
features desired for access control in video surveillance (cf. § 3.4.2, Table 5.1).
Video Surveillance: In the following, we describe how our mechanism is differ-
ent than the existing approaches which discuss access control in video surveil-
lance. These approaches have already been discussed in the thesis, for more
details see § 3.3.3.
Senior et al. [130] present the idea of using multiple privacy levels in video
surveillance systems where different users are to be provided different levels of
information. The authors suggest using a privacy-preserving console manager
that extracts the information components from videos as per the authorization
level of the user. Birnstill & Pretschner [25] propose to use two different op-
erational modes called default and alarm. The default mode aims to hide the
privacy sensitive regions and shows only the site map view of the surveillance
area with type and location of objects. The alarm mode, when activated, shows
the video streams without hiding the privacy-sensitive regions. However, in both
these solutions [130, 25], the authors neither define an access control model nor
do they discuss the structure and language that may be used to specify the
authorization policy. They assume that the access control policy is already in
place. Moreover, our approach is different than both these solutions [130, 25],
in terms of focusing on designing of an access control mechanism whereas these
solutions focus on computer vision and pattern recognition algorithms to hide
the privacy sensitive regions in a video.
Moncrieff et al. [87] identify the challenge of utilizing the video surveillance
system by exposing sufficient need-specific data to the users while preserving
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the privacy of people. The authors suggest to devise a dynamic access control
mechanism by incorporating the context of the requester in the access control
process. However, this paper also does not provide an access control mechanism.
The main contribution of this paper is to identify the challenge of a dynamic
access control in video surveillance while leaving the designing of dynamic ac-
cess control model as a goal to be achieved in future research. We take on this
challenge of designing a dynamic access control model and propose a mecha-
nism that incorporates contextual information in decision making and preserves
privacy of people without under-utilizing the efficacy of the system.
To the best of our knowledge, the only solution discussing the access control
model for video surveillance systems is provided by Thuraisingham et al. [145].
This solution makes use of metadata extracted from video data. However, in this
solution, the access privileges assigned to a user are based solely on the creden-
tials presented by the subject and no environmental information is considered
in the access control policy. Moreover, these credentials are static in nature and
are assumed not to change once access has been granted. Furthermore, this so-
lution uses the credential-based (i.e. attribute-based) approach which does not
facilitate reviewing permissions assigned to a user and makes it hard to change
the access control policy (cf. § 4.3.2). Due to lack of support for reviewing per-
missions, this model does not offer simplified auditing and policy modification
visualization features described in § 3.4.2 (summarized in Table 5.1). These
features are typically supported by a role-based approach hence we used the
well-known notion of roles in our proposed solution to fulfill these requirements.
Multimedia applications: Various solutions addressing the access control is-
sue in multimedia applications have been proposed. Kodali et al. [72] develop
a generalized security framework which enforces access control using already
configured access control models. As a multimedia object can be decomposed
into several layers of information, it is important that the access to such ob-
jects may be controlled based on the contents of these objects. However, this
model does not allow specification of access control policy based on contents
of the multimedia objects. The most influential access control model for mul-
timedia applications is presented by Bertino et al. [24], where they propose an
access control model for video database systems. They define a video stream
as a series of frames that describes the semantic context and is associated with
annotation. Considering the issues associated with prior access control mecha-
nisms that specify authorizations in terms of user identities or user groups and
object identifiers, their solution allows specification of authorization rules us-
ing credentials (attributes) to specify users and content expressions to specify
objects. Their solution offers varying granularity of protected objects ranging
from an entire video to part of a video. The concept of resource object expres-
sion in our approach is similar to content-expression in this paper. However, a
content expression does not allow referring objects with spatio-temporal infor-
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mation. Subsequent research [23] attempts to extend this work by suggesting
storage of the videos in a hierarchical fashion with respect to a concept hi-
erarchy, specific to the domain of addressed problem. For instance the video
database may contain videos about medical or news domain, thus a hierarchy
would be defined for each domain and each video stream would be stored as an
element in the given hierarchy. Such a hierarchy is then exploited in the access
control policy leading to reduced number of authorization rules exploiting the
hierarchical structure of the video database. Being well suited for multimedia
based video applications, the video data, in these solutions [24] [23], is not as-
sociated with the spatio-temporal characteristics. Besides, these solutions use
the concept of restricted objects in order to allow multilayer access to a video.
For instance, a user may be allowed to view a video but the faces of people
in video are specified as restricted objects. The concept of restricted objects
may lead to conflicts in the policy where one rule may allow a certain action
whereas another rule may restrict it. Though a conflict resolution mechanism
is offered to address this issue, however, such mechanism needs to be consulted
each time a new authorization rule is inserted in the policy. To avoid policy
conflicts, we rather use privilege modes as a combination of video properties
and actions that may be performed on the videos. For example, a privilege
mode may allow users to view videos but faces of people or number plates of
vehicles may be blurred by specifying video properties in the privilege mode,
rather than using negative authorizations. Thus our access control model may
achieve the same results without using negative permissions and hence avoiding
conflicts. Moreover, these solutions do not consider environmental information,
e.g. occurrence of an incident, in the access control policy. Furthermore, be-
cause of not being a role-based approach, these solutions [24, 23] do not offer
auditability and modification visualization.
Satellite data: Similar to our target domain, satellite images have also the
unique property of being associated with specific real-world geographic coordi-
nates and a timestamp that indicates the time when the image was captured.
Access control model, proposed by Atluri et al. [12], discusses an access con-
trol model for satellite images. The model utilizes spatio-temporal information
associated with satellite data by defining spatial and temporal terms and uses
the concept of user credentials in order to specify the users in the access control
policy. The authors use hierarchical taxonomies both for user credentials and
privileges to reduce the explicit specification of authorization rules in the policy.
Privilege modes in our solution are semantically different than privileges used in
this solution as we form privilege modes by combining actions with video prop-
erties. Besides, in applications where attributes may be associated with both
users and objects, access control policy may need to check whether there exists
a relation between a user attribute and an object attribute. For example, a
user associated with Brooklyn-east region may be allowed to access data related
to Brooklyn-east region only. Allowing direct comparisons between attributes
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Table 5.4: Summary of existing access control models relevant to video surveil-
lance
Features/
Approaches
Metadata-
based
permissi-
ons
User
context
Environm-
ental
informat-
ion
Dynamic
attribu-
tes
Simplified
auditing
Modificat-
ion
visualiza-
tion
Video Surveillance
Thuraisingham
et al. [145] YES YES NO YES NO NO
Senior et
al. [130],
Moncrieff et
al. [87],
Birnstill et
al. [25]
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Multimedia Applications
Bertino et
al. [24] YES YES NO NO NO NO
Bertino et
al. [23] YES YES NO NO NO NO
Kodali et
al. [72] NO YES NO NO YES YES
Satellite data
Atluri et
al. [12] YES YES NO YES NO NO
Atluri et
al. [13] YES YES NO YES NO NO
Our approach
ROAMVS YES YES YES YES YES YES
of users and objects can significantly reduce the number of authorization rules
because authorization rules may be formed without having to use values of cer-
tain attributes in the policy. However, none of the above solutions [12, 23, 24]
allows performing direct comparisons between attributes of different entities. In
a successive research, the work by Atluri et al. [12] is further extended with
roles [13]. However, the roles do not encapsulate permissions in this solution
rather a role is used as simply an attribute. Hence, auditing the permissions
assigned to a user and seeing the impact of a policy change are not supported
by these solutions [12, 13] either, due to not being role-based approaches. More-
over, these solutions do not take into account the environmental information,
e.g. occurrence of an incident, in making an access control decision.
Table 5.4 provides a summary of the access control models we discussed above
with respect to the features desired in access control for video surveillance sys-
tems, described in § 3.4.2 (summarized in Table 5.1). Under the video surveil-
lance category, we compare our solution against the one given by Thuraisingham
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et al. [145], since this is the only solution which discusses a formal access con-
trol mechanism for video surveillance, as mentioned earlier. A yes in a table
cell means that the given feature is supported by the approach while no against
a feature implies that the requirement is not supported by the solution. Note,
however, that no against a feature does not necessarily mean that the given
feature cannot be supported by the discussed approach, it rather means that
supporting the feature requires more work and in some cases may make the ap-
proach prohibitively complex. For instance, supporting the auditability feature
using credential-based approach is considered hard to achieve because reviewing
the policy for a user requires analyzing the whole policy.
5.5 Summary
This chapter presented an access control mechanism for video surveillance sys-
tems using the AERBAC approach. As the videos are linked to a particular
location and certain time, the formation of spatial and temporal constraints
was discussed to use them in the access control policy. The characteristics of
the objects to be protected and the users were discussed and it was shown
how the permissions can be created using the resource object expressions and
the conditions in a role-centered manner. The chapter introduced the privilege
modes as a combination of video properties and actions that can be allowed
on the video data. The derivation of additional permissions from the explicitly
stated permissions was discussed. We then demonstrated that the access control
policies following our ROAMVS approach can be specified using XACML policy
language. Finally, a comparison of our approach with other existing approaches
was presented.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future
Directions
Modern video surveillance systems offer advanced functionalities such as auto-
matically detecting and tracking an object in the captured videos. The observers
may watch the captured videos not only in physically-controlled monitoring
rooms but may also access them ubiquitously over hand-held devices. Pervasive
use of such systems motivates the need for controlling access to the videos, in
order to avoid performing voyeurism and profiling an individual by those mon-
itoring the videos, thus protecting the privacy of people. In this context, a
multilevel dynamic access control mechanism was presented that provides ac-
cess to different levels of information to different users taking the contextual
information into account. This mechanism allows to make use of the privacy
enhancing techniques in an effective manner such that proportionate access of
data is available to the observers whenever required. This chapter summarizes
our research contributions and indicates some interesting directions in which
our work can be extended.
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6.1 Research Summary
In order to present an overall picture of security and privacy issues in video
surveillance, we have presented an abstract model to systematically identify the
security and privacy requirements in a video surveillance system. The two-stage
process in our model enabled to identify a comprehensive set of requirements in
all components of video surveillance, considering the perspective of each stake-
holder involved. Examination of existing solutions, in multimedia systems and
other relevant domains, against the identified requirements showed that these
solutions cannot be readily used in video surveillance and hence further re-
search efforts are required to devise security solutions in video surveillance. In
this context, we have outlined a number of future research challenges, regarding
confidentiality, integrity and access control, to be addressed for ensuring security
and privacy in video surveillance systems.
From the security challenges that we identified, we have worked on the chal-
lenge of providing sufficient need-specific access of data to the observers yet
protecting the privacy of people. We have proposed an access control model
that integrates RBAC and ABAC bringing together the advantages offered by
both models while addressing their limitations such as role-explosion. Though
the model was developed considering the requirements of video surveillance en-
vironments, we first built a general-purpose model so that it may also be used
in other applications sharing similar requirements. In the proposed model, the
attributes may be associated with users, objects and environment thus allow-
ing the request context to be considered when making access control decisions.
Unlike traditional RBAC approaches, permissions in our model consist of op-
erations and object expressions enabling content-based access control. We pre-
sented different request evaluation mechanisms that may be used by various
applications, depending on their requirements, and presented two different al-
gorithms to evaluate attribute-based requests using the proposed model. Our
approach allows the evaluation of attribute-based requests by merely consulting
the access control policy while retrieving the objects later only if the request is
granted. This is an important characteristic of the proposed AERBAC model as
a request may be denied without the overhead of retrieving the objects and the
attributes associated with the user and the environment. We also demonstrated
the merits of our model by comparing it with RBAC and ABAC using example
configurations and discussing each model against the features desired in access
control for video surveillance.
The proposed approach provides a comprehensive access control model offering
following features: (1) the model allows to specify the access control policies
based on the contents of the data to be protected. These content-dependent
authorizations enable denoting a number of objects using a single permission
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and permits to control access to objects which have not yet been created, based
on the attributes that they may possess at the time of creation. This is par-
ticularly helpful in applications which contain a large number of objects and
where the objects are added on a continuous basis, such as video surveillance
systems; (2) in order to fully incorporate contextual information, the proposed
approach allows to make context-aware decisions by associating attributes with
all three entities: users, objects and environment; (3) the conditions linked to
the permissions allow to specify constrained-permissions by using attributes of
users, objects and environment. In certain applications, it is needed to compare
values of object attributes and user attributes. Our approach allows to perform
direct comparison between the attributes of the users and the objects which
may significantly reduce the number of authorizations to be specified.
In order to meet the challenging requirements regarding specification and admin-
istration of data protection policies in video surveillance systems, we presented
a multilevel access control mechanism for video surveillance environments based
on our AERBAC model. In the process of creating resource object expressions,
the video metadata, including the contents of the video, is also considered which
allows representing a number of resource objects using a single permission. The
presented solution is unique in terms of being role-oriented yet allowing speci-
fication of metadata-based access control policy. The privileges devised in our
access control model are abstract and meaningful to interact with video surveil-
lance data. As video data contains multiple levels of information, the privileges
using our model may range from simply viewing the annotations associated
with a video to accessing full information in a video. The concept of using priv-
ilege modes as a combination of video properties and actions enables multilevel
access control without using negative authorizations. Besides role hierarchies,
the existence of hierarchical relations among the attributes and partial order in
the privilege modes allows derivation of further permissions from the explicitly
specified permissions; this enables a larger set of authorizations comprised of
relatively few authorizations. A prototype was implemented to show that the
access control policies in video surveillance system using our mechanism can
be specified via XACML, a standard policy specification language. Finally, a
comparison of our approach with other relevant approaches showed that our
mechanism is better-suited for video surveillance systems with respect to the
features required in access control for video surveillance.
6.2 Thesis Contributions
• The introduction of an abstract model that is useful for finding a com-
prehensive set of security and privacy requirements in video surveillance
systems.
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• The identification of several research challenges regarding confidentiality,
integrity and access control in video surveillance which are to be addressed
when designing security solutions for video surveillance systems.
• Introduction of an access control model that combines the features offered
by both RBAC and ABAC models and allows content-dependent policy
specification yet providing administrative benefits such as modification
visualization typically associated with RBAC.
• Evaluation of the AERBAC model against RBAC and ABAC models
showing that the role-explosion and permission-explosion issues are re-
solved in AERBAC while allowing to take the contextual information into
account.
• Development of a role-oriented multilevel access control mechanism for
video surveillance environments making use of the metadata information
associated with the resources.
• Implementation of the proposed access control mechanism using XACML
to demonstrate specification and evaluation of the access control policies
in video surveillance.
6.3 Future Research Directions
In this section, we provide a number of directions for extending the work pre-
sented in this thesis.
6.3.1 Administrative model
An interesting direction will be to develop an administrative model for our
AERBAC model, similar to ARBAC97 [123] defined for the RBAC model. The
administrative model would allow to specify policies for the administrative per-
sonnel who may assign and revoke the roles as well as other attributes associated
to the users, objects and environment. Some non-administrative users assuming
certain roles may also be allowed to activate few of the environment attributes,
the administrative model may also look into this aspect and allow specifying
policies for such actions.
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6.3.2 Formal Evaluation of AERBAC
In this thesis, we performed an initial evaluation of AERBAC against the RBAC
and ABAC models showing that AERBAC model provides certain benefits not
offered by either RBAC or ABAC while addressing the well-known problems of
role-explosion and permission-explosion in RBAC. However, a formal evaluation
of AERBAC against RBAC and ABAC requires significant research effort and
remains to be done. The formal validation may work on quantifying how useful
AERBAC is, compared to other models, in terms of expressiveness, granularity,
scalability, etc. Moreover, performance of decision making may also be measured
against other models for which a reference implementation of other models and
appropriate policies would be needed.
6.3.3 Extend with Break-glass
The model that we propose allows the users to access resources in case the user
holds certain attributes or if an environment attribute (e.g. occurrence of an
event) is currently activated. However, it may not be possible to specify all
the situations in the access control policy and there may be unknown critical
situations not modeled in the policy when a user needs immediate access of
relevant resources. Several techniques to incorporate break-glass in access con-
trol have been proposed [52, 30, 51]. Extending AERBAC with break-glass is
an appealing research direction. Normally break-glass access allows a user to
perform any action on any resources, though the user may be accountable for
his/her actions later. AERBAC may offer an attractive benefit over other ac-
cess control models in that it may restrict the break-glass access of a user to
the resources represented by the permissions specified in user’s roles rather than
giving unrestricted access to all resources. In case of break-glass access, a user
may be allowed to exercise those permissions existing in user’s roles even if the
conditions associated with the requested permissions are not fulfilled, since a
break-glass access is typically needed in case of an abnormal situation which
may not be represented by the specified conditions.
6.3.4 Continuous Enforcement
For continuous enforcement of access control, especially in case of access to live
videos, further work is required to extend the proposed model with usage control
mechanism [108] and enforcement mechanism for data streams [91, 90] such that
the attributes which can change after granting access may be specified at the
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policy level.
6.3.5 Provisioning and Disclosing of Attributes
Due to being a role-oriented approach, AERBAC can be used to specify con-
straints on provisioning of attributes to the users such that certain attributes
may or may not be assigned to users when assuming certain roles. Similarly,
in privacy-preserving authorization [11, 31, 154] where user needs to disclose
possession of certain attributes to an authority in order to prove his/her ac-
cess rights, constraints can be specified on roles stating which attributes can be
disclosed when assuming a certain role.
Appendix A
Legal Compliance
The legislation regarding video surveillance varies significantly in Europe as
well as the rest of the world [111]. Some countries, e.g., Canada and Italy, have
made regulations regarding usage of video surveillance by private and public
authorities; others such as France and China have regulations but they apply
mainly to private systems, while some countries, for example India, have no
particular laws in this regard. Video surveillance is primarily criticized as a
threat to privacy and hence it is mainly regulated in the context of privacy and
data protection. We also suggest certain guidelines in order to help those who
want to deploy video surveillance while least compromising the privacy of people
and complying with legal infrastructure.
A.1 Classification of Relevant Legislation
There could be several provisions related to video surveillance including privacy
protection, criminal proceedings, federal & state laws and retention period which
need to be consulted for employment of a video surveillance system in a particu-
lar country. We attempt to classify legislation regarding video surveillance into
different categories, in order to serve as a reference point to investigate what
relevant provisions are to be considered before deploying or for maintaining a
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video surveillance systems in a particular region of the world.
A.1.0.1 Privacy and Data Protection
Most of the countries recognize the right to privacy. In some countries, for
example the United States, where right of privacy is not recognized explicitly
in the constitution there exist court rulings which recognize this right implic-
itly linking it with other provisions in the constitution. Regulations regarding
privacy are particularly important in cases where specific regulations on video
surveillance are missing in legislation of a country.
A.1.0.2 Communication Interception
Some countries such as Canada and Denmark have made regulations over com-
munication interception, even by public or law enforcement authorities, and
require a court order before intercepting the communication of an individual
under surveillance. This court order is usually valid for a limited duration, few
days to few months, and the court may renew it depending upon the matter,
for example in criminal proceedings which could lead to prison of more than
two years, for which an individual is being surveilled. This type of legislation
is also particularly relevant if no or limited legislation exists regarding video
surveillance.
A.1.0.3 Exemption for Public Authorities
In some cases where the system is to be operated by the public or law en-
forcement authorities, there might exist exemptions in the legislation. These
exemptions may allow the authorities to perform communication interception
or operate video surveillance systems to keep an eye over the activities of the
general public or a specific target without any restrictions. For example, in
France Police is allowed to remotely access and collect information held on IT
systems.
A.1.0.4 Federal & State Laws
In countries such as the United States that consist of autonomous states/provinces,
one needs to consult federal as well as state regulations in the context of video
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surveillance. For example, few Canadian provinces have strict regulations and
guidelines prepared by the provincial privacy commissioners that are to be fol-
lowed by the private organizations who wish to deploy video surveillance systems
in publicly accessible areas such as shopping malls and super markets.
A.1.0.5 Regulatory Body
Many countries have a regulatory body (also called regulator, privacy commis-
sioner or data protection authority) to keep oversight of data protection prac-
tices being followed by the organizations that need to process personal data of
any form whether images captured through video surveillance systems or other
data such as medical and biometric data. In such countries, legislation might
require registering and/or obtaining prior permission from regulator before em-
ploying video surveillance system operated by public or private authorities. In
Spain, for example, the regulator requires an efficacy study of the system against
alternative methods to justify a video surveillance system.
A.1.0.6 Video Surveillance
The legislation of a country may include laws that apply explicitly to video
surveillance systems. The laws could be related to overt video surveillance
systems or could cover covert systems as well which are normally used by security
agencies or detectives in an investigation. Depending upon the video surveillance
system to be deployed, one needs to consult the legislation carefully whether
the laws apply to public authorities, private bodies or both. Countries such
as Canada and the Netherlands which have explicit regulations regarding video
surveillance often also include clauses about followings:
Notification: The requirement that the video surveillance system controller must
notify the public about the surveillance by displaying meaningful symbols.
Workplace Surveillance: There might exist laws that refrain or restrict the usage
of video surveillance systems over workplace to monitor employee performance.
Retention Period: The maximum time-limit for which the personal data or
images could be stored.
Privacy Safeguards: The requirements regarding masking, logging, access con-
trol and auditing mechanism that limit access to the surveillance data.
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Public Access to their Data: The law often requires that there must exist mech-
anism to allow people to access their images in a reasonable timeframe.
A.2 Legislation in Selected Countries
In this section, we summarize the legislation of Canada, the United States and
other selected countries in Europe [15] [111, 112] regarding privacy in video
surveillance systems in the light of classification of relevant legislation, described
in the previous section. We choose these countries because of two reasons.
First, video surveillance is widely available in these countries. Secondly, there is
sufficient information available regarding their regulations in English language,
from reliable sources. This summary is not supposed to be exhaustive and the
law of a country may include further requirements that are to be followed by
the organizations who perform video surveillance. But it serves to provide a
general idea.
A.2.0.7 Canada
1 No explicit right of privacy in Charter of Rights and Freedoms, although it out-
lines protection from unreasonable search and seizure which is often considered
to be applicable on informational privacy too
2 Communication interception requires court order
3 The federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documentation Act
(PIPEDA) also applies to video surveillance
4 Regulatory body does exist and has provided certain guidelines both for covert
and overt video surveillance performed by public and private sector
5 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signs
6 The signage should include the purpose of collection of video surveillance and the
organization’s privacy contact person
7 Video data should be kept only as long as necessary and must be destroyed when
no more required
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A.2.0.8 Denmark
1 The right of privacy is recognized in the constitution
2 Communication interception requires court order and the frequency of requests
and approval is quite high
3 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signs
4 In 2007, act on TV surveillance was amended enabling private sector to perform
video surveillance on their property which was previously not allowed
5 There exists a regulatory body, however, informing the regulator or taking ap-
proval is not required before installing video surveillance systems
6 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signs
7 Retention period for video data is not clearly stated, however, retention period
for other personal information is 12 months
A.2.0.9 France
1 Privacy right is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution but has been ruled
to be implicit
2 Police is allowed to remotely access, record, collect and transfer information held
on IT systems
3 Anti-terror act of 2006 authorizes private parties to install video surveillance on
places open to public and likely to be exposed to risks of aggression or theft
4 Regulatory body exists and authorization from regulatory body is required be-
fore installing video surveillance systems . However, it has limited powers over
activities of government
5 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signs
6 Retention period for video data is not clearly stated, however, retention period
for other personal information is 12 months
A.2.0.10 Italy
1 No explicit protection of privacy in the constitution, though protections for com-
munication and home are there
2 Pre-emptive communication interception may occur at the discretion of Attorney
General
3 Strong regulatory authority exists
4 Video surveillance in public places is permitted only if it is proportionate to
the pursuing objectives and should only be activated when other measures are
inadequate
5 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signage
6 Storage of images should be limited in time
A.2.0.11 Netherlands
1 The right of privacy is recognized in the constitution
2 Communication interception requires court order
3 Video surveillance in public places requires informing the regulator in advance
4 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signs
5 Video data could be retained for upto four weeks
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A.2.0.12 Norway
1 Constitution does not include a specific privacy clause
2 Communication interception requires judicial warrant, however, bugging conver-
sations of criminals by police is relaxed
3 Regulator operates under ministry of Government Administration but is generally
considered independent
4 There is no requirement to inform regulatory body in case of non-recorded video
surveillance. However, for recorded video surveillance, the regulatory body has
to be informed which has the power to prohibit video surveillance
5 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signs
6 No data retention law exists
A.2.0.13 Spain
1 The right of privacy is recognized in the constitution
2 Communication interception does not required court order
3 Video surveillance can only be used when other proportionate methods are not
available
4 Video surveillance has to be reported to regulator who will assess its justification
5 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signs
6 Video data has to be removed after one month
A.2.0.14 United Kingdom
1 No constitutional right of privacy
2 Communication interception does not require court order rather ministerial ap-
proval is enough
3 Surveillance can be done by Police, local authorities or private sector
4 Regulator has been granted greater powers and fining capacities
5 It is obligatory to inform public about video surveillance via signs
6 Video data could be retained for two years
7 Although video surveillance code of practices exist but they have no legal binding
A.2.0.15 United States
1 No right to privacy in constitution, though court has ruled linking it with other
provisions
2 Data Privacy Act protects records held by public authorities, but no comprehen-
sive data protection law for private sector exists
3 Federal Trade Commission issued self-regulating privacy guidelines, however, it
has no authority to enforce privacy rights
4 No federal law regarding video surveillance exists. Video surveillance laws in
different states vary, for example, in New York video surveillance can only be
conducted by the police while in Arizona one can use video surveillance at a
public place without posting a notice to inform public
5 No data retention law exists
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A.3 Guidelines
Many public and private organizations have provided certain guidelines regard-
ing deployment and maintenance of the video surveillance systems. Some focus
only on public sector and law enforcement agencies, e.g, guidelines given by
Beech et al. [140], while others target both public and private organizations
which are using video surveillance systems, e.g., [49]. Whether these guidelines
are legally binding or not depends on the fact whether they have been pro-
vided by a private organization or a public authority, for example, there exist
certain guidelines in Canada regarding video surveillance which are provided
by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and hence are legally binding. Here
we combine the guidelines for employing video surveillance, provided by Euro-
pean Data Protection Supervisor [49], Privacy Commissioner of Canada [110],
and Constitution Project [140] – a non-government organization in USA. These
recommendations, albeit not guarantee to avoid breach of law, ensure that the
impact of video surveillance on privacy is minimized and therefore may help
achieving the compliance with the privacy legislation in a particular country.
1. Establish a lawful reason for conducting video surveillance and use video
surveillance only for that purpose
2. Determine whether a less privacy-invasive alternative to video surveillance
would meet the requirements
3. Perform the cost-benefit analysis, comparing the alternative means of ad-
dressing the stated purpose of the system
4. Build privacy into the system design and address data protection issues
on early stage
5. Assess the impact of system on privacy and freedom of individuals
6. Consult the regulatory authority – if any – and other stakeholders of the
system, for example employee representative in case of workplace moni-
toring
7. Determine whether live monitoring without recording is enough, otherwise,
store the recorded images securely and destroy them after a specified time
(one week in most of the cases)
8. Provide public notices about the surveillance
9. Devise a mechanism to give individuals access to data about them
10. Create technological and administrative safeguards to reduce the possibil-
ity of misuse and abuse of the system
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11. Provide training to the system operators and educate them on obligation
to protect the privacy of individuals
12. Maintain a secure log in order to keep track of the activities performed by
the system operators
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